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Action is my middle name








As thousands of  commuters will testify, fellow humans can both amaze and irritate. Empathy 
and aggression are everywhere. This ostensible positive versus negative dichotomy of  social 
interaction is all-encompassing. As an echo of  the diversity of  social life, one could also look 
at the online world. The videos that people watch represent the sharp contrast in pro- and 
antisocial interaction. ‘Hooligans fighting’ is one click away from ‘humans are awesome’. 
Similarly, websites range from crowd-funding a treatment for a child with a rare disease to 
hate-filled gatherings of  angry and confused people. 
We, Homo sapiens, are a social species. We spend our entire lives in a vast social environment. 
From our homes to our schools, from our work to our online life, it revolves around interaction 
with other people. Humans have a fundamental ‘need to belong’ (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
Indeed, loneliness has a profound effect on emotion, cognition and physiology (Hawkley & 
Cacioppo, 2010), and can even lead to cardiovascular problems (Cacioppo et al., 2002) and 
depressive symptoms (Cacioppo, Hughes, Waite, Hawkley, & Thisted, 2006). On the other 
hand, when two or more individuals interact a complex interplay between expression and 
perception of  emotional signals occurs. This will lead to a cascade of  positive and negative 
behavioral consequences. A simple heuristic is to view social interaction as a scale with each 
side representing the positive and negative aspect that shift the overall balance over time. The 
most striking ones are empathy- and aggression-related. We help each other, but also kill each 
other. Or, pertaining more to daily life, you can feel fear and show a freezing response when 
threatened, feel angered and react aggressively when you are wrongfully accused, or feel 
sympathy and offer help when observing the distress signals of  a person in need. 
Needless to say, understanding the mechanisms underlying social interaction is of  crucial 
importance to society. The study of  brain processes underlying social interaction will not 
only provide fundamental insight into human nature, it will offer new ways of  predicting and 
manipulating human behavior (Stanley & Adolphs, 2013). The goal of  this thesis is to provide 
insight into the neural mechanisms underlying both the negative and positive consequences 
of  social interaction. The negative social interactions (part I) in this thesis comprise the 
perception of  and reaction to threat signals, fear and anger, and dominance behavior, while 
the positive social interactions (part II) convey the perception of  and reaction to signals of  
distress and helping behavior. In short, how do we perceive and react to threat and distress? 
The social situations in this thesis range from prototypical expressions to complex social 
interactions, from a threatening individual to an emergency situation with multiple bystanders 
to a violent conflict between individuals. In the remainder of  this chapter, the research topics 
will be introduced and a foundation for the work in this thesis will be provided. A theoretical 
framework, a brief  review of  the neural networks involved, as well as the aims of  the separate 




While humans are social animals, we do not live in an evolutionary vacuum. The behavioral 
patterns studied in this thesis are not uniquely human. Precursors to human social behavior as 
well as homologous behavior are observed across the animal kingdom (Darwin, 1872/2009; 
Panksepp, 1998). Indeed this is the case for negative aspects, e.g., defensive, aggressive, and 
dominance behavior (Eibl Eibesfeldt, 1977; Mazur & Booth, 1998; N. McNaughton & Corr, 
2004), as well as for positive aspects such as (rough-and-tumble) play (Panksepp, Siviy, & 
Normansell, 1984; S. M. Pellis & Pellis, 1998), and even functional altruism (de Waal, 2008; 
2015; Preston & de Waal, 2002). A large body of  knowledge, derived from diverse research 
domains, provides evidence for the notion of  phylogenetically ancient mechanisms underlying 
the positive and negative aspects of  social interaction. 
Emotions are the building blocks of  social interaction. Throughout this thesis it will be 
stressed that the crucial aspect of  any social emotional situation is the individual’s response. 
The emotional value, whether psychological constructs (Barrett et al., 2007) or natural kinds 
(Panksepp, 2007), signals the relevance of  a situation or interaction to the observer who 
then either approaches or avoids the situation. This approach versus avoidance distinction 
serves as a common theme throughout this thesis, both for the positive and negative social 
interactions. Action is the middle name of  emotion and social interaction. What are some 
of  the important proximate mechanisms? How do we get from perception to action? In the 
following section, the Defensive or Fight/Freezing/Flight System, and the Dual-Process 
Sequential Opponent Motivational System, will be briefly described. Together these systems 
help explain the occurrence of  approach and avoidance behavior in situations as diverse as a 
confrontation with an aggressive individual to the observation of  distress in an older woman. 
Fight, flight, or freeze
From startle responses to noise blasts, to arm movements to protect the body, to clenched fists 
and dominance postures, defensive behaviors, actions that are to protect the individual, occur 
in the response to a variety of  situations. In response to physical threat (ball thrown) as well as 
social threat (angry person). The majority of  these responses are innate or unconditioned. For 
example, rats that never encountered a cat show freeze and avoidant responses when placed 
in a room with a cat (R. J. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1971). Defensive behavior is the results 
of  two systems. The first categorical system, approach versus avoidance, is complemented by 
a second system, defensive distance (N. McNaughton & Corr, 2004). While the former deals 
with fight, freeze and flight responses to threat, the latter deals with the perceived intensity of  
threat as a function of  distance. Reactions to threat are a direct consequence of  both systems. 
For defensive avoidance, medium intensity threat at intermediate distance results in flight, 
while the same situation results in a freezing response when flight is not available. Defensive 
attack occurs in the face of  high intensity threat at close distance. A similar division can be 




while medium intensity threat at a further distance results in risk assessment (N. McNaughton 
& Corr, 2004). Importantly, this translational model of  defensive responses maps onto 
human behavior (R. J. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989). Not only provide humans answers in 
response to hypothetical threat that correspond to the defensive system found in animals (D. 
C. Blanchard, Hynd, Minke, Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001), similar behavioral responses or 
proxies of  have been observed (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). For example, 
a freezing response, as defined by reduced body sway and hear rate deceleration has been 
observed in response to facial signals of  anger (Roelofs, Hagenaars, & Stins, 2010) and films 
negative in valence (Hagenaars, Roelofs, & Stins, 2014). Similarly, an approach-avoidance 
contingency (fight-flight) has been described in humans in response to a variety of  situations 
(Bradley et al., 2001; Carver, 2006; van Honk & Schutter, 2007). The confrontation with social 
emotional situation (threat, distress) induces a cascade of  physiological changes (Panksepp, 
1998; Preston & de Waal, 2002), that prepare the individual to respond adaptively. One such 
mechanism is preparation for action (de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004; 
Frijda, 1986; Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014; Hajcak et al., 2007; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, 
& Hamm, 1993; Schutter, Hofman, & van Honk, 2008b), a process that, as will be shown, 
allows the individual to deal with incoming threat and extend the behavioral repertoire.
Sympathy versus Distress
A related model focused on the positive dimension, the Dual-Process Sequential Opponent 
Motivational System (W. G. Graziano & Habashi, 2010; W. G. Graziano & Tobin, 2009), 
helps explain the occurrence of  prosocial behavior. This system nicely incorporates findings 
in the literature on threat and defensive behavior (N. McNaughton & Corr, 2004), motivation 
(Solomon, 1980; Solomon & Corbit, 1974), and parental care (Preston, 2013). When an 
individual is confronted with distress in the environment, two interrelated, but opposing, 
systems are activated. The first and fastest system (process A) overlaps with the Fight/Freezing/
Flight System. When activated the individual will feel distress and the behavioral response 
is limited due to the occurrence of  a freezing response. Under these conditions helping and 
other prosocial behaviors do not occur. Over time a second, but slower, evolutionary conserved 
motivational system, linked to parental care is activated. This system (process B) opposes the 
inhibitory function of  process A and is related to feelings of  sympathy. A stronger activation 
of  this system will increase the likelihood of  prosocial behavior. Crucially, these opposing 
feelings, sympathy versus distress, are observed in concert in the individual when confronted 
with an emergency. It is the net sum of  these two systems that determines the behavioral 
probability. This model is in line with the distinction between sympathy and personal distress 
in terms of  motivation (C. D. Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). Sympathy is an other-
oriented response and comprises feelings of  compassion and care for another individual, 
while personal distress is a self-oriented response and relates to feelings of  discomfort and 
distress in the observer. The dual-process system suggests that both sympathy and personal 
distress occur in every individual and, as will be shown, this explains a variety of  phenomena 
ranging from contextual effects to inter-individual differences.
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The brain and social emotional situations
The brain is a tool to predict and react to present and future situations (for example Schacter, 
Addis, & Buckner, 2007). While previous studies take the perspective of  distinct social or 
emotional brain regions, this thesis adopts a different approach and studies the close interplay 
between action and social and emotional processes by stressing the reactive aspect of  social 
interaction. Or as stated elsewhere:
Our perspective is that social interaction abilities are part and parcel of  the 
evolutionary endowment of  the species. The consequence of  this is that the 
neuroscience community needs to confront the fact that the brain’s natural task 
is thus not labeling prototypical emotions but registering and responding to the 
interactive emotional coloring that is part of  daily communication 
– de Gelder and Hortensius, 2014, p. 161
There is no social brain. Likewise, there is no emotional brain. Brain regions serve multiple 
functions. Indeed, this is reflected in large-scale automated term-based meta-analytic brain 
activation maps that were created using the ‘Neurosynth’ database (http://neurosynth.org), 
a large database on the inference of  concepts on brain regions derived from the literature 
using text-mining and meta-analysis (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 
2011). Forward inference maps of  the terms ‘social’, ‘emotion’, and ‘action’, indicating the 
likelihood of  activation if  a study uses the term, show largely overlapping maps (Figure 1A). 
The activation of  a variety of  occipital, parietal and pre(frontal) regions provides evidence for 
a functional convergence of  social, emotional and action processes. Importantly, several key 
regions such as the amygdala (AMG), the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and secondary 
motor areas are activated in at least two maps. In this section several important regions and 
networks combined into a working model will be described, partly based on the dual route of  
affective perception (de Gelder, Hortensius, & Tamietto, 2012), a framework that highlights 
the importance of  conserved neural mechanisms in the expression and perception of  social 
emotional signals, and reaction to these salient signals.
While the model in de Gelder, Hortensius and Tamietto (2012) deals with bodily expressions 
of  emotion, a similar model has been described for facial expressions (de Gelder & Rouw, 
2001; Vuilleumier, 2005). It is likely that aspects of  the dual route of  affective perception 
deal with visual emotional signals per se rather than distinct categories (Dalgleish, 2004; 
Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010), and this provides a suitable starting point for the work presented 
in this thesis. When confronted with a threatening or distressed individual, social emotion 
information is processed in a detection and recognition route. These routes correspond to a 
dorsal and ventral division in the brain (see Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; Goodale & Milner, 




– pulvinar (Pulv) – AMG, and dorsal stream– orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) pathway with or 
without primary visual cortex input, and sustains early emotion processing. This is followed 
by late emotion processing in the AMG, OFC, posterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula 
and somatosensory regions. This rapid detection and integration of  the social emotional 
information provides the input for reflexive defensive behavior mediated by the periaqueductal 
gray (PAG), putamen, and caudate nucleus. The second and parallel route is important for 
recognition and reflective action. Regions in the ventral stream, such as the extrastriate body 
area and superior temporal sulcus, together with the frontal-parietal attention network and 
frontal-parietal action network sustain a slower more careful analysis of  the social emotional 
situation. This dual route of  affective perception corresponds to a rough division in terms 
of  reflexive and reflective processes. Together with other accounts (Grezes:2014hu; Grèzes, 
Adenis, Pouga, & Armony, 2013a) and recent evidence (de Gelder et al., 2004; M. I. Garrido, 
Barnes, Sahani, & Dolan, 2012; Grèzes, Pichon, & de Gelder, 2007; Grosbras & Paus, 2006; 
Pichon, de Gelder, & Grèzes, 2008; 2009; 2012; Rudrauf  et al., 2008), it proposes that 
reactions to social emotional situations can be automatic, mediated by the first route, or 
the end result of  a more deliberate mechanism driven by the second route. Shortcut exists 
between routes that allow the second route to trigger more reflexive action via part of  the first 
route and vice versa. Thus, everything in between reflexive and reflective action is possible. 
Several key regions that were activated in the term-based meta-analytic maps, but were 
previously not described in the dual route of  affective perception (de Gelder et al., 2012), 
warrant discussion. While the regions highlighted above provide the framework for perception 
to action, these additional regions, the MPFC and clusters in secondary motor areas, extend 
the dual route perspective in important ways. 
Using the well documented connections between the AMG and motor cortical areas (for 
example Avendaño, Price, & Amaral, 1983; H. T. Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, & Barbas, 2007; 
Llamas, Avendaño, & Reinoso-Suárez, 1985), Grèzes and colleagues (2014) studied the possible 
existence of  a homologous pathway in humans. They showed direct anatomical connections 
between the AMG and primary and secondary motor areas. This pathway provides a direct 
way for the AMG to influence ongoing behavior that extend beyond reflexive reactions, but is 
still relatively independent from cognitive influences. Motor cortical areas have reliably been 
activated in response to social emotional information (for a review see Grèzes & Dezecache, 
2014). Both studies that measured activation (Conty, Dezecache, Hugueville, & Grèzes, 
2012; de Gelder et al., 2004; Grèzes et al., 2007; Grèzes, Adenis, Pouga, & Armony, 2013a; 
Pichon et al., 2008; 2009; 2012), as well as those that directly probed the human motor cortex 
(Baumgartner, Willi, & Jäncke, 2007; Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2012; 2014a; 
2014b; Coelho, Lipp, Marinovic, Wallis, & Riek, 2010; Coombes et al., 2009; Enticott et al., 
2012; Giovannelli et al., 2013; Hajcak et al., 2007; Schutter et al., 2008b; van Loon, van den 
Wildenberg, van Stegeren, Hajcak, & Ridderinkhof, 2010), provided evidence for the notion 
of  preparation for action. For example, Schutter and colleagues (2008b) briefly presented faces 
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with a fearful, happy or neutral expressions to participants while simultaneously measuring 
motor corticospinal excitability levels. Results indicated that facial signals of  fear selectively 
increase motor corticospinal excitability levels. This has been interpreted as a preparatory 
response (Hajcak et al., 2007). This action readiness or preparatory response is not limited 
to confrontations with threat, but is also likely to occur when confronted with the distress 
of  another individual (Preston & de Waal, 2002). Indeed, motor corticospinal excitability 
levels increase both for negative and positive valenced pictures of  affect (vanLoon:2010dg; 
Hajcak et al., 2007), showing the possible existence of  a general preparatory mechanism. A 
review of  premotor cortex activation in response to emotional displays of  threat found mean 
coordinates corresponding to the ventral/dorsal premotor (PM) border (Grèzes & Dezecache, 
2014). Stimulation of  this region in monkeys results in movement to defend the body (Cooke 
& Graziano, 2004), and a general role in organization of  defensive behavior including 
safeguarding of  interpersonal space has been described (M. S. A. Graziano & Cooke, 2006). 
Another region that is connected to the AMG and PAG among other regions (Gabbott, 
Warner, Jays, Salway, & Busby, 2005) and plays an important role in the translation of  the 
perception of  the social emotional situation to adaptive reactions is the MPFC. This region 
of  the prefrontal cortex has been described as the visceral motor cortex (Neafsey, Terreberry, 
Hurley, Ruit, & Frysztak, 1993) and sustains situation-response coupling (W. H. Alexander & 
Brown, 2011; Euston, Gruber, & McNaughton, 2012). After initial processing by other nodes 
of  the network, this region triggers the response in the individual based on previous experience 
with the situation and other contextual information. Together, the described neural network 
provides the necessary computations for behavioral reactivity to confrontations with salient 
situations (Figure 1B).
Outline of  this thesis
As the goal of  this thesis is to provide insight into the neural mechanisms of  social interaction, a 
multidimensional framework is used. Naturalistic stimuli together with a variety of  techniques 
from experimental and social psychology, and affective and social neuroscience are used to 
approximate and study the natural richness of  social emotional life. Together these studies 
eventually work towards a novel understanding of  active and everyday social interaction both 
positive and negative in nature (de Gelder & Hortensius, 2014).
The first part, chapter 2 – 4, focuses on the negative aspects of  social interaction. How is 
the human brain evolutionary endowed to cope with threat? While most of  us would argue 
to be rational beings, our daily life suggests otherwise. The majority of  behavioral reactions 
to situations serve as a function of  evolutionary conserved mechanisms. Chapters 2 and 3 




Figure 1. The neural system for perception of  and reaction to social emotional situations. Meta-analytic brain 
activation maps for the terms ‘social’, ‘emotion’, and ‘action’ (A) and working model (B). Automated term-based meta-analytic brain 
activation maps were created and downloaded from the ‘Neurosynth’ database (http://neurosynth.org) on August 16 2015. The 
terms are automatically extracted from scientific articles and reflect the topic under study and can be used to create meta-analytic 
maps. The maps are based on 1000 studies for ‘social’, 790 studies for ‘emotion’, and 708 studies for ‘action’. P(Activation|Term) 
is reported and maps are corrected at p < .01 FDR. Only some of  the relevant regions are labeled and color-coding denotes term-
based maps and overlap. The working model (based on de Gelder et al., 2012) describes two parallel routes that mediate perception-
to-action. The first route corresponds to detection of  the signal and rapid reflexive reaction, while the second route plays a role in 
recognition and deliberate and reflective reactions. Attention and perception-action coupling lie on the border between the detection 
and recognition route. SMA: supplemental motor area, dMPFC: dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, vMPFC: ventral medial prefrontal 
cortex, PAG: periaqueductal gray, AMG: amygdala, PM: premotor cortex, SC: superior colliculus, Pulv: pulvinar, OFC: orbitofrontal 
cortex, AI: anterior insular, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex.
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of  the observer. Related, chapter 4 investigates the processing of  social threat after damage 
to a key region in the described neural pathway, the amygdala. Together, this part focuses on 
the first route of  the working model and the defensive or Fight/Freezing/Flight system.
Chapter 2 investigates defensive behavior in response to threat directed towards or away 
from the individual. Both the perceptual and reactive consequences of  threat direction are 
assessed. Single-pulse TMS, to assess motor corticospinal excitability as indexed by motor 
evoked potentials (MEPs) amplitude, is complimented by an explicit recognition task. 
Do both these measures serve as a function of  threat direction? Importantly, do motor 
corticospinal excitability levels only increase when threat is directed towards the observer or 
is there a general defensive mechanism that is activated regardless of  threat direction? Taking 
into account the personality of  the observer, chapter 3 focuses on reflex-like dominance 
behavior in response to facial and bodily displays of  threat. Facial and bodily expressions 
play an important role in forming and maintaining patterns of  dominance and submission. 
Gaze-aversion from these signals is measured in an interactive eye-tracking task to test the 
hypothesis if  dominant individuals show similar reflex-like gaze behavior to non-conscious 
confrontations with bodily expressions of  anger as to facial expressions of  anger. In a follow-
up study the need for detection and recognition of  threat in the occurrence of  dominance 
behavior is established. The last chapter of  the first part, chapter 4, describes a unique 
report on social threat perception after bilateral damage to the amgydala. While previous 
studies have defined the amygdala as one homogenous structure, it can and needs to be 
further divided into at least three anatomical subnuclei each with a distinct functional role. In 
this study, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is used to test deficits in functional 
segregation as well as integration in the processing of  social threat in five participants with 
Urbach-Wiethe disease. As a result of  this genetic disorder all five participants have a lesion 
in the basolateral amygdala (BLA), a part of  the amygdala with crucial contributions to the 
processing of  threat. Functional analysis and connectivity analyses are used to investigate the 
neural signature of  a deficit in ignoring threat signals. 
Diverging the attention to positive aspects of  social interaction, the second part, chapter 
5 – 7, reports on studies that investigate the reaction to distress and helping behavior in a 
variety of  contexts. When asked almost everybody will say she or he will provide help when 
confronted with a future emergency situation. While mentally a hero, we often refrain from 
helping in real-life. One such example is the bystander effect, the decrease in helping behavior 
when several onlookers are present during an emergency (Darley & Latané, 1968). While this 
effect has been extensively studied from a situational approach in the last ~50 years (Fischer 
et al., 2011), several aspects remain ill understood. Chapter 5 and 6 provide insights into 
neural mechanisms and dispositional factors that play an important but often neglected role 
in the occurrence of  the bystander effect. In chapter 7 predictions derived from the previous 
two chapters were tested. This last part deals with the interplay of  route I and II, as well as 




Chapter 5, reports on the first ever fMRI study on the bystander effect. Participants 
performed a color-naming task while implicitly observing an emergency situation in which 
the number of  bystanders was parametrically varied. This study tests the novel hypothesis 
if  an increase in group size during an emergency will decrease activity in regions important 
for preparation for action. Chapter 6 is a follow-up study that investigates dispositional 
and situational factors that influence the occurrence of  helping behavior. In a series of  four 
experiments, the influence of  sympathy and personal distress on responding to an emergency 
with bystanders is investigated. To this goal, a novel cued-reaction time task was created that 
allows the measure of  preparatory responses as a function of  the emergency situation. At a 
later stage a cognitive load manipulation is added to test the influence of  cognitive processes 
on the ostensible relation between personal distress and the negative effect of  bystanders. 
This is complemented with a direct measures of  the motor system using single-pulse TMS. 
Overall it is hypothesized that personal distress, but not sympathy, will be related to a negative 
effect of  bystanders. In the final chapter of  the second part, chapter 7, the previous two 
studies are combined to investigate the prediction of  helping behavior during a violent 
conflict. Importantly, this chapter goes beyond the status quo and pays tribute to the notion 
that interactions are in essence affective loops. Therefore, Immersive Virtual Reality (IVR) 
was used. IVR is a state-of-the-art technique that allows researchers to create ecologically 
and methodologically sound environments to study complex social behaviors under strict 
control (Blascovich et al., 2002). This chapter examines if  individual differences in reflexive 
behavioral reactivity to an emergency situation can be used to predict later helping behavior 
during a violent conflict between an aggressor and victim. In addition, the relation between 
self-reported decision-making style and helping behavior is assessed. Proxemics measurement, 
interpersonal distance to the victim and aggressor, is also used to allow for a throughout 
analyses. 
In Table 1 an overview of  the individual chapters and research topics is presented. A general 
discussion on the empirical findings of  the first and second part of  the thesis with theoretical 
implications will be provided in chapter 8. Moreover, several directions for the future of  






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Devil - Threat

Doorslaggevende plekken in een individuele anatomie? In de eerste plaats het hoofd, of  liever 
de schedel, dat geheel van botten dat het instrument om de wereld waar te nemen beschermt. 
Het is echter niet de intelligentie of  het uitzonderlijke abstractievermogen maar het eenvoud-
ige, oude afweermechanisme tegen de buitenwereld, de nog in die intelligentie aanwezige 
stoffelijke, dierlijke afweer die beschermd moet worden. Voor een analfabeet of  iemand die 
niet kan rekenen, kan het hoofd toch nog de doorslaggevende plek zijn, zolang hij een ge-
weer kan pakken en de bajonet van de kolf  en de trekker van de loop kan onderscheiden. 
Het hoofd zit bomvol vermogens en verassende omwegen – een stadsplattegrond waarop de 
steegjes tot in het oneindige uitwaaieren – maar wat telt is de hoofdweg: we hebben een brein 
om ons niet te laten doden. Dat vereist maximale vaardigheden van onze vijanden. Laten we 
het niet ingewikkeld maken, dacht Lenz in stilte. Het brein heeft, als je het nader bekijkt en 
echt begrijpt de vorm en de functie van een geweer, meer niet. 
  
– G.M. Tavares - Leren bidden in het tijdperk van de techniek, 2012

Chapter 2
When anger dominates the mind - 
Increased motor corticospinal excitability in the face of  threat
This chapter is in revision as:
Hortensius R, & de Gelder B & Schutter DJLG. When anger dominates the mind – Increased 
motor corticospinal excitability in the face of  threat.




Threat demands fast and adaptive reactions that are manifested at the physiological, 
behavioral and phenomenological level and reckon with the direction of  threat and severity 
to the individual. Here, we investigated the effects of  threat directed towards or away from the 
observer on motor corticospinal excitability and explicit recognition. Sixteen healthy right-
handed volunteers completed a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) task and a separate 
three-alternative forced-choice emotion recognition task. Single-pulse TMS to the left primary 
motor cortex was applied to measure motor evoked potentials from the right abductor pollicis 
brevis in response to dynamic angry, fearful or neutral bodily expressions directed towards 
or away from the observer. Results showed that motor corticospinal excitability increased 
independent of  direction of  anger compared with both fear and neutral. In contrast, anger 
was better recognized when directed towards the observer compared with when directed 
away from the observer, while the opposite pattern was found for fear. The present results 
provided evidence on the differential effects of  direction and threat on explicit recognition 
and motor corticospinal excitability. In the face of  threat motor corticospinal excitability 
increased independently of  the direction of  anger, indicative of  the importance of  more 
automatic reactions to threat. 
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Introduction
Evolution created several coherently operating neural systems that help orchestrate 
and coordinate perceptual, behavioral, and physiological changes that promote 
survival in the face of  danger 
– Panksepp, 1998, p. 206
In the human brain both subcortical and cortical areas underlie defensive mechanisms when 
confronted with threat (de Gelder et al., 2004; Mobbs et al., 2007; Panksepp, 1998; Pichon et 
al., 2012). Adaptive reactions to threat depend on a balance between these areas (for example 
van Honk, Harmon-Jones, Morgan, & Schutter, 2010). Emotional reactions to threat, such 
as anger and fear are influenced by several factors, such as personality and interpretation 
(Dill, Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1997; P. Hall & Davidson, 1996; Wilkowski, Robinson, 
Gordon, & Troop-Gordon, 2007). Furthermore, we decode and interpret threatening signals 
in a contextual setting (Kret & de Gelder, 2010; Righart & de Gelder, 2008a; 2008b; Sinke, 
Van den Stock, Goebel, & de Gelder, 2012; Van den Stock, Vandenbulcke, Sinke, & de 
Gelder, 2014a). 
Previous research mainly looked at the processing of  threat signals without taking into account 
the observers’ perspective. Studies looked at threat per se rather than threat directed towards 
or away from the observer, which may introduce ambiguity of  the threatening stimulus. The 
fearful face can, for instance, be interpreted in at least two ways: Fear as a consequence of  a 
threat in the environment or as a consequence of  an action of  the observer. One way to take 
into account for the perspective of  the observer is the use of  gaze direction (Hadjikhani, Hoge, 
Snyder, & de Gelder, 2008; Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000; N’Diaye, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 
2009).
For facial expressions of  threat, gaze permits to disentangle the relevance with respect to the 
observer. A fearful facial expression with averted gaze signals a possible imminent threat in the 
environment, similar to an angry facial expression with direct gaze that signals direct threat to 
the observer. In line with this, angry faces with direct gaze and fearful faces with averted gaze 
are recognized faster (Adams & Kleck, 2003), rated as more intense (Adams & Kleck, 2005; see 
also Hess, Adams, & Kleck, 2007; N’Diaye et al., 2009; Sander, Grandjean, Kaiser, Wehrle, 
& Scherer, 2007) and enhance rapid reactions to facial expressions (Soussignan et al., 2013). 
An fMRI study found increased activation to fearful facial expressions with averted compared 
to directed gaze not only in brain areas important for stimulus detection, but also action 
preparation (premotor and motor areas) (Hadjikhani et al., 2008). Similar results have been 
found when manipulating the relevance of  angry bodily expressions (Grèzes, Adenis, Pouga, 
& Armony, 2013a; Grèzes, Philip, Chadwick, Dezecache, Soussignan, et al., 2013b). Similar 
to a dynamic dual route perspective of  affective perception (de Gelder et al., 2012), Grèzes 
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and colleagues (2013a) showed that a first network encompassing the premotor area, inferior 
frontal gyrus, amygdala and temporal pole, is not necessarily modulated by relevance, but is of  
particular importance for rapid detection and responses to threat (Grèzes, Adenis, Pouga, & 
Armony, 2013a). The second, frontal-based, network is relevance-dependent and is suggested 
to code for somatic consequences of  the emotional state in the observer and subsequent 
response selection. As the direction to and distance from the observer is of  importance for 
emotional memory and the behavior consequence (fight, flight or freezing) of  the perceived 
threat (Åhs, Dunsmoor, Zielinski, & LaBar, 2015; R. J. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989), we 
aimed to extend previous findings by using the direction of  the action as communicated by 
movement to investigate the effect of  threat directed towards or away from the observer, on 
the level of  physiology and explicit recognition.
To directly quantify the effect on motor corticospinal excitability levels when an individual 
is confronted with threat, we used single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). 
When applied to the primary motor cortex (M1), motor neurons can be stimulated by 
delivering a strong, brief  magnetic pulse to the scalp, leading to a motor evoked potential 
(MEP) that indexes motor corticospinal excitability (Hallett, 2000). Early findings by Fadiga 
and colleagues (1995) that action observation increased motor corticospinal excitability 
were extended by a later study showing effects of  self-induced happiness and sadness on 
motor corticospinal excitability levels (Tormos, Cañete, Tarazona, Catalá, & Pascual-Leone, 
1997). Indeed, motor corticospinal excitability levels have successfully served as a proxy for 
emotion-related action mechanisms in a variety of  studies (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 
2005; Baumgartner et al., 2007; Borgomaneri et al., 2012; Coelho et al., 2010; Coombes 
et al., 2009; Enticott et al., 2012; Giovannelli et al., 2013; Hajcak et al., 2007; Overeem, 
Reijntjes, Huyser, Lammers, & van Dijk, 2004; Schutter et al., 2008b; van Loon et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, Schutter, Hofman and van Honk (2008b) showed that fearful facial expressions 
selectively increase motor corticospinal excitability suggesting increased action preparedness 
when confronted with threat (Hajcak et al., 2007). 
In the present study we used single-pulse TMS to study the physiological consequence of  
threat directed towards or away from the observer. We showed participants dynamic video 
clips of  social threat, with fear and anger as threat signals and measured motor corticospinal 
excitability levels and explicit recognition. The goal of  our study was to address the question 
if  motor corticospinal excitability levels and explicit recognition were directly related to 
the direction of  threat. We anticipated that anger directed towards the observer and fear 
directed away from the observer is better recognized than vice versa. Importantly, can this 
incongruence effect be observed in changes in motor corticospinal excitability levels? More 
specifically, do motor corticospinal excitability levels only increase when anger is directed 
towards the observer and fear is directed away from the observer?




Participants were recruited by advertisements around the Utrecht University campus and 
by means of  word-of-mouth. Eighteen healthy right-handed volunteers (twelve women, four 
men), aged between 18 and 24 years, participated in exchange for course credits or payment. 
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no contraindications for non-
invasive brain stimulation (Keel, Smith, & Wassermann, 2001) or history of  psychiatric or 
neurological disease. None of  the participants were regular smokers or were on medications, 
except for women using oral contraceptives (n = 10). All participants received written and oral 
information prior to the study, but remained naïve about the aim of  the study, and provided 
written informed consent. Stimulation parameters were in agreement with the International 
Federation of  Clinical Neurophysiology safety guidelines (Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, Pascual-
Leone, Safety of  TMS Consensus Group, 2009) and the study was approved by the medical 
ethics committee of  University Medical Center Utrecht and Utrecht University, Utrecht, the 
Netherlands, and was carried out in accordance with the standards set by the Declaration of  
Helsinki.
Stimuli
Dynamic emotional expressions directed towards or away from the observer were recorded as 
part of  the creation of  a larger stimulus database containing facial and bodily expressions (see 
Kret, Pichon, Grèzes, & de Gelder, 2011). In order to achieve natural expressions of  emotions 
during the recording, actors read short emotion-inducing stories, were shown pictures of  
emotional scenes, and were coached throughout the recordings. Eight male actors expressed 
anger or fear towards or away from the observer by means of  a forward or backward jump. 
Thus, we were able to create congruent and incongruent expressions of  the emotion. In the 
congruent condition anger is expressed towards the observer (forward jump), while fear is 
expressed away from the observer (backward jump). In the incongruent condition, anger is 
expressed away from the observer and fear is expressed towards the observer. It is important 
to note that the perspective of  the observer defines the direction of  threat. Thus, the angry or 
fearful individual was moving towards the, or away from, the observer by means of  a jump. 
Threat was always directed at the observer as the actor had directed gaze and a frontal body 
orientation. Only the direction of  the jump differed between the threat directed towards and 
away the observer, as all other aspects were held constant. To allow controlling for movement, 
a neutral expression was also included. For each actor and emotion two different versions 
were recorded. Actors were dressed in black and filmed against a green background in a 
recording studio under controlled and standardized lighting conditions. Video clips (2s) were 
edited using Adobe After Effects CS5 (Adobe Systems Inc., San Jose, CA, USA). Faces were 
masked with Gaussian mask in order to focus on information communicated by the body. 
Duration of  the clip was reduced to 300ms since previous studies found an increase in motor 
corticospinal tract excitability 300ms after stimulus onset (Oliveri et al., 2003; Schutter et al., 
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2008b). The Video shows examples of  the stimuli used.
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Motor Evoked Potentials
A biphasic Neopulse magnetic brain stimulator (maximum output 4160 A peak/1750 VAC 
peak) with a modified 8-shaped iron core coil (Neopulse, Atlanta, GA, USA) was used for 
stimulation over the left M1. Motor evoked potentials were recorded with active Ag-AgCl 
electrodes (11 x 17mm) using an ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, the Netherlands) 
from the right abductor pollicis brevis (APB) in a belly-tendon montage with the active 
electrode placed at the muscle belly of  the right APB and the reference electrode located at 
the proximal phalanx of  the thumb (Baumgartner et al., 2007; Hajcak et al., 2007; Schutter 
et al., 2008b). The ground electrode was attached to the wrist. Sampling rate was set at 2048 
Hz and the signal was offline high-pass filtered (3dB cutoff frequency: 20 Hz, roll-off: 24 dB/
octave).
Procedure
After explanation of  the procedure by the experimenter, the participants provided written 
informed consent and answered several standard questions on present physical and mental 
well-being (including, hours of  sleep and alcohol intake in last 24 hours, and current 
emotional state) as an additional check for exclusion criteria. Next, participants were seated in 
a comfortable dentist chair with their arms placed on the upper leg with the palm of  the hand 
facing upward. Electromyogram electrodes were attached and the resting motor threshold of  
the left hemisphere was assessed (mean±SD percentage of  maximum output: 49.21±7.04%), 
using the standardized visual thumb movement procedure (Schutter & van Honk, 2006). 
A passive viewing task was used and participants were instructed to relax their body, not 
focus on their hands, and fixate on the fixation cross shown continuously during the task. 
Single-pulse TMS over left M1 at an intensity of  120% MT was applied 300ms after stimulus 
onset. After completion of  the TMS procedure, participants indicated the emotion (fear, 
anger or neutral) of  the presented stimulus in a separate three alternative forced-choice task. 
Stimuli (16 per condition) were presented in random order with a fixation cross (TMS: 4800 
– 5200ms; emotion recognition: 1000 – 1500ms) in between. Upon completion, participants 
were debriefed and received payment. 
Video. Scan the QR code to see examples of  the stimuli.
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Data reduction and analysis
Data of  two participants were removed due to noisy EMG signals and excessive muscle 
artifacts. MEP was quantified as the peak-to-peak amplitude (>50μV) of  the maximal EMG 
response. Every trial was visually inspected and was done blind to the stimulus condition. 
Trials containing excessive background EMG and MEPs <50μV or outside of  the expected 
time window were removed. Mean±SD percentage of  included trials per condition across 
participants was 91.28±14.06%. As the data was significantly non-normal distributed, 
D(16) = 0.26, p = .004, MEPs were transformed into z-scores based on individual mean and 
standard deviation (cf. Burle, Bonnet, Vidal, Possamaï, & Hasbroucq, 2002; van Loon et al., 
2010). In addition, mean rectified baseline EMG activity was epoched from 1010ms to 10ms 
prior to the TMS pulse in order to examine the possible effect of  baseline EMG activity on 
the MEP (Orban de Xivry, Ahmadi-Pajouh, Harran, Salimpour, & Shadmehr, 2013).
For the emotion recognition data, we calculated the recognition accuracy (percentage correct) 
for each emotion as a function of  direction. In addition, for each emotion an incongruence 
effect was calculated by subtracting recognition accuracy of  expressions directed away 
from the observer from recognition accuracy of  expression directed towards the observer. 
A positive value indicated better recognition when the emotion is expressed towards the 
observer, whereas a negative value indicated better recognition when the emotion is expressed 
away from the observer.
A general linear model (GLM) for repeated measurements with direction (2) and emotion (3) 
as within subject factors, was applied to both the TMS and emotion recognition data. Paired 
samples t tests were performed for post-hoc testing. The alpha level of  significance was set at 
0.05 (two-tailed) throughout. 
Results
Motor corticospinal excitability
Stimulation was well tolerated by all subjects and no side effects were reported. No significant 
main effect for direction was observed, F(1, 15) = 0.10, p = .76, whereas a significant main 
effect was found for emotion F(2,30) = 3.60, p = .04, ηp2 = 0.19 (Figure 1A). The two-
way interaction between direction and emotion was not significant, F(2, 30) = 0.23, p = 
.80. Post-hoc tests show that MEP amplitude was increased independent of  direction for 
anger (mean±SEM z-transformed MEP amplitude: 0.12±0.05) compared with both fear 
(-0.08±0.05) and neutral (-0.03±0.04), t(15) = 2.47, p = .03, d = 0.62 and t(15) = 2.14, p = 
.05, d = 0.54 respectively. No difference was observed between fear and neutral expressions, 
t(15) = 0.57, p = .58. MEP amplitude differed only from zero for anger, t(15) = 2.66, p = .02, d 
= 0.67, and not for fear or neutral, t(15) = -1.70, p = .11 and t(15) = -0.79, p = .44 respectively. 
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These effects could not be explained by condition-specific effects on baseline EMG activity, 
since no main effect of  direction, F(1,15) = 2.04, p = .17, emotion, F(2, 30) = 1.29, p = .28, or 
interaction between direction and emotion was found, F(2, 30) = 2.25, p = .15. Similar results 
were obtained after controlling for percentage of  trials removed (centered), F(2,28) = 4.62, 
p = .02, ηp2 = 0.25, with an increase in MEP amplitude for anger independent of  direction 
compared with both fear, p = .007, and neutral, p = .05. 
Explicit recognition 
A main effect for direction, F(1, 15) = 34.13, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.70 and emotion, F(2, 30) = 11.51, 
p = .006, ηp2 = 0.34, was found. In addition, an interaction between direction and emotion was 
observed, F(2, 30) = 127.12, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.89 (Figure 1B). Recognition accuracy of  angry 
expressions was higher when directed towards the observer (mean±SEM percentage correct: 
89.84±1.88%) compared with away from the observer (38.67±4.16%), t(15) = 11.56, p < .001, 
d = 2.89. The same pattern was observed for neutral expressions (towards: 87.50±5.71%, and 
away: 78.91±6.09%), t(15) = 3.67, p = .002, d = 0.92, whereas the opposite was found for 
fearful expressions (towards: 70.31±3.20%, and away: 94.53±1.12%), t(15) = 7.77, p < .001, 
d = 1.94. The incongruence effect was most profound for angry expressions (mean±SEM 
towards – away difference: 51.17±4.43) compared with fearful (24.22±3.12; reversed), t(15) = 
4.83, p < .001, d = 1.21, and neutral expressions (8.59±2.34), t(15) = 9.04, p < .001, d = 2.26. 
The incongruence effect for fearful expression was significant higher compared with neutral 
expressions, t(15) = 4.39, p = .001, d = 1.10.
Assessment of  response patterns in the incongruent conditions showed that when directed 
away from the observer, anger (mean±SEM percentage of  answers: 38.67±4.16%) was more 
likely to be confused with fear (41.02±4.60%) than with neutral (20.31±3.05), t(15) = 3.14, 
p = .007, d = 0.78 (Figure 1C). No confusion was observed for fear directed towards the 
observer (70.31±3.20%), with no difference between percentage of  anger (12.11±2.77%) and 
neutral responses (17.59±3.39%), t(15) = -1.03, p = .32).
In a separate behavioral study (n = 27) we replicated the effects on explicit recognition. An 
interaction between direction and emotion was observed, F(2, 52) = 139.07, p < .001, ηp2 = 
0.84, with recognition of  angry (towards: 84.49±2.17%, away: 43.06±3.54%, t(26) = 11.78, 
p < .001, d = 2.27) and fearful expressions (towards: 69.91±2.16%, and away: 92.36±1.98%, 
t(26) = 9.31, p < .001, d = 1.79) showing opposite results. Anger directed away from the 
observer was likely to be confused with fear (35.19±3.17%) than with neutral (21.76±2.66), 
t(26) = 2.88, p = .008, d = 0.56. In this sample, fear directed towards the observer was more 
likely to be confused with neutral (20.83±2.03%) than with anger (9.26±1.81%), t(26) = 3.64, 
p = .001, d = 0.70.
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Discussion
The goal of  the present study was to measure the influence of  direction of  threat from the 
perspective of  the observer using measures of  motor corticospinal excitability and explicit 
recognition. Interestingly, motor corticospinal excitability levels were independent of  direction 
of  anger. However, explicit recognition results showed an incongruence effect for fearful and 
angry actions. Anger directed towards the observer was recognized better compared to anger 
directed away from the observer, while the opposite pattern was found for fearful expressions. 
The results concur with evolutionary accounts on emotion (Darwin, 1872/2009), and 
highlight the emotion-action link (Frijda, 1986). The influence of  threat can be observed at 
three interrelated levels in the organism; perception, behavior, and physiology (Panksepp, 
1998). Effective threat processing depends on the ability to perceive threat as such, and the 
consequent physiological changes that eventually would lead to adaptive behavior. Threats in 
the environment lead to a cascade of  reactions in the observer, preparing possible behavioral 
Figure 1. The effect of  direction of  threat on motor corticospinal excitability levels and explicit recognition 
accuracy. MEP amplitude did increase for anger independent of  direction (A). Recognition accuracy was higher for angry 
expressions directed towards the observer, and fear expressions directed away from the observers (B). Inset shows the incongruence 
effect. Anger directed away was confused with fear, while no clear confusion was observed for fearful expressions (C). 
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consequences (Frijda, 2010), such as startle responses (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990), fast 
facial reactions (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998), and changes in heart rate (F. K. Graham & 
Clifton, 1966). What mechanism and neural network underlie these initial reactions?
The dynamic dual route perspective of  affective perception suggests that one route underlies 
early emotion processing that results in reflexive action, while a cortical-based network 
underlies recognition and action representation and leads to voluntary behavior (de Gelder 
et al., 2012). Importantly, a network consisting of  the periaqueductal gray, hypothalamus, 
amygdala, the premotor cortex and pre-supplementary motor area mediates behavioral 
reactions of  the individual when confronted with a threatening situation (de Gelder et al., 
2004; Grèzes et al., 2007; Grèzes, Adenis, Pouga, & Armony, 2013a; Grosbras & Paus, 
2006; Pichon et al., 2008; 2009; 2012). Directly comparing the neural network underlying 
perception of  fear and angry bodily expressions, Pichon, de Gelder & Grèzes (2009) found 
that angry expressions activated a wider range of  regions such as the premotor cortex. This 
result fits with our observations in the present study. The confrontation with a conspecific 
displaying anger could directly activate a reflexive mechanism in the observer. Similar to 
that in monkeys (for example Avendaño et al., 1983) a direct amygdala-motor network has 
recently been found in humans (Grèzes et al., 2014). This network would allow for relatively 
direct activation of  the motor system without top-down influences in the face of  threat. 
This view is in agreement with the activation of  this network independent of  relevance of  
(Grèzes, Adenis, Pouga, & Armony, 2013a) and attention to (Pichon et al., 2012) angry bodily 
expressions.
Preparation for defensive reactions not only needs to be relatively independent of  attention 
and other cognitive processes, but it needs to be early and fast as well. Based on previous 
research (Oliveri et al., 2003; Schutter et al., 2008b), we stimulated the motor cortex 300ms 
post-stimulus onset and found a selective increase for angry bodily expressions. Interestingly, 
Borgomaneri, Gazzola & Avenanti (2014a) showed that at 150ms post-stimulus onset, motor 
corticospinal excitability increased only for stimuli negative in valence, while at 300ms post-
stimulus onset, it increased for both stimuli negative and positive in valence (Baumgartner 
et al., 2007; see also Borgomaneri et al., 2012; Borgomaneri, Vitale, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 
2015b; Coombes et al., 2009; Hajcak et al., 2007). In contrast, Schutter, Hofman and van 
Honk (2008b) found that fearful, but not happy or neutral faces increased motor corticospinal 
excitability as measured at 300ms after stimulus onset. So far, the temporal dynamics of  the 
influence of  emotional signals on motor corticospinal excitability remains elusive. 
The observation of  no effect of  fearful bodily expressions towards or away the observer on 
motor corticospinal excitability levels, is not necessary in contradiction with a previous study 
showing a selective increase for static fearful facial expressions (Schutter et al., 2008b). Next 
to differences in terms of  communicative value and immediacy between faces and bodies 
(de Gelder, 2009), static versus dynamic emotional signals (Grèzes et al., 2007), proximate 
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versus distal threat (Mobbs et al., 2007), contextual differences in relevance and threat value 
(Mobbs et al., 2010), could explain the difference in results. In the present study, angry bodily 
expressions could have had the highest relevance to the participant and the highest threat 
value compared to fearful and neutral expressions. In the previous study by Schutter and 
colleagues (2008b), but also in other studies using bodily expressions (Borgomaneri et al., 
2012; 2015b; Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2014b; Borgomaneri, Vitale, & Avenanti, 
2015a) fear was the emotional signal with the most relevance and threat value compared 
to happy and neutral signals. In other words, anger stands out more in the present study, 
while fear stands out in the previous study. To counteract potential and unwanted effects of  
relevance and threat value, future studies should carefully consider which emotional signals 
to include and compare among. For example, by directly comparing signals of  fear and anger 
(Pichon et al., 2009; 2012).
An additional question is at what moment in time information of  direction, relevance and 
other contextual factors are combined. Early contextual effects (115- 160ms post-stimulus 
onset) on the processing of  emotion signals have been reported (Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, 
& de Gelder, 2005; Righart & de Gelder, 2008a). Interestingly, a recent study that combined 
EEG and fMRI, showed that while processing in the amygdala of  emotional content was 
independent of  gaze and gesture, these factors are integrated at the level of  the premotor 
cortex already 200ms after stimulus onset (Conty et al., 2012). In contrast, our results show 
that direction of  anger is not affecting motor corticospinal excitability when stimulating at 
300ms post-stimulus onset. Again the two dual routes already mentioned could underlie 
this difference. Angry bodily expressions trigger activation of  the first network, which is 
independent of  direction, and result in activation of  preparatory processes. It is important to 
note that these two networks do not necessarily have to be exclusive in terms of  brain regions. 
The crucial distinction is that in one network contextual information is taken into account, 
while in the other, it is not. The present results of  increased motor corticospinal excitability 
even if  the angry person is jumping away from you, might also reflect aberrant activation of  
preparatory responses. It is possible that top-down influences might counteract this initial 
process. These questions warrant further testing by probing the primary motor context at 
different time points.
The pattern of  results found for explicit emotion recognition suggests that activation in the 
second network could underlie these results, as explicit recognition presumably uses different 
processing resources than the reactive aspect (for example de Gelder et al., 2012). Explicit 
processing may tap into more cognitive-related processes. It takes the form of  categorization 
(e.g., is it an angry, fearful or neutral person? How angry is the person?), instead of  a binary 
response (e.g., threat or no-threat? Is this something that I need to act upon?). In line with 
previous modulation by relevance (Grèzes, Adenis, Pouga, & Armony, 2013a), activation 
in regions of  this network reflects the direction of  threat. During explicit recognition and 
categorization of  bodily expressions, the direction of  the movement in reference to the 
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observer is taken into account. The explicit recognition results are in line with a prototypical, 
but context-dependent, distinction between approach and avoidance tendencies and 
anger and fear. From the perspective of  the individual expressing the behavior, anger can 
be viewed as a manifestation of  approach-related behaviors, while fear can be viewed as 
a manifestation of  avoidance-related behaviors (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-
Jones, 2003; Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2013; Wilkowski & Meier, 2010). This division might 
also be apparent at the perceptual level. Participants perceiving the emotional signal might 
be more inclined to respond with the label fear if  an emotional movement is directed away 
from them and the label anger if  the emotional movement is directed towards them. Indeed, 
categorization of  angry facial expression is facilitated when accompanied by an approach 
movement (Adams, Ambady, Macrae, & Kleck, 2006) and approach-related movements are 
faster for angry facial expressions (Wilkowski & Meier, 2010). Importantly, as suggested by 
the present experiment these effects are dependent on the context. For example, only when 
approach was linked to aggression did anger enhance approach movements (Krieglmeyer & 
Deutsch, 2013). 
Of  importance for future research are personality and other individual differences in the 
processing of  threat in contextual settings. For example, violent offenders are more influenced 
by an irrelevant angry bodily expression when recognizing happy faces (Kret & de Gelder, 
2013). Interestingly, people with a history of  exposure to violent crimes compared to people 
with no history showed increased reaction times to threat directed towards them (Fernandes 
et al., 2013). Incorporating the perceptual and personality domain, a recent TMS study 
showed that interhemispheric connectivity was related to an attentional bias to angry facial 
expressions and to an aggressive personality style (Hofman & Schutter, 2009). As effects of  
personality on motor corticospinal excitability levels have also been reported (Wassermann, 
Greenberg, Nguyen, & Murphy, 2001), future studies may incorporate measures of  aggression- 
and/or anxiety-related traits in the study of  perception and interpretation of  threat and the 
occurrence of  defensive and/or aggressive behavior. 
In conclusion, the present study showed that the direction of  threat influenced motor 
corticospinal excitability and explicit recognition differently. Importantly, motor corticospinal 
excitability increased independent of  direction of  anger, while explicit recognition was 
directly related to the direction of  the emotional signal. This suggests that in the face of  
threat, a rapid mechanism is activated to cope with the incoming threat that is independent 
of  explicit recognition.




Trait dominance promotes reflexive staring at masked angry body postures
This chapter is published as:
Hortensius R, van Honk J, de Gelder B & Terburg D (2014). Trait dominance promotes re-
flexive staring at masked angry body postures. PLoS ONE, 9:e116232.




It has been shown that dominant individuals sustain eye-contact when non-consciously 
confronted with angry faces, suggesting reflexive mechanisms underlying dominance 
behaviors. However, dominance and submission can be conveyed and provoked by means 
of  not only facial but also bodily features. So far few studies have investigated the interplay 
of  body postures with personality traits and behavior, despite the biological relevance and 
ecological validity of  these postures. Here we investigate whether non-conscious exposure 
to bodily expressions of  anger evokes reflex-like dominance behavior. In an interactive eye-
tracking experiment thirty-two participants completed three social dominance tasks with 
angry, happy and neutral facial, bodily and face and body compound expressions that were 
masked from consciousness. We confirmed our predictions of  slower gaze-aversion from 
both non-conscious bodily and compound expressions of  anger compared to happiness in 
high dominant individuals. Results from a follow-up experiment suggest that the dominance 
behavior triggered by exposure to bodily anger occurs with basic detection of  the category, 
but not recognition of  the emotional content. Together these results suggest that dominant 
staring behavior is reflexively driven by non-conscious perception of  the emotional content 
and triggered by not only facial but also bodily expression of  anger.
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Introduction
A proud man exhibits his sense of  superiority over others by holding his head and 
body erect. He is haughty (haut), or high, and makes himself  appear as large as 
possible; so that metaphorically he is said to be swollen or puffed up with pride
– Darwin, 1872/2009 p. 142
Social dominance is often established and maintained through direct gaze and sustained 
eye-contact. The mechanism underlying such staring-contest behavior is fundamental to the 
establishment of  social hierarchies and is found in humans and other primates (Mazur & 
Booth, 1998; Terburg, Hooiveld, Aarts, Kenemans, & van Honk, 2011). Dominance and 
submission are, however, not exclusively conveyed or provoked through facial features. One 
only has to imagine the figure of  an approaching person in a dark alley to appreciate that 
body language might be an important factor in dominance-submission interactions. Indeed, 
briefly adopting a high-power pose may lead to dominance-related changes such as increased 
testosterone and decreased cortisol levels, heightened risk-taking, and increased feelings of  
power (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010). In the observer, the perception of  a threatening bodily 
expression can subsequently trigger neural mechanisms underlying automatic defensive 
action (de Gelder et al., 2004; Pichon et al., 2012).
The relation between sustained eye-contact and personality traits of  dominance resembles 
a non-conscious reflex-like mechanism (Terburg et al., 2011; Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 
2012a). Despite the ecological validity and biological relevance of  body postures (de Gelder, 
2009), surprisingly few studies have been conducted on their interplay with personality traits 
and behavior. Here we aim to fill this gap by investigating whether angry bodily expressions 
that are not perceived consciously evoke reflex-like dominance behavior similar to the staring-
contest as was shown previously with slower gaze-aversion from angry compared to happy 
faces (Terburg et al., 2011; Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 2012a). Given the strong link between 
aggression and dominance (Mazur & Booth, 1998), and the notion that physical aggression 
is acted out with the body, we expect that these gaze-aversion effects will generalize to bodily 
dominance-cues.






Thirty-two healthy individuals (sixteen females), aged between 19 and 26 years, participated 
in exchange for course credit or eight Euros. The study received approval from the internal 
faculty board (Human Biopsychology and Psychopharmacology) at Utrecht University. 
Participants were unaware of  the aim of  the study, and provided written informed consent. 
The research was conducted according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of  
Helsinki. 
Stimuli and tasks
The same angry, happy and neutral facial expressions (five male, five female actors) from 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976) were used as in Terburg et al. (2011; 2012a). A mask was made 
from cut-up and randomly reassembled faces. Angry, happy and neutral bodily expressions 
(five male, five female actors) were taken from the Tilburg Stimulus Set (van de Riet, Grèzes, 
& de Gelder, 2009). The neutral control expression was an instrumental action (cf. making 
a telephone call). All three expressions were well recognized in a separate group of  students 
(n = 24; mean±sd percentage correct for angry: 91.30±2.29, happy: 98.26±0.81, neutral: 
97.39±1.57). In addition to the isolated facial and bodily expressions, we tested if  the effects 
were generalizable to full emotional expressions including facial and bodily signals. Therefore 
we constructed face-body compounds (Meeren et al., 2005) by combining these expressions 
(Figure 1). Using Photoshop CS2 (Adobe Systems Inc., San Jose, CA, USA) faces from the 
MacBrain Face Stimulus Set were carefully resized and positioned on top of  the body using 
realistic proportions (face-body ratio of  1:7). Contrast and brightness of  the face was adjusted 
to match the values of  the body. Only congruent compounds were created (e.g. angry face 
with angry body). The mask for bodily and compound expressions consisted of  a scrambled 
image of  all stimuli combined.
We used a procedure similar to Terburg and colleagues (2011). Participants performed three 
eye-tracking tasks with faces, bodies or face-body compounds as target stimuli. Face-only and 
body-only tasks were tested first (counterbalanced across participants). The compound task 
was presented last to prevent the more complex stimuli from interfering with their simpler 
counterparts due to repetition effects. In each trial a gray pre-mask with a central fixation-
cross (random interval between 1000–1500 ms) preceded a red, green or blue emotional 
target-stimulus (angry, happy or neutral), followed by a post-mask of  similar luminance and 
color. In order to prevent habituation to the masking, different versions of  the masks were 
used. We selected a target presentation time of  14ms (van Honk, Peper, & Schutter, 2005), 
because the previously reported effects of  trait dominance on gaze-aversion were observed 
exclusively in individuals that were fully unaware of  the masked facial emotions (Terburg et 
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al., 2011) and bodily expressions are confidently detectable at presentation durations of  33ms 
(Stienen & de Gelder, 2011).
Participants’ task was to avert gaze as fast as possible to one of  three circles below the stimulus 
with the same color (Figure 2A). The emotional expressions were presented in a fixed 
sequence, repeated five times (NxxyNyyxNNyyxNxxyN; N = neutral; x and y = angry or 
happy counterbalanced over participants), in order to ensure that all successive trial-types 
occurred equally often (Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 2012a). Before the onset of  each task, 
participants performed 10 neutral practice trials. Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch CRT 
monitor. The session was concluded with three 30-trial awareness checks, with the stimuli 
presented in the same manner as the social dominance task, but with the instruction to 
identify the emotion of  the masked target in a 3-alternative-forced choice design (3AFC).
Trait dominance
Participants completed the Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS) (Carver & White, 1994), as 
a measure of  trait dominance and non-dominance related reward sensitivity. The BAS 
questionnaire consists of  three subscales: fun-seeking (BASF; e.g., “I will often do things for 
no other reason than that they might be fun”), drive (BASD; e.g. “I go out of  my way to 
get things I want”), and reward responsiveness (BASR; e.g. “It would excite me to win a 
contest”). These subscales have successfully been used to distinguish between dominance 
(BASD and BASR) and non-dominance related reward sensitivity (BASF) (Carver & White, 
1994; Terburg et al., 2011).
Data analysis.
Gaze latencies (time between target onset and first gaze on target-circle) were recorded with a 
Figure 1. Examples of  an angry, happy and neutral face-body compound expressions. 
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Tobii X120 binocular eyetracker sampling at 120 Hz (Tobii Technology, Danderyd, Sweden). 
Latencies shorter than 100ms or more than 3SDs from the individual’s mean within each task 
were discarded, and mean latency was computed for each emotional condition in each task, 
and used for further analysis.
Dominance-related BAS scores were calculated by combining the scores on the drive and 
reward-responsiveness BAS scale, rs(32) = .67, p<.001 (Terburg et al., 2011). Non-dominance 
related BAS scores were defined as the score on the fun-seeking BAS scale. Dominance and 
non-dominance related BAS scores were not significantly related, rs(32) = .13, p = .48.
Individuals who scored significantly above chance-level (>14 correct; chance level = 10 
correct on 30 trials; binomial test with one-tailed α = .05) on the objective awareness-check 
were excluded from further analyses (face: null, body: three, compound: five). Using a 
general linear model (GLM) for repeated measurements, we tested for each task separately if  
emotional expression influenced gaze duration. In line with previous studies (Terburg et al., 
2011; Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 2012a), linear regression analyses were used for the three 
tasks separately on the angry-happy contrast with dominance and non-dominance related 
BAS-scores as predictor variables.
Figure 2. Illustration of  the social dominance task and results. Outline of  the social dominance task (A). Dominance 
increases gaze duration to angry bodily and compound expressions, but not to facial expressions (B). Part A is adapted from Terburg 
et al. (2011).
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Results
No main effect of  emotion was found for facial, F(2,62) = 1.00, p = .37, bodily, F(2,56) = 1.31, 
p = .28, or compound expressions, F(2,52) = 0.02, p = .98. Significant regression models were 
observed for bodily, F(2,26) = 9.16, p = .001, R2 = .41, and compound, F(2,24) = 3.47, p = 
.05, R2 = .22, but not for facial, F(2,29) = 1.11, p = .35, R2 = .07, expressions. Consistent with 
our predictions, slower gaze-aversion from angry compared to happy bodily expressions was 
positively related to dominance traits (β = .48, p = .005) and negatively to non-dominance 
related reward sensitivity (β = −.57, p = .001; Figure 2B). These results were similar when 
two individuals with bias scores >±150ms were removed, F(2,24) = 9.39, p = .001, R2 = .44, 
with dominance traits (β = .40, p = .02) and non-dominance related reward sensitivity (β = 
−.65, p<.001) as predictors. Dominance traits also positively predicted gaze-aversion from 
angry compared to happy compound expressions (β = .44, p = .02), but non-dominance 
related reward sensitivity did not contribute significantly to this model (β = .15, p = .40). 
Discussion
As hypothesized, we observed slower gaze-aversion from non-conscious angry compared to 
happy body postures in relation to dominance traits. This effect was similar for body and 
compound stimuli and is in line with previous studies using face stimuli presented at a longer 
stimulus duration (Terburg et al., 2011; Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 2012a). This suggests a 
robust effect of  body-evoked dominance behavior. However, in the present study we did not 
observe the same effect with face stimuli. Importantly, the present and previous (Terburg et al., 
2011) study were similar except for presentation duration of  the target stimuli. In the previous 
study the faces were presented for 33ms and the dominance effect was exclusively found in 
the participants, about two-thirds of  the sample, that were fully unaware of  the emotional 
content of  the stimuli (Terburg et al., 2011). Crucially, although faces (but in general not their 
emotional expression) are detectable at 33ms, they are fully undetectable at 14ms (Williams et 
al., 2004). Body postures, but again not their emotional expression, might have been detected 
at such short durations. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the reflexive dominance behavior 
we observe in our experiments depends on some form of  basic detection of  the stimuli. We 
therefore tested the hypothesis that at 14ms presentation duration bodies are detectable, but 
faces are not.






Twenty healthy individuals (ten females) aged between 18 and 24 years participated in 
exchange for course credit. The participants did not take part in the social dominance 
experiment and were unaware of  the aim of  the study.
Stimuli and tasks
Participants performed eight short experiments in which they had to detect the occurrence 
of  a target-stimulus (detection task) or recognize the target-emotion (emotion recognition 
task). We used four different stimulus durations (10/14/20/28 ms). Refresh rate of  the CRT 
monitor was adjusted with respect to the duration of  the stimulus (i.e. for a stimulus duration 
of  10 and 20ms the refresh rate was changed to 100 Hz). Duration and target-stimulus were 
counterbalanced across participants. The same stimuli and trial procedure were used as in 
the social dominance task. Either faces or bodies served as target-stimuli. In each trial a 
gray pre-mask preceded a colored target-stimulus (happy, angry, or neutral expression), which 
was followed by a post-mask of  similar color, shown until response. In the detection task 
participants indicated if  they had seen the target-stimulus (yes/no), while in the emotion 
recognition task the participants indicated the emotion. In the detection task 50% of  the trials 
contained no stimulus. For each condition twelve trials were shown, with a total of  576 trials 
in the detection task and 288 trials in the emotion recognition task.
Data analysis
For the detection task we calculated the d-prime (d’), which measures the distance between 
signal and noise (D. M. Green & Swetz, 1966). With a d’ of  0 the individual cannot discriminate 
between signal and noise, whereas a d’ of  1 suggests medium performance and a d’ of  4.65 
suggests optimal performance. The d’ is calculated with the following formula:
d’ = F-1 (H’) - F-1 (FA’)
We used the formula proposed by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) to calculate corrected hit 
rate (H’) and corrected false alarm rate (FA’) out of  the hits (h), correct rejections (cr), misses 
(m) and false alarms (f):
H’ = (h + 0.5) / (h + m + 1)
FA’ = (f  + 0.5) / (f  + cr + 1) 
To test differences in detection (d’) between facial and bodily expressions at different stimulus 
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durations, a general linear model (GLM) for repeated measurements with stimulus-type (2) 
and duration (4) as within subject factors was used. A similar approach was used for emotion 
recognition (number of  trials correct). In addition, we tested if  emotion recognition for each 
target-stimulus was significantly different from chance level at each duration (36 trials in total 
per target-stimulus per duration, chance level = 12) by means of  one sample t-test. Post-hoc 
paired samples t tests were Bonferroni-corrected.
Results
Detection
A main effect of  type of  stimulus was found, F(1,19) = 17.82, p<.001, ηp2 = 0.48. Post-hoc 
t-tests showed that the d’ for bodies was significantly higher compared to faces at all durations 
(p’s≤.01). Furthermore, the d’ for bodies was significantly different from zero at all durations 
(p’s≤.008), whereas the d’ for faces was only significant from zero with a duration of  28ms 
(p = .04). A main effect of  duration, F(3,57) = 6.15, p = .006, ηp2 = 0.25 was observed. The 
overall d’ at 28ms was significantly higher compared to 14 ms, t(19) = −3.42, p = .02. No 
significant interaction between type of  stimulus and duration was observed, F(3,57) = 0.06, p 
= .98. Table 1 reports the d’ values across conditions.
Emotion recognition
Number of  trials correct differed between type of  stimulus, F(1,19) = 5.70, p = .03, ηp2 = 0.23. 
Participants had more trials correct when recognizing bodily (14.01±0.87) compared to facial 
(11.70±0.26) expressions. Importantly, for both target-stimuli the number of  trials correct at 
each duration was not significantly different from chance-level (12 correct; p’s>.22), except 
for a marginally significant difference for bodies presented at a duration of  14ms (p = .06). 
No main effect of  duration was observed, F(3,57) = 0.26, p = .85. Furthermore, no significant 
interaction between type of  stimulus and duration was found, F(3, 57) = 0.69, p = .56. Table 
1 reports the number of  trials correct across conditions.
Discussion
As expected, with none of  the presentation durations were the participants able to recognize 
the emotional expression of  the masked faces or bodies. In contrast, stimulus detection 
performance was different for faces and bodies. Results showed medium performance for body 
detection, but detection of  faces was only significantly different from zero at a presentation 
time of  28 ms. The latter result suggests that the faces in the social dominance experiment 
remained undetected. Moreover, although their emotional expressions were successfully 
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masked, the bodies in the social dominance experiment, as well as the faces in our previous 
experiments (Terburg et al., 2011; Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 2012a), were most likely 
detectable.
General Discussion
In the present study we investigated whether dominant individuals exhibit reflex-like gaze 
behavior when confronted with bodily anger. In support of  our hypothesis we show for both 
bodies, and compounds, a positive relationship between trait dominance and slower gaze-
aversion from non-consciously processed angry compared to happy expressions. The results 
from the control experiments suggest that the absence of  gaze-aversion effects with facial 
expressions in the present experiment may be related to the fact that faces, but not bodies, 
are undetectable at presentation times of  14 ms. It is important to note that in the social 
dominance task using bodies or faces, the stimulus property that varies and therefore needs 
to be masked is the emotional expression (Van Selst & Merikle, 1993). Given that emotional 
expressions were successfully masked in the present as well as in previous studies using this 
task (Terburg et al., 2011; Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 2012a), the results point at non-
conscious effects of  facial (previous study) and bodily (present study) anger on dominance 
behavior, that is, in the absence of  critical awareness of  the emotional content (Van Selst & 
Merikle, 1993).
Bodily expressions signal intentions and actions, and have been suggested to automatically 
trigger action responses (de Gelder, 2009). They activate subcortical mechanisms (de Gelder 
et al., 2004; Pichon et al., 2012) associated with early emotional processing and reflexive 
action (de Gelder et al., 2012). Recent evidence on the combination of  dominance traits, 
electrophysiology, endocrine functions and behavioral responses to facial anger suggests that 
staring-behavior for dominance is rooted in a relatively increased subcortical over cortical 
processing mode (Hofman, Terburg, van Wielink, & Schutter, 2013), and mediated by the 
steroid hormone testosterone (Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 2012a) (Terburg & van Honk, 
Table 1. Results for detection and emotional recognition tasks
10 ms 14 ms 20 ms 28 ms
Detection 
Faces -0.03±0.06 0.04±0.05 0.16±0.08 0.43±0.15
Bodies 0.98±0.25 1.02±0.28 1.22±0.28 1.47±0.37
Emotion recognition 
Faces 11.90±0.43 11.70±0.42 11.45±0.44 11.75±0.50
Bodies 13.45±0.89 14.15±0.80 14.00±1.03 14.45±1.20
Mean ± standard error d’ reported for detection; mean ± standard error number of  trials correct reported for emotion recognition.
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2013). Involvement of  testosterone in staring-contests has also been suggested in other primate 
species (Mazur & Booth, 1998), which underscores the importance and adaptive relevance of  
this type of  dominance behavior (Darwin, 1872/2009). As such, these results provide for the 
first behavioral evidence that non-conscious bodily anger can evoke ecologically valid, reflex-
like dominance behavior.
Interestingly, although we did not observe dominance behavior in relation to facial anger, 
behavioral effects using the same threshold (14 ms) have previously been found when using 
fearful faces (van Honk et al., 2005). This intriguing difference might reflect the evolutionary 
relevance of  fear over anger as a signal of  predatory danger (Öhman, 2005), but further 
research is needed to substantiate this claim (Pessoa, Japee, & Ungerleider, 2005). In addition, 
bodily expressions of  anger might bias perception towards adaptive action (‘I need to dodge 
the punch’) whereas facial expressions of  anger might bias perception towards understanding 
intention (‘why is the person angry at me?’) (de Gelder, 2009). Notwithstanding that angry 
facial expression still trigger reflexive behavior with longer stimulus duration (Terburg et 
al., 2011), bodily signals of  threat might simply be more effective in triggering dominance 
behavior.
The present and previous results (Terburg et al., 2011) suggest that basic detection, but not 
recognition, of  the emotional content, lies at the foundation of  the relation between trait 
dominance and reflexive staring. Detection and recognition of  bodily expressions, but also 
facial expressions, are possibly mediated by distinct but connected parallel neural routes 
with different behavioral outcomes (de Gelder et al., 2012; de Gelder & Rouw, 2001). It is 
important to note that detection and recognition are not necessarily dependent upon each 
other, i.e. detection can occur without recognition and vice versa. Indeed, a recent study 
showed that above chance-level emotion categorization of  a facial expression may take place 
when observers cannot reliably categorize the stimulus as either a face or an object (Seirafi, De 
Weerd, & de Gelder, 2013). An interesting phenomenon in this respect is ‘affective blindsight’ 
(AB), which describes patients with cortical blindness who can still process some of  the 
emotional content of  visual information (Anders et al., 2004; de Gelder & Hadjikhani, 2006; 
de Gelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999; Morris, 2001; Pegna, Khateb, Lazeyras, 
& Seghier, 2005; Tamietto et al., 2009; Van den Stock, Tamietto, Hervais-Adelman, Pegna, 
& de Gelder, 2015b). It is thought that AB is driven by subcortical brain regions, such as the 
amygdala, pulvinar, and superior colliculus (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010; Tamietto, Pullens, 
de Gelder, Weiskrantz, & Goebel, 2012), which is in line with the above proposed involvement 
of  subcortical areas in reflexive dominance behavior. Furthermore, in line with our results AB 
patients seem to be able to detect bodies, but not faces, above chance-level (Van den Stock 
et al., 2015b), whereas the emotional content of  both faces and bodies do evoke affective 
responses (Tamietto et al., 2009). Importantly, these effects are non-conscious in nature and 
as such might resemble the non-conscious emotional modulation of  dominance behavior 
observed in the present study.
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In conclusion, the present study replicates and extends previous research on dominance 
behavior (Terburg et al., 2011; van Honk & Schutter, 2007) and provides important insights 
into reflexive social behavior. Exposure to angry bodily expressions can drive reflex-like gaze 
behavior and this finding provides a new window on the interplay between personality traits 
and behavioral reflexes.




The neural mechanisms of  threat perception after basolateral amygdala damage
This chapter is under review as:
Hortensius R, Terburg D, Morgan B, Stein DJ, van Honk J & de Gelder B. The neural mech-
anisms of  threat perception after basolateral amygdala damage.




The amygdala plays an important role in the processing of  threat signals, but it has so far 
been difficult to investigate the contribution from the different amygdala nuclei in humans. 
The current study investigated the neural signature of  basolateral amygdala damage during 
perception of  facial and task-irrelevant bodily threat signals. Five individuals with Urbach-
Wiethe disease with focal basolateral amygdala damage and twelve matched controls viewed 
facial and bodily expressions presented in congruent and incongruent face-body compounds 
while attention was always directed at the facial expression. Results showed that activation for 
fearful versus happy bodies was increased in the inferior parietal lobule in the Urbach-Wiethe 
disease group compared to controls. Moreover, after basolateral amygdala damage ambiguous 
threat processing is related to decreased activation in the temporal pole, but increased activity 
in the ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal and medial orbitofrontal cortex. This division 
between the prefrontal- and temporal-network was also present in the functional connectivity 
maps. Decreased temporal pole activity and increased prefrontal activity may underlie a 
switch from resolving ambiguity to dysfunctional threat signaling and regulation, resulting in 
hypersensitivity to threat after basolateral amygdala damage.  
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Introduction
The face and body are ubiquitous social and emotional signaling systems. Recognizing these 
face and body signals, especially in the case of  potential threat, is of  crucial importance for 
adaptive reactions to the other person. Previous studies have reported that the amygdaloid 
complex is a key region for recognition of  these signals. Studies using neuroimaging in healthy 
individuals have shown that the amygdala (AMG) is activated in seeing facial expressions 
(Morris et al., 1996; see Sabatinelli et al., 2011 for a review) as well as bodily expressions 
(see de Gelder et al., 2012 for a review; Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003). The role of  the 
AMG spans a wide range of  mechanisms related to threat recognition, including on the 
perception side, rapid detection the visual stimulus, and on the behavior side, automatic 
reflexive behavior and deliberate action. Presumably, each of  these is supported by partly 
different networks involving the AMG in connection with other key structures. 
To better understand the role of  the AMG in threat perception we need to distinguish the 
role of  its different nuclei and their connectivity profile. The major division of  the AMG 
is between the superficial (SFA), basolateral (BLA), and central-medial amygdala (CMA) 
(McDonald, 1998). This subdivision correspondents to three different networks, the olfactory 
network (mediated by the SFA), the autonomic network (CMA), and the frontal-temporal 
network (BLA) (Bzdok, Laird, Zilles, Fox, & Eickhoff, 2013; Swanson & Petrovich, 1998). The 
latter two networks are of  importance for the processing of  and reactions to threat. The CMA 
mediates reflexive reactions to threat together with the hypothalamus and brainstem (A. S. 
Fox, Oler, Tromp, Fudge, & Kalin, 2015; Mosher, Zimmerman, & Gothard, 2010). The role 
of  the BLA in threat perception and reaction is more complex and diverse. The BLA receives 
input from the sensory thalamus and sensory cortices, and it has bidirectional connections with 
many cortical, including frontal and temporal, regions such as the ventral and dorsal part of  
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and temporal pole (TP) (H. T. Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; 
Heimer, Harlan, Alheid, Garcia, & de Olmos, 1997). The BLA-temporal network presumably 
plays a role in the emotional labeling of  an object category and determining its affective value 
(Benarroch, 2015). The connections with the medial and orbital prefrontal cortex have been 
implicated in safety signaling, emotion regulation and affective learning (Likhtik & Paz, 2015).
It has so far been difficult to directly investigate the functional contribution of  different 
AMG nuclei and associated neural networks in humans during threat perception. Urbach-
Wiethe disease (UWD) is a disease that in some cases leads to bilateral calcification of  the 
AMG. Detailed investigation in five individuals with UWD from the South African Northern 
Cape revealed that the calcification of  the basolateral amygdala was associated with a lower 
threshold for fear recognition and a stronger task interference from non-conscious perceived 
fearful faces (Terburg, Morgan, Montoya, Hooge, et al., 2012b). A recent study with three 
individuals from the same group showed a hypersensitivity to bodily threat signals as indexed 
by a higher influence of  unattended threat body expressions on recognition of  the facial 
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emotion (de Gelder et al., 2014). The neural mechanisms underlying these behavioral 
consequences of  BLA damage have however not been studied yet.
Here, we mapped the neurofunctional signature of  perception of  facial and bodily expressions 
in isolation (happy and fear), and in congruent and incongruent face-body compounds in five 
participants with BLA calcification and twelve matched controls. It can be hypothesized that 
the BLA-frontal and BLA-temporal network are differentially targeted by BLA damage with 
each having distinct behavioral consequences. First, the BLA has an inhibitory influence on 
the MPFC (Dilgen, Tejeda, & O’Donnell, 2013) and damage to the BLA would result in an 
increase in activation in both the dorsal and ventral part of  the MPFC. If  the previously 
published behavioral bias is a result of  hypersensitivity to threat we would expect increased 
activation in this BLA-frontal network and possibly motor-regions due to aberrant action 
preparation that accompanies this hypersensitivity. If  on the other hand the bias is due to 
hypersensitivity to ambiguity, increased activity should be found in the BLA-temporal network 




Five volunteers with UWD disease from the Northern Cape of  South-Africa (Thornton 
et al., 2008) and 12 matched controls from the same region participated in the present 
experiment. Participants had no history of  secondary psychopathology or epileptic insults. 
Environmental conditions, age, and neuropsychological characteristics were similar for UWD 
and control participants (Supplementary Table 1). Previously, structural and functional 
MRI assessment by means of  cytoarchitectonic-probability labeling provided evidence that 
the calcification is restricted to the BLA (Klumpers, Morgan, Terburg, Stein, & van Honk, 
2014b; Terburg, Morgan, Montoya, Hooge, et al., 2012b). Figure 1 shows the location and 
size of  the calcification and a three-dimensional reconstruction of  the lesion. Three of  the 
five UWD participants (UWD 1-3) also participated in the previously reported behavioral 
experiment (de Gelder et al., 2014). Participants were unaware of  the aim of  the study and 
provided written informed consent. The study was approved by the Health Sciences Faculty 
Human Research Ethics Committee of  the University of  Cape Town and carried out in 
accordance with the standards set by the Declaration of  Helsinki. 
Stimuli and Task
Fearful and happy faces (MacBrain Face Stimulus Set) were paired with a fearful or happy 
body (de Gelder & Van den Stock, 2011), resulting in congruent (e.g., a fearful face with a 
fearful body) or incongruent (e.g., a happy face with a fearful body) compounds (Meeren et 
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Figure 1. Location and size of  the BLA damage. Coronal view of  T2-weighted magnetic resonance images (left) and three-
dimensional reconstruction (right) of  the lesion for the five Urbach-Wiethe disease (UWD) participants with birth year indicated. 
Reconstruction of  the AMG subnuclei was based on the cytoarchitectonic probability maps from Amunts et al. (2005) in Eickhoff 
et al. (2005).
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al., 2005). Control stimuli were created in which the face or body or both were replaced with 
a grey shape (e.g., a happy face with grey rectangle, a grey oval with a fearful body, grey oval 
and grey rectangle). Ten unique stimuli (5 female) per condition were created. Figure 2 
presents examples of  the stimuli used.
Participants were instructed to focus on the face only and not to pay attention to the rest 
of  the body. In order to maintain this focus a fixation cross was placed on the nose of  the 
face-body compound stimulus. Participants performed a passive oddball task (Carretié, 
Hinojosa, Martín-Loeches, Mercado, & Tapia, 2004). During the course of  the experiment 
the fixation cross could change into a red circle. Participants were instructed to pay attention 
to this change but did not have to make an overt response. This was done to counteract 
any possible contamination by a motor response in the trials of  interest. A nurse familiar 
to the participants was trained to provide instructions for the task outside of  the scanner. 
The task was explained to the participant with examples of  face-body compound stimuli not 
used in the actual experiment. The experiment started when participants indicated that they 
understood the instructions. 
The experiment used a block design. During a stimulation block the 10 stimuli belonging to 
the same category (e.g., fearful face with a happy body) were presented in a random order 
for 800ms each, with an inter stimulus interval of  200ms (total duration 10 s). Each run 
consisted of  27 stimulation blocks (9 different conditions repeated 3 times) and 6 oddball 
blocks presented in a random order. This was followed by an inter block interval of  6 s. Three 
rest blocks of  10s each were presented at a fixed time point (after stimulation/oddball block 
5, 11, and 22). During these rest blocks no stimuli were shown, to counteract any possible 
habituation and provide a more dynamic presentation. Participants completed two runs, with 
a total time of  18 minutes. Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA), projected onto a screen located at the end of  the 
scanner bore. Each new event was synchronous with a new scan volume. 
Image acquisition
Data was acquired with a Siemens Magnetom Allegra 3 Tesla head-only scanner (Siemens 
Medical Systems GmBH, Erlangen, Germany) at the Cape Universities Brain Imaging Centre 
(CUBIC) in Cape Town, South Africa. Earplugs attenuated the scanner noise and padding 
was used to reduce head movements. Functional whole brain coverage was achieved using 
2D echo-planar images sequence. Each volume contained 36 slices acquired in ascending 
order with a 3.5 mm isotropic resolution (interslice gap = 0.525, TR = 2000ms, TE = 27 ms, 
flip angle = 70°, field of  view (FOV) = 225 x 225 mm2, matrix size = 64 x 64). In total 278 
functional volumes were collected per run. After the final functional run a high-resolution 
T1-weighted anatomical scan with 1 mm isotropic resolution was collected (no gap, TR = 
2300ms and TE = 39 ms, FA = 9°, field of  view = 240 x 256 mm2, matrix size = 256 x 256). 
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functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging preprocessing and analyses 
Data preprocessing and analyses were carried out using BrainVoyager QX Version 2.8.4 
(Brain Innovation, The Netherlands, www.brainvoyager.com). The first 4 volumes of  each 
run were discarded to avoid T1 saturation effects. Preprocessing of  the functional data 
consisted of  slice time correction (using sinc interpolation), a rigid-body algorithm to correct 
for small movements between scan (trilinear/sinc estimation and interpolation), and temporal 
high-pass filtering (GLM-Fourier with two cycles sine/cosine per run including linear trend 
removal). No spatial smoothing was used. Functional data was co-registered to the anatomical 
data, and all data was normalized into Talairach space. 
To reduce individual macro-anatomical differences between participants and crucially 
between the UWD and control group, and to subsequently improve statistical power, Cortex-
Based alignment was used (Frost & Goebel, 2012; Goebel, Esposito, & Formisano, 2006). 
This high-resolution cortical mapping procedure achieves a non-rigid alignment of  different 
brains using the individual curvature information that reflects the gyri and sulci folding 
pattern (see Frost and Goebel, 2012 for more details). As the CBA procedure already applies 
smoothing to the data and results in superior alignment between participants, no further 
spatial smoothing was used. Pre- and post-CBA comparison of  between-subjects alignment is 
shown in Supplementary Figure 1. 
Figure 2. Examples of  stimuli used in the experiment. 
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At the single-subject level, fixed-effects whole-brain general linear model were performed 
using a regression model with each condition and oddball block defined as predictors. The 
z-transformed motion predictors were included as predictors of  no interest. In addition, to 
reduce error variance possible, outlier predictors were included in the model. An outlier map 
was created for each run to show clusters that have a time course value of  > 6SD above 
the mean. These maps were manually inspected for outlier clusters and if  the value was 
> 6SD above the mean, but not related to motion or an incidental spike, the time course 
was extracted, z-transformed, and included in the design matrix. Next, the design matrix 
of  each run of  each participant was checked for shared variance to prevent over fitting. If  a 
predictor was explained by the combination of  other predictors (R2 > .80), it was removed 
from the design matrix. Thus, besides the task predictors (9 + 1 oddball), motion predictors 
and possible outlier predictors were included in the design matrix. The number of  predictors 
of  no interest ranged between 5 and 9 and did not differ between groups, p’s > .22. 
At the group level a random-effects general linear model was performed. Using a dummy-
coded general linear model the following analyses were performed: 
1. We first investigated the regions that were activated for fearful compared to 
happy bodies regardless of  the facial information and vice versa. 
2. To map the effect of  incongruent versus congruent face-body compounds we 
contrasted incongruent (fearful face and a happy body, and happy face and a 
fearful body) with congruent (fearful face and a fearful body, and happy face 
and a happy body).
3. To determine the influence of  unattended fear versus unattended happiness, 
fearful bodies with a happy face or grey oval were contrasted with happy bodies 
with fearful face or grey oval.
Between-group as well as within-group maps (for UWDs and controls separately as well 
as combined) were calculated. Additional analyses are reported in the Supplementary 
Material. The between-group maps were cluster size corrected (Forman et al., 1995). In brief, 
a whole-brain correction was calculated by estimating a false-positive rate for each cluster by 
taking into account the spatial smoothness of  the initial statistical map. In accordance with 
Goebel, Esposito and Formisano (2006), the initial single voxel threshold was set at p = .01, 
and the minimal cluster size threshold applied to the final statistical maps after Monte-Carlo 
simulation (1000 iterations) corresponds to a cluster-level false-positive rate (α) of  5%. The 
separate group maps of  the UWD and control groups were tested against zero using a one-
sample t-test and thresholded at p < .01, with an extended cluster size of  25. 
Besides testing for difference in functional segregation we established potential differential 
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functional integration by performing functional connectivity analyses (C. J. Price, Crinion, 
& Friston, 2006). We used psychophysiological interaction (Friston et al., 1997) to probe the 
potential impact of  basolateral amygdala damage on the neural network underlying threat 
perception. Functional coupling between the seed region identified in the between-group 
analyses and other regions was estimated as a function of  the psychological context. The 
demeaned extracted time course from the seed region (the physiological state) was used 
to create psychophysiological interaction predictors by multiplying it with the contrast of  
interest (psychological state). Besides psychophysiological interaction and contrast predictors, 
the time course of  the seed region, motion, and possible outlier predictors were included 
in the model. After fixed-effect single-subject analysis, a whole-brain random effects group 
analysis was used to map the difference in connectivity pattern between the UWD and control 
group. Thresholds were similar as in the functional activation analyses. All statistical maps 
are shown on the averaged group-aligned surface reconstruction. Talairach coordinates and 
t- and p-values of  peak vertices are reported.
Results
Functional activation
To complement previous behavioral and EEG studies on face-body compound perception (de 
Gelder et al., 2014; Kret & de Gelder, 2013; Meeren et al., 2005) and to establish the functional 
activation in the presence of  a functional BLA, we start with reporting the functional maps in 
the control group only (Supplementary Table 2-4). First, results revealed no regions that 
were activated more for fearful compared to happy bodies regardless of  the facial information. 
Second, the right temporal pole (TP), superior and interior temporal gyrus were activated for 
happy versus fearful bodies regardless of  the facial information. Third, significant clusters 
were observed for congruent versus incongruent face-body compounds, but not for the 
inverse contrast. Activity increased for congruent compared to incongruent compounds in 
the superior frontal gyrus, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC). Fourth, the cingulate 
gyrus and cuneus were activated for unattended fear bodies compared to unattended happy 
bodies. 
Next we investigated between-group differences in brain regions that showed differential 
activation for fearful versus happy bodies. UWDs compared to controls showed less activation 
in the left fusiform gyrus, but more activation in the right anterior inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL) for fearful versus happy bodies. Directly comparing incongruent with congruent face-
body compounds revealed that UWDs compared to controls showed more activation in 
the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), and the 
dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC). However, UWDs compared to controls showed less 
activation in the left and right TP. No significant between-group differences were found when 
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directly contrasting unattended fear bodies versus unattended happy bodies. The results are 
presented in Figure 3-5 and Table 1.
We ran an alternative analysis that focused solely on subcortical activation after BLA damage. 
To allow a fine-grained analysis we ran the same contrasts as in the main analyses but masked 
the subcortical areas. No significant clusters emerged even with spatial smoothing (4mm 
Gaussian kernel).
Functional connectivity
In a first analysis, we identified regions that showed functional connectivity with the IPL 
and the fusiform gyrus during the processing of  fearful versus happy body regardless of  the 
facial information. This revealed increased functional connectivity between the IPL and the 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in the UWDs compared to controls. Increased 
coupling between the fusiform gyrus and the anterior IPL was observed in UWDs compared 
to controls, highlighting the importance of  the latter region in threat processing. 
Next, we established regions that showed functional connectivity with the mOFC, vMPFC, 
dMPFC and left and right TP, during the processing of  incongruent versus congruent face-
body compounds. Interestingly, UWDs compared to controls showed decreased coupling 
Figure 3. The importance of  the IPL in processing of  fearful body expressions. The UWD group showed more 
activation for fearful versus happy bodies in the right anterior IPL, but less activation in the left fusiform gyrus (top). Increased 
functional connectivity between the IPL and the subgenual ACC, and the fusiform gyrus and the anterior IPL was observed in UWDs 
compared to controls (bottom). 
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between the mOFC and the posterior IPL. Increased functional connectivity between the 
cuneus as well as the precuneus with the vMPFC was observed in the UWDs compared to 
controls. With the dMPFC as seed region, UWDs compared to controls showed increased 
coupling with the vMPFC, but decreased coupling with the superior temporal gyrus and TP. 
Lastly, UWDs compared to controls showed increased functional connectivity between the 
right TP and the inferior temporal gyrus and bilateral middle temporal gyrus, and decreased 
functional connectivity between the left TP and mOFC and superior frontal gyrus. Figure 
3-5 and Table 2 report the results from the functional connectivity analyses. 
Basolateral amygdala activation and functional connectivity in controls
To investigate the role of  the BLA in threat perception, we tested the contrasts in an exploratory 
ROI analyses in the control group. ROIs were created based on the cytoarchitectonic 
probability maps from Amunts et al. (2005) in Eickhoff et al. (2005). Results show more 
activation for happy compared to fearful bodily expression in the left BLA, t(11) = 2.43, p = 
.03. A similar but non-significant pattern was found for the right BLA, t(11) = 2.04, p = .07. 
Functional connectivity revealed that the left BLA showed increased connectivity during this 
contrast with the right primary motor cortex and supplemental motor area, XYZtal = 6, -8, 
Figure 4. Enhancement of  PFC midline activation during ambiguous threat processing after BLA damage. The 
mOFC, vMPFC, and dMPFC showed increased activity in the UWD group (top left) during ambiguous threat processing. Inset shows 
increased dMPFC activation for incongruent versus congruent face-body compounds in UWDs, and decreased vMPFC activation 
for the same contrast in controls. UWDs showed decreased functional connectivity between the mOFC and the posterior IPL, and 
increased functional connectivity between the cuneus and precuneus with the vMPFC. The dMPFC showed increased coupling with 
the VMPFC, but decreased coupling with the superior temporal gyrus and TP (right and bottom). Maps are cluster-size corrected 
except for the within-group maps that are shown with a threshold of  p < .05 (uncorrected) for illustration purposes.
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54; t = 7.993; p = .000007, 195 vertices, and the left supplemental motor area, XYZtal = -5, 
-3, 52; t = 4.911; p = .000463; 53 vertices; tested against zero using a one-sample t-test, with a 
threshold of  p < .01, extended cluster size of  25 (Figure 6). No significant effects were found 
in the left or right CMA.
Discussion
The aim of  the present study was to investigate the consequences of  BLA damage on the 
neural network involved in processing facial and task-irrelevant body expressions of  threat. 
Taken together our results reveal the impact of  BLA damage on a PFC-TP-IPL network 
during the processing of  threat. We observed that activation was increased in the IPL but 
decreased in the fusiform gyrus in UWDs compared to controls for fearful contrasted to happy 
Figure 5. Disruption of  TP in ambiguous threat processing after BLA damage. Activity in the TP was reduced for the 
UWD group during ambiguous threat processing (top left). Inset shows decreased bilateral TP activation for incongruent versus 
congruent face-body compounds in UWDs, and increased bilateral TP activation for the same contrast in controls. Consistent with 
the dissociation between the frontal- and temporal-network, increased functional connectivity was observed in the UWDs between 
the left TP and mOFC and superior frontal gyrus. The right TP showed increased coupling with the inferior temporal gyrus and 
bilateral middle temporal gyrus (right and bottom). Maps are cluster-size corrected except for the within-group maps that are shown 
with a threshold of  p < .05 (uncorrected) for illustration purposes.
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Figure 6. Functional role of  the BLA. Activation in left BLA was increased for happy compared to fearful body expressions (top). 
During this contrast the left BLA showed functional coupling with the left premotor motor cortex and right primary and premotor 
cortex (bottom).
Table 1 Outcome of  main between-group functional activation analyses
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z Area t p N
Fearful versus happy body regardless of  the facial information
UWDs > Controls
Anterior inferior parietal lobule RH 54 -29 32 40 4.606 .000343 93
Controls > UWDs
Fusiform gyrus LH -41 -69 -12 19 -4.731 .000268 33
Incongruent versus congruent face body compounds
UWDs > Controls
Medial orbitofrontal cortex RH 14 45 -12 11 4.724 .000271 52
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex RH 9 56 10 10 4.474 .000446 51
Dorsal medial prefrontal cortex RH 10 38 29 9 4.641 .000320 42
Controls > UWDs
Temporal pole RH 40 -4 -31 21 -4.486 .000435 77
Temporal pole LH -33 6 -20 38 -4.430 .000487 110
All clusters survive cluster-size correction except the anterior inferior parietal lobule and fusiform gyrus. Area refers to 
Brodmann area, N is number of  vertices.
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Table 2 Outcome of  between-group connectivity analyses
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z Area t p N
Fearful versus happy body regardless of  the facial information
Seed: Inferior parietal lobule
UWDs > Controls
Subgenual anterior cingulate RH 8 35 1 24 4.974 .000167 50
Seed: Fusiform gyrus
Anterior inferior parietal lobule* LH -54 -43 25 40 4.926 .000183 51
Incongruent versus congruent face body compounds
Seed: Medial orbitofrontal cortex
Control > UWDs
Posterior inferior parietal lobule RH 40 -61 42 7 -4.648 .000316 58
Seed: Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
UWDs > Controls
Precuneus RH 7 -69 23 31 5.646 .000047 21
Cuneus RH 8 -82 26 19 4.650 .000314 22
Seed: Dorsal medial prefrontal cortex
UWDs > Controls
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex LH -6 52 12 10 5.509 .000060 29
Controls > UWDs
Superior temporal gyrus LH -47 20 3 22 -5.986 .000025 108
Temporal pole LH -40 8 -25 38 -4.486 .000435 43
Seed: Right temporal pole
UWDs > Controls
Inferior temporal gyrus RH 55 -22 -17 20 5.564 .000054 55
Middle temporal gyrus RH 60 -25 -2 21 4.654 .000312 88
Middle temoral gyrus LH -54 -36 -1 22 4.076 .000994 37
Seed: Left temporal pole
Controls > UWDs
Medial orbitofrontal cortex RH 11 41 -12 11 -5.356 .000080 36
Superior frontal gyrus RH 19 26 52 6 -5.475 .000064 38
*Did not survive cluster-size correction. Area refers to Brodmann area, N is number of  vertices.
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bodily expression. Importantly, the IPL showed increased coupling with the subgenual ACC, 
while the fusiform gyrus showed increased functional connectivity with the IPL in UWDS. 
Furthermore, BLA damage resulted in differential impact on the frontal-BLA network and 
temporal-BLA network. In the UWD group regions in the midline (mOFC, vMPFC, dMPFC) 
showed increased activation to ambiguous threat, but reduced activation in the bilateral TP. 
Functional connectivity analyses provided further indication for this differential effect and 
showed reduced coupling between frontal and temporal regions after BLA damage. Reduced 
coupling between the dMPFC and TP, and superior temporal gyrus during the perception 
of  ambiguous threat was observed in UWD compared to controls. Under similar conditions, 
we also observed decreased functional connectivity between the left TP and mOFC, and 
superior frontal gyrus in the UWD participants. 
This proposed PFC-TP-IPL network may be involved in several important processes that 
regulate confrontation with threat along three different axes. In order to respond adaptively, 
a threatening signal needs to be perceived as a threat, but an ambiguous signal should be 
interpreted within the different components of  the situation. Resolving such affective 
ambiguity is sustained by the TP. Next, safety signaling and emotion regulation are important 
to assess threat value and select the appropriate behavioral response; regions in the prefrontal 
midline have consistently been implicated in these processes. Finally, the selection and 
execution of  action takes place, mediated by the IPL and by motor regions. Damage to the 
BLA could result in anomalous activity in all three nodes of  the network (Figure 7) and 
explain the previously observed hypersensitivity to threat (de Gelder et al., 2014; Terburg, 
Morgan, Montoya, Hooge, et al., 2012b). We now discuss these steps and the influence of  
BLA damage in more details. 
Figure 7. The PFC-TP-IPL network and the processing of  threat. Different nodes of  the network sustain different roles. 
While the TP is critical in resolving affective ambiguity, regions in the prefrontal midline signal threat value, safety, and mediate 
behavioral response selection. The IPL and motor regions play an important role in the selection and execution of  the selected 
behavioral response. Damage to the BLA results in anomalous activity in all three nodes of  the network and this could lead to 
aberrant processing and reactions to threat (right).
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Temporal pole, resolving ambiguity 
Our results are consistent with existing knowledge on afferent and efferent connections and 
the functional role of  the TP, a polymodal association area and part of  the extended limbic 
system (Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007). Connections between TP and the nearby BLA 
have been reported in monkeys (Aggleton, Burton, & Passingham, 1980; H. T. Ghashghaei & 
Barbas, 2002), and similar connections were recently demonstrated in humans using in vivo 
probabilistic tractography (Bach, Behrens, Garrido, Weiskopf, & Dolan, 2011) and meta-
analytic connectivity modeling (Bzdok et al., 2013). The TP is also densely connected to 
midline regions, e.g., orbitofrontal cortex (Kondo, Saleem, & Price, 2003) and the ventral 
or visual part receives input from extrastriate visual areas, e.g., inferior temporal regions 
(Markowitsch, Emmans, Irle, Streicher, & Preilowski, 1985). Initial evidence from its role in 
social emotional processes came from Klüver–Bucy syndrome as well as the temporal variant 
of  frontal temporal dementia (Franzen & Myers, 1973; Thompson, Patterson, & Hodges, 
2003). Decreased recognition of  facial signals of  affect is a dominant factor in both disorders. 
As the TP is activated in a variety of  social emotional tasks, from face perception to theory 
of  mind, a recent review proposed a unifying role that could underlie the variety of  results 
(Olson et al., 2007). The authors suggested that the TP binds valence to incoming visual 
signals. It provides the affective meaning to the percept. If  so, one would expect that TP also 
drives the emotional labeling of  initial ambiguous social cues. Indeed, increased TP activity 
was observed when participants view unique stimuli (Asari et al., 2008), or when participants 
performed an emotion-naming compared to color-naming task (Sinke, Sorger, Goebel, & de 
Gelder, 2010). Importantly, this proposed perception-emotion linkage is similar to the role 
of  the BLA in emotional coloring of  a signal (Benarroch, 2015). Our findings indicate that 
the TP together with the BLA orchestrates the coupling between emotion and perception. 
This BLA-TP network establishes the emotional label and biases ongoing neural processes. 
The decreased activation to incongruent face-body compounds, i.e. ambiguous threat, in the 
TP and decreased coupling with the mOFC after BLA damage could potentially underlie 
incorrect labeling of  the compound as threat and subsequently biasing upstream neural 
activity (e.g., midline PFC). This refers to a potential perceptual bias effect in which a task-
irrelevant stimulus influences the percept of  the task-relevant stimulus in the direction of  the 
former (de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). This effect is enhanced after BLA damage (de Gelder 
et al., 2014), and could thus be related to dysfunctional TP functioning and reduced cross-
talk between temporal and frontal regions leading to impaired integration of  perceptual and 
emotional processes. 
Midline regions, emotion regulation and safety signaling
The regions in the prefrontal midline that showed increased activation in UWDs during 
ambiguous threat are connected to the BLA (Barbas, 2015) and have consistently been 
implicated in social emotional processes (Likhtik & Paz, 2015). As highlighted in a study 
by Barbas and colleagues (2003) the orbital and medial part of  the frontal cortex have 
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different connectivity patterns with regions within the AMG and have distinct but related 
roles (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). While the orbitofrontal cortex mediates the emotional and 
motivation value of  the stimulus (Mobbs et al., 2010), the function of  the MPFC has been 
described in terms of  situation-response coupling (W. H. Alexander & Brown, 2011). These 
two processes could be impaired after damage to the BLA. Not only is the threat level of  the 
emotional signal increased, inappropriate action plans are also activated, consistent with the 
role of  the MPFC-BLA network in safety signaling (Likhtik & Paz, 2015). This would hold 
especially for the ventral part of  the MPFC, while the dorsal part has been associated with 
threat anticipation (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Klumpers et al., 2014a). When participants are 
confronted with a real-life threat but overcame their fear, vMPFC activation increased and 
was positively related to subjective fear (Nili, Goldberg, Weizman, & Dudai, 2010). 
When confronted with threat the emotional signal is hardly unambiguous. Similarly, 
irrelevant threat can influence the interpretation of  a situation. The importance of  the AMG, 
in particular the BLA, and the MPFC in these processes has been noted (Brand, Grabenhorst, 
Starcke, Vandekerckhove, & Markowitsch, 2007; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 
2006; Etkin et al., 2004; H. Kim, Somerville, Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2003; H. Kim 
et al., 2004; Neta, Kelley, & Whalen, 2013; Nohlen, van Harreveld, Rotteveel, Lelieveld, & 
Crone, 2014). For example, the BLA codes the subjective interpretation of  the emotion of  
the face (Wang et al., 2014). Interestingly, MPFC and BLA activation are inversely correlated 
when participants are interpreting ambiguous emotional faces (H. Kim et al., 2003). Similar 
findings of  distraction by irrelevant threat after BLA damage (de Gelder et al., 2014; (Terburg, 
Morgan, Montoya, Hooge, et al., 2012b), have been obtained in individuals with mood and 
anxiety disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Related to this, changes in connectivity of  
the MPFC with (parts of) the AMG have been found after early life stress (Malter Cohen et al., 
2013), trauma (Thomason et al., 2015) and general anxiety disorder (T. Greenberg, Carlson, 
Cha, Hajcak, & Mujica-Parodi, 2013; Roy et al., 2013). Deficits in threat discrimination 
have been related to less differential responses in the vMPFC (T. Greenberg et al., 2013) 
and to decreased MPFC-AMG connectivity (Cha et al., 2014). In keeping with the potential 
difference in the ventral and dorsal part of  the MPFC, a recent study showed that at rest, 
coupling between vMPFC (including the subgenual ACC) and AMG was negatively related 
to state anxiety, while dMPFC-AMG connectivity positively predicted state anxiety (M. J. 
Kim, Gee, Loucks, Davis, & Whalen, 2011). To conclude so far, the absence of  BLA input to 
the MPFC may lead to dysfunctional threat signaling and regulation. 
Inferior parietal lobule and action 
Here, we showed increased activation in the IPL for fearful bodily expressions regardless of  
the facial information in UWDs. Moreover, under the same task conditions increased coupling 
between the fusiform gyrus and IPL was observed in UWDs. The IPL has been implicated in 
action observation and representation (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003) and maintaining attention 
(Malhotra, Coulthard, & Husain, 2009). Together with assigning an affective label and 
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signaling the threat value and potential safety, another crucial step when confronted with 
threat is the selection and execution of  the appropriate action. Several observations in the 
literature are in line with the possible role of  the IPL in representation of  action and possible 
action preparation during threat and the specific influence of  the AMG on these processes. 
The right IPL has been implicated in responding to salient information in the environment 
(Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009). An early study showing activation of  IPL during perception 
of  fearful bodily expressions (de Gelder et al., 2004), was complimented by a later study on 
the perception of  threatening social interaction (Sinke et al., 2010). Directly influencing IPL 
activity during emotion body perception using online Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
resulted in increased sensitivity for fearful bodily expressions (Engelen, de Graaf, Sack, & de 
Gelder, 2015). A recent study that investigated face processing in two patients with complete 
bilateral AMG damage, showed that the one patient that had intact recognition of  fearful 
facial expressions and startle response, also had increased activation in the premotor cortex 
and IPL to fearful faces (Becker et al., 2012). These findings could be interpreted as increased 
preparatory responses for action in the face of  threat. However, the IPL is a heterogeneous 
region and encompasses as much as five different clusters (Mars et al., 2011), each with 
distinctive roles (for example Kwok & Macaluso, 2015). In the present study both the anterior 
and posterior IPL were implicated in neural circuitry after BLA damage, but under different 
task conditions and in different hemispheres. The anterior region is connected to premotor 
cortex and could serve as a crucial hub in the transition from perception to action. In contrast, 
the posterior part of  the IPL is connected to the parahippocampal gyrus and is activated 
during memory tasks. How these different regions interact with BLA damage and the exact 
roles they fulfill during threat perception is unknown. Lastly, in control participants the BLA 
showed more activation to happy compared to fearful bodily expressions and increased 
functional connectivity between the BLA and the SMA and M1 during this contrast. While 
the importance of  a BLA-motor network for direct BLA-initiated behavioral reactions to 
threatening situations has been described (Grèzes et al., 2014), the functional meaning of  the 
current findings remains unknown.
Conclusion
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging we studied the neural signature of  unattended 
body expression perception and face-body incongruence in a unique sample with BLA 
damage. We demonstrated the significance of  a PFC-TP-IPL network in the functional 
integration of  and reaction to threatening social stimuli. An imbalance in this network could 
reflect hypersensitivity for threat as observed after BLA damage.




No between-group differences were found when contrasting emotional faces or bodies versus 
control stimuli. Supplementary Tables 5 and 6 and Supplementary Figure 2 report 
the significant clusters for the UWD and control group combined. No significant clusters 
were found between- or within-groups for fearful versus happy facial expression regardless of  
bodily expression. These functional maps are in line with previous research on face and body 
perception (de Gelder et al., 2010; Kret et al., 2011; Sabatinelli et al., 2011; van de Riet et al., 
2009). Moreover, the lack of  significant differences in functional activation between UWDs 
and controls when perceiving emotional faces and bodies in isolation is in line with behavioral 
observations of  intact emotion recognition of  both facial and bodily expressions (de Gelder et 
al., 2014; Terburg, Morgan, Montoya, Hooge, et al., 2012b). 
Supplementary Table 1 Demographic data
UWDs (n = 5) Controls (n = 12)
UWD 1 UWD 2 UWD 3 UWD 4 UWD 6 Mean Mean
Age 27 34 38 52 39 38±9.14 37.17±5.20
VIQ 97 84 93 82 83 87.80±6.76 86.67±4.68
PIQ 99 87 85 84 87 88.40±6.07 88.17±5.39
FSIQ 98 84 87 81 83 86.60±6.73 85.83±4.43
VIQ: verbal IQ, PIQ: performance IQ, FSIQ: full-scale IQ. Means and standard deviations are reported. No significant 
differences between groups, p’s ≥ .78.
Supplementary Figure 1. Pre- and Post-Cortex-Based Alignment comparison of  between-subjects alignment. 
Position of  the left central sulcus for all participants before and after Cortex-Based Alignment shown on a semi-inflated cortex 
representation.
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Supplementary Table 3 Incongruent versus congruent face body compounds
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z Area t p N
Controls
Congruent > Incongruent
Superior frontal gyrus RH 9 26 54 6 -3.996 .001040 30
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex RH 8 41 -1 10 -2.414 .028110 34
UWDs
Congruent > Incongruent
Insula RH 36 -8 6 13 -3.093 .006981 46
Insula LH -34 -4 3 13 -2.608 .019014 51
UWDs and Controls
Inferior parietal lobule LH -32 -46 37 40 -5.817 .000026 68
p < .01 (uncorrected) with an extended cluster size of  25. Area refers to Brodmann area, N is number 
of  vertices.
Supplementary Table 2 Fearful versus happy body regardless of  the facial information
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z Area t p N
Controls
Happy > Fear
Temporal pole RH 38 -3 -30 21 -3.636 .002225 42
Superior temporal gyrus RH 49 9 -9 38 -2.919 .010028 39





p < .01 (uncorrected) with an extended cluster size of  25. b did not survive cluster-size correction. Area refers to Brodmann 
area, N is number of  vertices.
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Supplementary Table 4 Unattended fear versus unattended happiness
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z Area t p N
Controlsa
Unattended fear > unattended happy
Cingulate gyrus RH 2 -12 27 23 6.603 .000006 47
Cuneus LH -3 -71 13 18 2.964 .009131 25
UWDsa
Unattended fear > unattended happiness
Cingulate gyrus RH 4 -10 37 24 6.741 .000005 58
Unattended happiness > unattended fear
Middle frontal gyrus LH -41 16 26 46 -3.000 .008479 33
UWDs and Controlsa
Unattended fear > unattended happiness
Cingulate gyrus RH 4 -10 37 24 6.741 .000005 50
Cingulate gyrus RH 2 -12 27 23 6.603 .000006 51
UWDs versus Controls
No significant clusters
a p < .01 (uncorrected) with an extended cluster size of  25. Area refers to Brodmann area, N is number of  vertices.
Supplementary Table 5 Fearful and happy faces > control stimuli for both UWDs and controls
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z Area t p N
Inferior occipital gyrus RH 27 -87 -9 18 6.756 .000005 183
Fusiform gyrus RH 35 -55 -13 37 6.321 .00001 133
Lingual gyrus RH 8 -72 4 18 5.199 .000088 39
Inferior occipital gyrus LH -29 -84 -7 18 8.947 < .000001 717
Middle frontal gyrus LH -18 18 53 6 4.924 .000153 42
Cuneus LH -7 -81 4 17 4.983 .000136 90
Precuneus LH -20 -63 49 7 4.411 .000437 76
Superior frontal gyrus LH -20 45 31 9 6.493 .000007 109
p < .01 (uncorrected) with an extended cluster size of  25. Faces are presented with a grey rectangle, and the control stimulus is a 
grey oval and rectangle. Area refers to Brodmann area, N is number of  vertices.
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Supplementary Table 6 Fearful and happy bodies > control stimuli for both UWDs and controls
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z Area t p N
Lingual gyrus RH 15 -84 -11 18 5.323 .000069 93
Fusiform gyrus RH 41 -59 -13 37 7.222 .000002 147
Middle occipital gyrus RH 28 -89 2 18 4.631 .000277 32
Inferior occipital gyrus RH 27 -87 -9 18 5.547 .000044 47
Cuneus RH 8 -90 11 18 4.235 .000631 18
Middle occipital gyrus RH 36 -76 9 19 4.616 .000286 39
Inferior occipital gyrus LH -12 -90 -10 17 8.011 .000001 1189
Precuneus LH -20 -58 55 7 4.441 .000411 122
Superior Frontal gyrus LH -6 51 29 9 6.979 .000003 151
Precuneus LH -24 -71 21 31 4.608 .000291 74
Parahippocampal gyrus LH -21 -52 5 30 4.706 .000238 48
Superior frontal gyrus LH -20 10 55 6 4.732 .000226 37
Posterior cingulate LH -6 -50 19 30 4.238 .000627 56
Precentral gyrus LH -29 -9 48 6 4.762 .000212 90
Superior frontal gyrus LH -9 62 16 10 4.774 .000207 18
p < .01 (uncorrected) with an extended cluster size of  25. Bodies are presented with a grey oval, and the control stimulus is a 
grey oval and rectangle. Area refers to Brodmann area, N is number of  vertices.
Supplementary Figure 2. Functional maps during the perception faces and bodies. Faces (top) and bodies (bottom) 
compared to control stimuli activate regions such as the lingual gyrus, inferior occipital gyrus, fusiform gyrus, inferior occipital gyrus, 
cuneus, precuneus, and superior frontal gyrus. 






Motieven zijn niet meer dan geestelijke handvatten om daden te verklaren. Als we zouden 
stoppen met het opsporen van verklaringen zou er meer worden gehandeld. Het zoeken naar 
drijfveren levert hooguit drijfzand op. Menigeen laat zich daarin vastzuigen en komt vervol-
gens niet meer tot actie.
  
– A.H.J. Dautzenberg - Samaritaan, 2011

Chapter 5
The neural basis of  the bystander effect - 
The influence of  group size on neural activity when witnessing an emergency
This chapter is published as:
Hortensius R & de Gelder B (2014). The neural basis of  the bystander effect - The influence 
of  group size on neural activity when witnessing an emergency. NeuroImage, 93:53–58. 




Naturalistic observation and experimental studies in humans and other primates show that 
observing an individual in need automatically triggers helping behavior. The aim of  the 
present study is to clarify the neurofunctional basis of  social influences on individual helping 
behavior. We investigate whether when participants witness an emergency, while performing 
an unrelated color-naming task in an fMRI scanner, the number of  bystanders present at the 
emergency influences neural activity in regions related to action preparation. The results show 
a decrease in activity with the increase in group size in the left pre- and postcentral gyri and 
left medial frontal gyrus. In contrast, regions related to visual perception and attention show 
an increase in activity. These results demonstrate the neural mechanisms of  social influence 
on automatic action preparation that is at the core of  helping behavior when witnessing an 
emergency.
The neural basis of  the bystander effect
[ 85 ] 
Introduction
People are social animals and thrive by interacting with other people. We want company 
when in misery and we help others when in need, be it physically or by means of  donating 
time or money. Spontaneous helping behavior is observed throughout the animal kingdom 
and occurs in the absence of  explicit reward (Preston, 2013), as observed for example in 
children and young chimpanzees (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken, Hare, Melis, 
Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007). Yet these familiar intuitions were challenged in the sixties by a 
well-known finding in social psychology that revealed a dark side of  human interaction, the 
‘bystander effect’.
The bystander effect refers to the decrease in helping behavior of  an onlooker when a person 
is in need and multiple bystanders witness the emergency (Darley & Latané, 1968; for a recent 
meta-analysis see Fischer et al., 2011). Several explanations of  this effect have been suggested 
among which pluralistic ignorance, diffusion of  responsibility, and evaluation apprehension 
are mentioned most frequently (Fischer et al., 2011). All of  these reflect interpretations that 
appeal to high level cognitive notions and provide a top–down explanation for social behavior. 
While these interpretations undoubtedly shed some light on group influences on individual 
behavior, they do not directly point to an underlying single or composite neural mechanism.
In line with a bottom-up explanation of  social phenomena and mechanisms rooted in 
cross-species similarities (de Waal & Ferrari, 2010), the perception–action model proposes 
that merely observing someone in need will trigger a cascade of  somatic and autonomic 
responses that have motor and emotional behavioral consequences (Preston & de Waal, 
2002). Observing and responding to distress of  another individual can be seen as a basic 
evolutionarily conserved mechanism, shared with other animals (de Waal, 2008; Preston, 
2013), that point to a less cognition based or more unintentional, implicit, action based process. 
Thus, witnessing an emergency (e.g., a person fainting) results in preparation of  automatic 
helping behavior, and consequently in activation of  brain areas related to preparation for 
action and coupling between the situation and adaptive behavior. Indeed, recent research 
using a variety of  behavioral and neurophysiological methods has shown that already static 
social emotional information (e.g., emotional scenes or expressions) influences activation in 
the primary motor cortex (Hajcak et al., 2007; Schutter et al., 2008b), supplemental motor 
area, middle frontal gyrus and the cingulate gyrus (de Gelder et al., 2004) and that this can be 
explained as a preparation for action (Frijda, 1986; Lang, 1994). The next question is whether 
this automatically triggered preparation for action is already influenced by social context, i.e. 
group size.
In the present study we investigated the neurofunctional basis of  group influences on individual 
helping behavior. We used videos depicting the scene of  an emergency and we manipulated 
the presence and group size of  other persons at the scene. To tap into the automatic, attention-
The neural basis of  the bystander effect
[ 86 ]
Chapter 5
independent processes underlying helping behavior, participants performed a color detection 
task that was unrelated to the stimulus conditions and did not require cognitive involvement, 
or recognition or understanding of  the situation. We tested the hypothesis that an increase in 
group size will decrease activity in regions which lie at the core of  automatic preparation for 
action in the observer. This result would provide evidence of  the influence of  social context 




Seventeen healthy, right-handed volunteers, (three males) aged between 18 and 27 years 
participated in exchange for money. Participants reported no psychiatric or neurological 
history, normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no current use of  psychoactive medications, 
except for women taking oral contraceptives. Written informed consent was obtained and 
participants were unaware of  the aim of  the study. The experiment was carried out in 
accordance with the standards established by the Declaration of  Helsinki and approved by 
the local ethics committee.
Stimuli
A real life situation served as a starting point for creating short movie clips using local amateur 
actors. In each scenario the central character was a woman shown fainting and falling to the 
floor but the number of  people passing by her differed. Group size consisted of  none, one, two 
or four bystanders (by0, by1, by2, by4; Figure 1A). The people passing by were instructed 
to simply walk by when the woman fainted without intervention, but were allowed to look at 
the person in need if  they wanted to or did so spontaneously. The notion of  bystander usually 
refers to the situation where a crowd watches an emergency situation involving an individual, 
but experimental studies investigating the bystander effect have used multiple techniques (see 
Fischer et al., 2011) ranging from physical (increase in group size) to virtual (internet). Here 
our aim was to use a bystander situation that can occur in real life and allowed testing in the 
well-controlled environment of  a MRI scanner. We therefore used dynamic stimuli from the 
viewpoint of  a person looking across the street. Examples of  the stimuli are shown in the 
Video. As an illustration of  the realism and the notion of  automatic helping behavior, we 
report the following anecdote. During the recording of  one scene a woman who was not part 
of  the group of  actors rushed onto the set in distress and offered help to the woman ‘fainting’.
In total six unique videos per scenario were shot. The raw footage was edited using Adobe 
After Effects CS5 (Adobe Systems Inc., San Jose, CA, USA) and grayscale movies (720 × 576 
pixels, 25 frames/s, total duration of  3 s) were created. Movies were slightly blurred to reduce 
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availability of  facial information. Furthermore, a selection of  the movies with none, one, two, 
or four people passing by was inverted and reversed (Control). In addition, another control 
scenario was created in which the person fainting, without bystanders present, stood up again 
(Standing). In this scenario, half  of  the movies consisted of  the actress standing up again, 
whereas the other half  was due to lack of  material reversed and slowed down footage of  the 
last part of  the falling sequence to create the illusion that the person was standing up again. 
Movies were mirrored and three colored dots (80ms for each dot) were added to each movie 
for task purposes (see below). The dots always appeared on the bodies of  people in the scene.
Design and procedure
Subjects performed a color-naming task as used previously (see Pichon et al., 2012; Sinke et al., 
2010). This task is unrelated to the effect of  interest. Participants were instructed to indicate 
if  the three colored dots presented during the movie were of  the same or different colors 
(Figure 1B). To control for possible motor anticipation the response alternatives appeared 
randomly left or right of  the fixation cross and participants were instructed to react after offset 
of  the stimulus. Participants performed four practice trials on different stimuli, showing the 
actress standing and waiting, outside of  the scanner. There are several advantages of  using 
this task. It counteracts possible social desirable thoughts and ruminations. The participants 
remain naive to the goal of  the experiment since they are instructed to perform a color-
naming task and the content of  the movie is never mentioned to them. Thus, it will prevent 
excessive contemplation, but still allow a full comprehension of  the social situation. This is of  
importance, since we wanted to tap into the whole range of  activation related to responding 
to an emergency and not only into higher order, cognitive processes. This task counteracts 
possible differences in attention and the use of  cognitive resources during the course of  the 
experiment, between subjects and conditions. It will also allow a more ecological approach, 
as the demands on the subjects are similar as outside the laboratory. Instead of  active looking 
for possible emergency situations, humans are most of  the time suddenly confronted with an 
emergency while they are engaged in something else.
A slow-event related design was used. Following presentation of  the stimuli (3 s), an answer 
screen (2 s) and a fixation interval (9 or 11 s) were presented. Each session consisted of  4 
experimental functional runs. Each run consisted of  36 trials and a total of  144 trials were 
Video. Scan the QR code to see examples of  the stimuli.
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presented with 24 trials per condition (2 repetitions of  each unique and mirrored video). For 9 
participants an anatomical scan was performed after 2 runs, while the anatomical scan of  the 
other seven subjects was obtained in a separate session in which they performed a different 
experiment (Huis In ‘t Veld & de Gelder, 2015).
Stimuli were presented using Presentation Version 14.8 (www.neurobs.com), projected onto 
a screen located at the end of  the scanner bore. Participants viewed the stimuli via a mirror 
mounted with an angle of  ±45° to the head coil. Each movie started at a new scan volume, 
as the onset of  the stimuli was synchronized to a trigger from the scanner.
Image acquisition
Data was acquired with a 3-Tesla head scanner (MAGNETOM Allegra, Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany). Earplugs were used to attenuate scanner noise and padding was used to reduce 
head movements. Gradient-echo T2⁎-weighted transverse echo-planar images (EPI) with 
blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were used for functional scans. Each 
volume contained 32 axial slices acquired in an ascending-interleaved manner (repetition 
time (TR) = 2000 ms, echo time (TE) = 30 ms, slice thickness = 3.5 mm, no gap, flip angle 
(FA) = 90°, field of  view (FOV) = 224 x 224 mm2, matrix size = 64 × 64). We collected a total 
of  267 functional volumes for each subject as well as high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical 
images using parameters from the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (TR = 2250 
ms, TE = 2.6 ms, slice thickness = 1 mm, no gap, FA = 90°, FOV = 256 x 256  mm2, matrix 
size = 256 × 256).
fMRI preprocessing and analysis
Image preprocessing was carried out using BrainVoyager QX version 2.6 (Brain Innovation, 
the Netherlands, www.brainvoyager.com). The first 2 volumes of  each run were discarded 
to avoid T1 saturation effects. Preprocessing of  functional data consisted of  incremental 
linear trend removal, temporal high-pass filtering, a rigid-body algorithm to correct for small 
movements between scans and spatial smoothing with a 4 mm Gaussian kernel. Functional 
and anatomical data were normalized into Talairach space.
To map the increase and decrease in percentage change of  the BOLD signal with the increase 
in group size a parametric-coded single-subject fixed-effects general linear model (GLM) with 
control, standing and response screen as additional predictors was used (Figure 1C). Next, 
at the group level a random-effects GLM was performed. In addition, we calculated the 
following contrasts using a dummy-coded GLM. The influence of  visual complexity was 
determined with a control > (by1 + by2 + By4) contrast and the effect of  witnessing an 
emergency was investigated with the by0 > standing contrast. All analyses were restricted 
using a mask to exclude non-brain voxels.
The statistical threshold for single voxels was set at FDR < .05 with a cluster threshold of  
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40. For several maps we calculated the corrected cluster-level threshold (Forman et al., 1995; 
Goebel et al., 2006). This method corrects for multiple cluster tests across space. First, a single 
voxel threshold of  p = .005 (uncorrected) was used for initial statistical maps. As it was our 
analysis of  interest, we used a single voxel threshold of  p = .05 (uncorrected) to calculate 
the corrected cluster-level threshold for the parametric decrease in BOLD signal with the 
increase in group size. Next, a whole-brain correction criterion was calculated estimating a 
false-positive rate for each cluster taking into account the spatial smoothness of  the map. This 
was established by means of  Monte-Carlo simulation (5000 iterations) and the minimum 
cluster size threshold applied to the statistical maps corresponds to a cluster-level false-
positive rate (α) of  5%. Cluster size is reported in number of  anatomical voxels and the used 
statistical threshold is indicated for each analysis in the corresponding table. Statistical maps 
are displayed on the Colin 27 average brain.
Results
Data from one participant was discarded due to technical failure. Mean accuracy±SD during the 
color-naming task was 96.53±2.14. Comparing the different conditions revealed no differences 
in performance (p’s ≥ .09), indicating that task difficulty was not a factor in the fMRI analyses. 
Figure 1. Stimuli, task and illustration of  the analysis. Unprocessed stills of  examples of  the used scenarios where group 
size consisted of  none, one, two or four bystanders (A). Overview of  the color-naming task (B). A parametric analysis was used to map 
the increase and decrease in percentage change of  the BOLD signal with the increase in group size (C).
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Decrease in brain activity with the increase in group size
The parametric analysis showed a decrease in activity with the increase in group size in 
the left medial frontal gyrus and the left postcentral gyrus extending to the precentral gyrus 
(Figure 2A and Table 1).
Increase in brain activity with the increase in group size
The right superior occipital gyrus, right lingual gyrus, left cuneus, and left middle temporal 
gyrus showed a parametric increase in activity (Figure 2B and Table 1). The control > 
bystander contrast revealed significant clusters in the fusiform gyrus, precuneus, cuneus and 
middle temporal gyrus of  the right hemisphere (Table 2). Importantly, these regions only 
overlap with regions showing an increase, but not a decrease, in activation with the increase 
in group size.
Brain activity related to witnessing an emergency
The right cuneus was more active when the person was shown fainting and falling down 
without bystanders compared to the same person standing up again without bystanders. In 
Figure 2. Results from parametric analysis. Regions showing a decrease (A) or increase (B) in activation with the increase in 
group size.
Table 1. Parametric effect of  number of  bystanders
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z t p Cluster size
Decrease in activity with the increase in group sizea
Medial Frontal Gyrus LH 7 37 -9 4.94 .000177 2998
Postcentral Gyrusb LH -43 -26 45 4.19 .000783 3511
Increase in activity with the increase in group sizec
Lingual Gyrus RH 14 -74 -6 9.93 .000000 719
Superior Occipital Gyrus RH 32 -74 24 7.22 .000003 246
Cuneus LH -25 -80 24 6.60 .000008 58
Middle Temporal Gyrus LH -46 -68 18 7.65 .000001 166
a p <.05, cluster size corrected; b extending to the precentral gyrus; c FDR <.05. 
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Table 2. Control > Bystander
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z t p Cluster size
Fusiform Gyrus RH 29 -47 -3 4.97 .000169 583
Fusiform Gyrus RH 23 -65 -9 6.47 .000011 709
Precuneus RH 32 -65 30 5.34 .000083 612
Cuneus RH 2 -83 18 4.62 .000330 1194
Middle Temporal Gyrus RH 38 -53 3 4.94 .000179 401
p < .005, cluster size corrected.
Table 3. Falling versus Standing 
Talairach coordinates
Hemisphere x y z t p Cluster size
Falling > Standing
Cuneus RH -1 -95 18 6.14 .000019 804
Standing > Falling
Fusiform Gyrus RH 38 -35 -12 7.06 .000004 2020
Inferior Temporal Gyrus RH 44 -68 0 6.45 .000011 2863
Middle Occipital Gyrus RH 29 -83 3 4.67 .000300 373
Middle Temporal Gyrus LH -46 -65 9 6.16 .000018 4573
 p < .005, cluster size corrected.
addition, the right fusiform gyrus, right inferior temporal gyrus and left middle temporal 
gyrus and right middle occipital gyrus were more active when the person was standing up 
instead of  falling down (Table 3).
Discussion
The present study investigated the influence of  group size on neural activity during 
unintentional observation of  an emergency. The left precentral and postcentral gyri and the 
left medial frontal gyrus showed a decrease in activity with the increase in group size. In 
contrast, regions involved in visual processing and attention showed an increase in activity 
with the increase in group size. We propose that these results support the conclusion that 
group size during an emergency already influences activity in brain regions sustaining 
preparation for action.
Action is at the core of  survival of  the individual and the group (Panksepp, 1998), and 
activity in motor regions, including the precentral gyrus, has been found to be mediated 
by social emotion information (de Gelder et al., 2004; Hajcak et al., 2007; Pichon et al., 
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2012; Schutter et al., 2008b). The observed decrease in this area is in line with the proposed 
reduction in automatic action preparation with the increase in group size. This provides a 
new perspective on the negative influence of  group size on helping behavior as observed in 
the bystander effect. Automatic mechanisms can underlie the processing, action tendencies 
and the behavioral consequences of  social cues and these are already influenced by contextual 
information (Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). The selection of  an action, i.e. the decision to help 
or not, and providing help itself, can be implicit in nature, unintentional, independent of  
cognitive deliberation, while still be context-dependent (Preston, 2013). Indeed, empathic 
responses seem to be stimulus-driven and independent of  task instruction (Avenanti, Minio-
Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006). Moreover, previous studies using the same color-detection 
task as used here support the conjecture of  automatic action preparation in response to 
social emotional information regardless of  attention (Pichon et al., 2012; Sinke et al., 2010). 
For example, observing someone threatening another individual triggered activation in the 
premotor area and putamen regardless of  the focus of  attention (Sinke et al., 2010).
In addition to the precentral gyrus, the postcentral gyrus corresponding to the somatosensory 
cortex, and the medial frontal gyrus showed a decrease in activation with the increase in 
group size. Besides its importance for proprioception, the somatosensory cortex was found 
to be activated during the encoding of  actions for later enactment (Eschen et al., 2007). The 
somatosensory cortex, but also the medial frontal cortex, is activated during representations 
and regulation of  emotional states of  oneself  and other people (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, 
Cooper, & Damasio, 2000; Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; Pitcher, Garrido, Walsh, & 
Duchaine, 2008). The medial frontal cortex has been characterized as the visceral motor 
cortex (Neafsey et al., 1993) and is connected to a large number of  brain areas relevant for 
adaptive behavior such as the amygdala, hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray (Gabbott 
et al., 2005). Moreover, it is involved in sustaining the associations between events and 
corresponding adaptive responses (W. H. Alexander & Brown, 2011; Euston et al., 2012). 
Thus, the parametric decrease in this area may reflect implicit decoupling between the 
observation of  the emergency and action preparation in view of  the appropriate behavioral 
response (i.e. helping). Indeed, activity in the medial frontal cortex has been linked to daily 
helping behavior of  both friends and strangers (Rameson, Morelli, & Lieberman, 2012).
While the present results suggest that group size has already an effect at the level of  
preparation for action, this does not mean that other processes could not also play a role. 
For example, it was recently shown that in-group membership increases confrontational 
intervention in a bystander situation (Slater et al., 2013). Alternatively, higher-order processes 
could interact with automatic processes by possibly down-regulating corresponding neural 
activity. Therefore, in the present research we wanted to tap into automatic processing by 
focusing the attention of  the participant on an unrelated task, in order to keep cognitive 
resources and attention at a constant level between conditions and throughout the course of  
the experiment. This was successful as no effect of  the increase in group size was found on 
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performance during the color-naming task. It is therefore unlikely that cognitive processes 
could explain the present results. However, future research should manipulate task demands 
(e.g., difficulty, attention, instruction) to disentangle higher-order from automatic processes 
when witnessing an emergency.
One may argue that the activation in motor areas we find here relates to the motor response 
during the color-naming task. But this is unlikely in view of  the fact that several measures were 
taken to rule out the possibility that this could explain or mediate part of  the results. First, 
a delayed response was used (i.e. participants responded after offset of  the stimulus) thereby 
increasing the possibility to disentangle task-related and stimulus-related activations. Second, 
the response alternatives appeared randomly on the left or right of  the screen in order to 
prevent motor anticipatory activity. Third, the response screen was also taken into account in 
the regression model in order to control for motor-related confounds. It is therefore unlikely 
that the present results are task- and not stimulus-driven.
The increase in activation with the increase in group size was limited to visual regions. It 
is suggested that vision is always affective vision (Pessoa, 2012). For instance, emotionally 
arousing content increases activation in extrastriate areas (Lang et al., 1998). However, given 
the overlap between areas showing an increase in activity with the increase in group size and 
areas activated in the visual control contrast, it is likely that the former activation is due to the 
increase in visual complexity.
A recent meta-analysis suggests that the bilateral insular cortex and medial and anterior 
cingulate cortex are activated when witnessing another individual’s suffering (Lamm, Decety, 
& Singer, 2011). In the present study, we found that when witnessing an emergency without 
bystanders, activation was limited to the right cuneus. We provide two explanations for this 
contrast with the existing literature. First, empathy consists of  multiple different phenomena 
ranging from emotion contagion to sympathy to cognitive empathy (F. Deutsch & Madle, 1975; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002). The present study did not focus on deliberate observation of  an 
individual’s suffering but on the consequence of  unintentional observation of  an emergency. 
Using a color-naming task we might have canceled cognitive empathy and other higher-order 
forms of  empathy and more tapped into reflexive preparation to help (Preston & de Waal, 
2002). Thus, one would expect that if  the participant is given more time to contemplate the 
event, activation would shift to brain regions important for higher order empathic processes. 
Another explanation might be the occurrence of  a repetition effect. The initial perception 
to the emergency might result in a strong emotional reaction in the subject, but repetitive 
presentation might reduce this reaction and corresponding activation patterns. While in the 
present study this possible effect might be reduced given the implicit processing of  the stimuli, 
it might still have affected emotional and empathic reactions and thus corresponding neural 
patterns.
The neural basis of  the bystander effect
[ 94 ]
Chapter 5
In conclusion, our results provide insight in the neural mechanisms of  the bystander effect and 
show that group size influences neural responses already at the level of  preparation for action. 
Subsequently, this reduces the individual’s spontaneous tendency to help. The present study 
illustrates how complex and well-described social phenomena such as the bystander effect can 
be investigated inside the laboratory and how this may lead to a better understanding of  the 
underlying neural mechanisms of  social behavior.
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Chapter 6
Personal distress and the influence of  bystanders on responding to an emergency
This chapter is in revision as:
Hortensius R, Schutter DJLG & de Gelder B. Personal distress and the influence of  bystand-
ers on responding to an emergency. 




Spontaneous helping behavior during an emergency is influenced by the personality of  the 
onlooker and by social situational factors such as the presence of  bystanders. Here, we sought 
to determine the influence of  sympathy, an other-oriented response, and personal distress, a 
self-oriented response, on the effect of  bystanders during an emergency. In four experiments, 
we investigated whether trait levels of  sympathy and personal distress predicted responses 
to an emergency in the presence of  bystanders using behavioral measures and single-pulse 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation. Sympathy and personal distress were expected to be 
associated with a faster response to an emergency without bystanders present, while only 
personal distress would predict a slower response to an emergency with bystanders present. 
Results of  a cued-reaction time task showed that people who reported higher levels of  
personal distress and sympathy responded faster to an emergency without bystanders (Exp. 
1). In contrast to predictions, perspective taking but not personal distress was associated with 
slower reaction times with an increasing number of  bystanders during an emergency (Exp. 
2). However, the decrease in motor corticospinal excitability, a direct physiological measure 
of  action preparation, with the increase in the number of  bystanders was solely predicted by 
personal distress (Exp. 3). Incorporating cognitive load manipulations during the observation 
of  an emergency suggests that personal distress is linked to an effect of  bystanders on reflexive 
responding to an emergency (Exp. 4). Taken together, these results indicate that the presence 
of  bystanders during an emergency reduces action preparation in people with a disposition 
to experience personal distress.
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Introduction
When confronted with a person in distress, most people react to the situation by rushing 
forward to help. Generally, two types of  emotional reactions to an emergency situation that 
promote helping behavior are distinguished, namely personal distress and sympathy (for a 
review see C. D. Batson et al., 1987). Both state and trait levels of  sympathy and personal 
distress have been linked to helping behavior (Archer, Diaz-Loving, Gollwitzer, Davis, 
& Foushee, 1981; Carlo, Allen, & Buhman, 1999; Cialdini et al., 1987; Coke, Batson, & 
McDavis, 1978; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg, Fabes, et al., 1989a; Eisenberg, Miller, 
et al., 1989b). However, sympathy and personal distress markedly differ in terms of  underlying 
motivations. The former results in altruistic-driven (other-oriented; feelings of  sympathy and 
compassion for the victim) and the latter in egoistic-driven (self-oriented; feelings of  distress 
and discomfort in the observer) helping behavior (C. D. Batson et al., 1987; C. D. Batson, 
O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983; M. H. Davis, 1983). 
Although feelings of  personal distress and sympathy each lead to helping behavior, the 
underlying incentive to help may thus be very different. As such it could be argued that social 
situation or context could have a different influence on these two factors. Indeed, studies 
have shown that helping behavior, driven by personal distress, is reduced when the aversive 
situation can be easily avoided, while sympathy-driven helping behavior is not (C. D. Batson 
et al., 1983; C. D. Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Coke et al., 1978; Toi 
& Batson, 1982). Contextual effects have also been reported for trait measures of  other- and 
self-oriented responses to emergency situations (C. D. Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-
Benefiel, 1986; Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer, & Speer, 1991; Romer, Gruder, & Lizzadro, 
1986). Romer and colleagues (1986) reported that people with an altruistic orientation offered 
the most help when no compensation (experimental credits) was given. Interestingly, helping 
was reduced in this group when compensation was offered. Furthermore, social evaluation 
of  the latent helper by the experimenter influences the relation between personal distress 
and helping behavior, but not between sympathy and helping behavior (Archer et al., 1981; 
Eisenberg, Miller, et al., 1989b; Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986). For 
example, directly manipulated and self-reported concerns for social evaluation did not account 
for the positive relation between trait sympathy and helping behavior (Eisenberg, Miller, et 
al., 1989b). Taken together, social context has a more pronounced and negative influence on 
the relation between personal distress and helping behavior than helping behavior driven by 
sympathy. 
Helping behavior also decreases when more people are present at the scene. This 
phenomenon is known as the “bystander effect” (Darley & Latané, 1968). Several cognition-
based explanations, including notions like diffusion of  responsibility or pluralistic ignorance 
have been given for this lack of  helping behavior (Latané & Darley, 1970). The decision 
model proposed by Latané and Darley (1970) describes the explicit cognitive calculation in 
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terms of  attentional capture, evaluation, responsibility, beliefs and the conscious decision 
to help. Interference can occur at any of  these levels. However, this model does not cover 
the entire range of  explanations (for example S. M. Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 
2002), or the emerging view on helping behavior and prosocial behavior (Preston, 2013; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Zaki, 2014). Helping behavior is observed 
across species, ranging from rats (Ben-Ami Bartal, Decety, & Mason, 2011; Ben-Ami Bartal, 
Rodgers, Bernardez Sarria, Decety, & Mason, 2014; Márquez, Rennie, Costa, & Moita, 
2015; Sato, Tan, Tate, & Okada, 2015) to chimpanzees (Warneken et al., 2007; Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2006). The act of  helping is not necessarily a deliberate one. As was described in 
Preston (2013), providing help is rooted in an evolutionarily conserved mechanism, offspring 
care, with fixed action patterns (see also Decety, Norman, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2012). This 
bottom-up view highlights the importance of  a neural mechanism for fast context-dependent, 
goal-directed responses. Merely the observation of  a salient emotional situation – for example, 
witnessing a person in distress – triggers a wide variety of  reflexive responses (de Waal, 2008; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002), including increased action readiness and preparation (e.g., fight-
flight responses) (de Gelder et al., 2004; Frijda, 1986; Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014; Hajcak et 
al., 2007; Lang et al., 1993; Schutter et al., 2008b). 
In a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we investigated the neural 
basis of  the bystander effect by manipulating the number of  bystanders present at an 
emergency (Hortensius & de Gelder, 2014). The results showed a decrease in activity with an 
increase in the number of  bystanders in the left precentral and postcentral gyrus and medial 
frontal gyrus when participants witnessed an emergency. This suggests that the number of  
bystanders influences neural responses in brain regions dedicated to motor-related behavior, 
possibly indicative of  action preparation during the observation of  emergency (de Gelder 
et al., 2004; Hajcak et al., 2007; Pichon et al., 2012; Schutter et al., 2008b). An outstanding 
question is how trait levels of  sympathy and personal distress influence the effect of  bystanders 
on action preparation. 
In the present study, we examined the extent to which trait sympathy and personal distress 
predict reaction times during a cued-reaction time task when participants witnessed an 
emergency without bystanders (Exp. 1), and when the number of  bystanders was manipulated 
during an emergency (Exp. 2). We hypothesized that both trait personal distress and sympathy 
would predict faster responses to an emergency, as compared with a nonemergency situation 
without bystanders (Exp. 1). Furthermore, we expected that an increase in the number of  
bystanders would result in slower responses to an emergency situation. Based on the previously 
found negative influence of  social context (e.g., possibility to escape the situation, exposure 
to social evaluation) on helping behavior driven by personal distress, we anticipate that this 
slowing of  reaction times with an increase in the number of  bystanders will be predicted by 
personal distress and not sympathy (Exp. 2). 
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Methods
Participants
Sixty-two volunteers, between 18 and 29 years of  age, participated in exchange for course 
credits. In all, 18 female and 12 male students took part in Experiment 1, and 21 different 
female and 11 different male students took part in Experiment 2. Right-handed (n = 56), 
left-handed (n = 5) and ambidextrous (n = 1) participants were included. In Experiment 2, 
the data from two participants were lost due to technical failure and were replaced by new 
volunteers. Participants were unaware of  the aim of  the study. Written informed consent was 
obtained, and the experiment was carried out in accordance with the standards set by the 
Declaration of  Helsinki. 
Stimuli
The stimuli used in Hortensius & de Gelder (2014) were slightly modified for the present 
purpose. A simulation of  a street-side event was used as a starting point to create an 
emergency situation in which a woman was shown fainting and falling to the floor. During this 
emergency, people were passing by (henceforth: the bystanders). The original short video clips 
were recorded from the viewpoint of  a person looking across the street. The grayscale video 
clips were blurred in order to reduce visibility of  facial expressions and other non-relevant 
information. In the present experiment, we made several changes to the existing video clips. 
First and foremost, besides the fainting and falling scenario, we created a nonemergency 
situation in which the woman stood up in a completely natural way. Using Photoshop CS2 
(Adobe Systems Inc., San Jose, CA, USA) we overlaid the bystander sequence on both types of  
situations. This made sure that (a) the emergency and nonemergency situations were similar 
in terms of  bystanders, but differed only in the action of  the woman, and (b) the action of  the 
woman was similar for all the bystander conditions. Both the increase in visual complexity 
between the emergency and nonemergency situations and the emotional impact of  the action 
of  the woman with different numbers of  bystanders were kept similar. To increase realism, 
actions of  the target character and bystanders happened within the same time window. In 
total, six scenarios were created, with the situation being either an emergency (woman falling) 
or a nonemergency (woman standing up) and the number of  bystanders consisting of  none, 
one or four bystanders. Six unique videos per scenario (three different actors and groups, 
with two repetitions) lasting 1s were created. Figure 1 and the Video show examples of  the 
stimuli used. 
In addition, scrambled versions of  videos were made in MATLAB (version R2011b, The 
MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, USA) using a Fourier-based transformation of  each phase 
spectra of  every video frame. This procedure removes all social-emotional information except 
for low-level visual parameters such as movement and spatial frequency. These scrambled 
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videos served as a low-level visual control condition.
Task
To measure the effect of  an emergency on reaction times, an adapted cued-reaction time task 
was used. In a cued-reaction time task, a preparation cue is presented before a response cue, 
which allows the participants to prepare their response (Hagura, Kanai, Orgs, & Haggard, 
2012; van Boxtel & Böcker, 2012). A video clip was presented in between the onsets of  the 
preparation cue and the go cue (Figure 2). Following a preparation cue (blue dot) at the onset 
of  the video clip, a go cue (green dot) was presented after 1s – that is, the offset of  the video 
clip – to inform the participant to respond. Both cues were presented for 160ms. On 20% 
of  the trials in Experiment 1, and 12.5% of  the trials in Experiment 2, a no-go cue (red dot) 
was presented.
The social situation may influence ongoing emotional and cognitive processes that can 
be measured by means of  reaction times after offset of  the video. This rationale is taken 
from other studies using emotional Stroop tasks, gaze cueing paradigms, and emotional go/
no go tasks to map individual differences in processing emotional and social information 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). The present setup allows us 
to assess responses to an emergency without explicit measures in a relatively well-controlled 
environment and reaction times are taken as an index of  action preparation during the non-
intentional observation of  an emergency.
Questionnaire
Empathy can be thought of  as a multifaceted concept consisting of  phenomena like mimicry, 
sympathy and perspective taking (Preston & de Waal, 2002). In line with this multidimensional 
approach, we used the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) to measure trait empathy (M. H. 
Davis, 1980; 1983; De Corte et al., 2007). This questionnaire assesses several different aspects 
Figure 1. Stills of  the stimuli used in the study.
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of  empathy. Besides perspective taking and fantasy (i.e., the ability to transpose oneself  to a 
fictional situation), the IRI measures empathic concern and personal distress. The former 
trait measures sympathy and compassion for less fortunate others (i.e., an other-oriented 
emotional reaction), whereas the latter measures the experience of  discomfort in response to 
distress in others (i.e., a self-oriented emotional reaction). The difference between personal 
distress and empathic concern becomes clear when one looks at example items to measure 
personal distress – for example, “I tend to lose control during emergencies” and “When I see 
someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces” – and empathic concern – 
for example, “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”, “I 
am often quite touched by things that I see happen”. In the literature, a variety of  terms are 
used to describe an other-oriented emotional response to the distress of  another person (C. D. 
Batson, 2009). Empathic concern and sympathy, the most commonly used labels in the literature, 
are often used interchangeably. The usage of  the term empathic concern might however result 
in confusion, because it suggests that empathic concern and empathy are the same. Empathy 
refers to the multifaceted concept, while empathic concern is an aspect of  this concept (Wispé, 
1986). In line with the existing literature, we will use the term sympathy when referring to the 
trait measure of  an other-oriented emotional reaction. 
Procedure
The task and experimental procedure were identical for both experiments, unless otherwise 
specified. The experimental session started with six practice trials of  the cued-reaction time 
task, using video clips of  a woman standing and waiting. Next, participants completed a 
baseline block with the scrambled versions of  videos used in the subsequent experimental 
blocks. In Experiment 1, only the two scenarios without bystanders were used in the main 
experimental blocks, whereas in Experiment 2, all six scenarios were used. No mention was 
made with respect to the content of  the movies. Original and mirrored videos were included 
to prevent the possible influence of  direction of  movement in the videos (e.g., left motion 
direction) on the subsequent response. The stimuli were presented in a randomized order, 
and repeated twice, resulting in 24 go trials per condition. Participants were instructed to 
respond as quickly as possible with the index finger of  their dominant hand and to fixate 
on the fixation cross shown continuously during the task. After the cued-reaction time task, 
participants completed the Dutch version of  the IRI.
Video. Scan the QR code to see examples of  the stimuli.
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Data reduction and analysis
Reaction times below <150ms and >1500ms were removed from analysis (mean±SD 
percentage of  trials removed: Exp. 1, 5.33±1.43 %; Exp. 2: 3.12±2.18 %), as well as 
incorrect trials (mean±SD percentage of  false alarms and misses: Exp. 1: 2.30±2.48 %; Exp. 
2: 2.27±2.17 %). Reaction times were calculated as percentage changes from the baseline 
(scrambled) block (set at 100 %). 
In Experiment 1 a paired-sample t-test was performed to look at the difference in reaction 
times between an emergency and nonemergency situations. In addition, we subtracted the 
baseline-corrected reaction times of  the nonemergency from those of  the emergency trials 
to calculate a bias score, so that negative values indicated faster response to the emergency 
situation. In Experiment 2, a general linear model (GLM) for repeated measurements with 
situation (2) and number of  bystanders (3) as within-subject factors was used to test the 
difference in influences of  the number of  bystanders on baseline-corrected reaction times 
during the observation of  an emergency versus a nonemergency situation. Given the a priori 
predictions, we tested for a significant linear trend contrast. Paired-samples t-tests were used 
for the post-hoc testing. 
To investigate the relationship between trait personal distress and sympathy and responses 
to an emergency, linear regression analyses were employed for both experiments. In the first 
Figure 2. Cued-reaction time task. Between a preparation and a response cue, a video clip was shown. Participants responded 
as fast as possible to the go cue with the index finger of  their dominant hand.
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step, the hypothesized predictors were entered into the model (Exp. 1: trait personal distress 
and sympathy; Exp. 2: trait personal distress), whereas in Step 2, the remaining scales were 
added in a stepwise fashion (method: probability of  F to enter <.05; criteria probability of  
F to remove >.1). Cohen’s effect size (ƒ2) was calculated using the formula: ƒ2 = R2 / (1–R2), 
with effect sizes of  around 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 being interpreted as small, medium, and large, 
respectively (Cohen, 1988). The alpha level of  significance was set at .05 (two-tailed). 
Results 
Experiment 1
No difference in reaction times was found between emergency (mean±SEM percentage 
change from the baseline, 98.56±1.19 %) and nonemergency (99.13±1.18 %) situations, 
t(29) = -0.44, p = .66. A significant linear regression model was observed for the emergency-
nonemergency bias score, F(2, 27) = 13.16, p < .001, R2 = .49, ƒ2 = .96 (Table 1). In line 
with our expectations, participants with higher self-reported trait personal distress, β = -.35, 
p = .02, and sympathy, β = -.54, p = .001, responded faster to an emergency than to a 
nonemergency situation without bystanders (Figure 3). 
Experiment 2
Table 2 shows the reaction times across conditions. No main effect for situation, F(1, 29) 
= 3.69, p = .07, or number of  bystanders, F(2, 58) = 0.40, p = .67, was observed. Contrary 
to expectations, no significant interaction between situation and number of  bystanders was 
found, F(2, 58) = 1.43, p = .25. The linear trend for this interaction was also not significant, 
F(1, 29) = .99, p = .33, indicating that the linear effect of  the number of  bystanders on 
reaction times did not vary as a function of  the situation. To determine whether trait personal 
distress predicted the effect of  an increase in the number of  bystanders during an emergency 
situation, we calculated the regression slope of  the reaction times as a function of  the number 
of  bystanders in each situation (emergency and nonemergency). This analysis was adapted 
from the perceptual-processing literature, in which the slope of  the reaction times is calculated 
as a function of  set size (for example Golan, Bentin, DeGutis, Robertson, & Harel, 2014; 
Lockhart et al., 2014; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). In the present study, the slope indicated the 
change in reaction times with an increasing number of  bystanders, and fits with the previously 
used parametric approach on group influences (Hortensius & de Gelder, 2014), as well as the 
finding that the bystander effect grows larger as the number of  bystanders increases (Fischer 
et al., 2011). If  the number of  bystanders has a disruptive effect on the perception of  and 
reaction to an emergency, people would be slower when the number of  bystanders increases, 
and thus reaction times will increase (positive slope). If, on the other hand, an increase in 
the number of  bystanders has no effect, reaction times would not increase and the slope 
will be zero. Finally, a negative slope would indicate a decrease in reaction times: people 
Personal distress and the bystander effect
[ 106 ]
Chapter 6
respond faster when the number of  bystanders increases. A positive and negative slope may 
be indicative of  a decreased or increased tendency for helping behavior, respectively. The 
current findings showed a positive slope in the emergency situation, mean±SEM, 0.48±0.21, 
and the nonemergency situation, 0.17±0.251. These slopes were not significantly different 
from each other, t(28) = 1.17, p = .25. While the nonemergency slope did not differ, t(29) = 
0.67, p = .51, the emergency slope was significantly larger than zero, t(28) = 2.33, p = .03. 
A significant model was found for the emergency slope, F(2, 26) = 4.18, p = .03, R2 = .24,ƒ2 = 
.32 (Table 3). While personal distress was positively associated with the slowing of  reaction 
times with an increase in the number of  bystanders, β =0 .29, p = .11, it was neither a significant 
nor the sole predictor in the model. The slope was predicted by perspective taking, β = .46, p 
= .022. Interestingly, when responding to the emergency situation, people with higher levels 
of  trait perspective taking showed a stronger effect of  the number of  bystanders. In other 
words, people with a disposition to adopt the perspectives of  other people became slower 
when the number of  bystanders increases during an emergency. In line with expectations, 
Table 1. Outcome of  regression analysis for emergency – nonemergency bias score in Experiment 1
b β p
Step 1
Overall model: F(2,27) = 13.16, p < .001, R2 = .49, ƒ2 = .96
Constant 29.36±5.95 [17.15, 41.57] <.001
Personal distress -0.67±0.27 [-1.22, -0.12] -.35 .02
Sympathy -0.98±0.25 [-1.50, -0.46] -.54 .001
Step 2
Perspective taking* .16 .29
Fantasy* .09 .58
b = unstandardized coefficients±standard error [95% confidence intervals], β = standardized coefficient. * Removed predictors.
Figure 3. Trait personal distress and sympathy predicted faster responses to an emergency than to a 
nonemergency situation without bystanders.
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sympathy did not predict the influence of  the number of  bystanders, β =0 .11, p = .64. No 
significant model was found for the nonemergency slope, F(1, 28) = 0.59, p = .45, R2 = .02. 
Discussion
Consistent with our predictions, trait personal distress and sympathy were associated with 
faster responses to an emergency situation without bystanders present (Exp. 1). However, in 
contrast to our expectations, personal distress did not significantly predict the effect of  the 
number of  bystanders on reaction times during an emergency (Exp. 2). Perspective taking 
predicted slower responses to an emergency situation with an increase in the number of  
bystanders. This finding concurs with previous explanations of  the bystander effect that 
appeal to a more cognitive level including diffusion of  responsibility and pluralistic ignorance 
(Latané & Darley, 1970). Work by Clark and Word (1972) showed that the bystander effect 
is driven by ambiguity. Only during ambiguous situations was helping behavior reduced by 
the presence of  bystanders. In the present experiment, the situation could be viewed as more 
ambiguous when there were more bystanders present. This bystander-induced ambiguity 
may have resulted in an increased need to evaluate the situation, the state of  the woman, and 
the behavior of  the bystanders, especially so for people with higher levels of  trait perspective 
taking. The consequence of  this is a slower response to the emergency situation.
Is this slowing in response the result of  a slower response selection or increased top-down 
control of  anticipatory responses? In the present cued-reaction time task, the preparation 
cue displayed before a go cue allows participants to already prepare their response and 
this can be influenced by the presented situation (emergency or nonemergency situation). 
Faster reaction times may thus be indicative of  increased action preparation, whereas slower 
reaction times indicate a decrease in action preparation. While with a cued-reaction time task 
like the one used here, reaction times serve as a proxy for action preparation, the difficulty 
of  using reaction times is in distinguishing between the preparation and execution of  the 
Table 2. Mean reaction times ± standard errors in percentage changes from baseline for Experiment 2
No bystanders One bystander Four bystanders
Emergency 86.34±2.14 87.83±2.13 87.86±1.91
Nonemergency 89.21±1.95 88.24±1.80 89.34±1.96
1 One individual with a slope (-5.21) three standard deviations from the mean in the emergency situation was removed from the 
analyses. With this individual the slopes for the emergency (0.29±0.28) and nonemergency situation (0.11±0.25) where not sig-
nificantly different from each other, t(29) = 0.63, p = .54 or from zero, t(29) = 1.06, p = .30 and t(29) = 0.44, p = .66 respectively. 
2 With inclusion of  the outlier a significant model appeared, F(2, 27) = 5.11, p = .01, R2 = .28, ƒ2 = .39, in which personal distress, β 
= .38, p = .03, and perspective taking, β = .41, p = .02, predicted the emergency slope.
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response. Moreover, contextual effects on reaction times can be driven by perceptual or action 
processes or a combination of  both. One way to overcome this issue is to directly target the 
human primary motor cortex by means of  transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Using 
this technique, a noninvasive magnetic pulse is delivered at the surface of  the scalp overlying 
the primary motor cortex. This pulse results in a current flow in the cortex and produces a 
motor-evoked potential (MEP). Motor corticospinal excitability can be quantified by MEP 
amplitude. Single-pulse TMS to map motor corticospinal excitability levels when individuals 
observe a social cue has been used in the study of  action observation (Avenanti, Candidi, & 
Urgesi, 2013; Fadiga et al., 1995), emotion (Hajcak et al., 2007; Schutter et al., 2008b), and 
empathy (Hétu, Taschereau-Dumouchel, & Jackson, 2012). Importantly, increases in MEP 
amplitude has been proposed to index action preparation (Coombes et al., 2009; Hajcak et 
al., 2007; Schutter et al., 2008b; van Loon et al., 2010).
In the third experiment we used single-pulse TMS to measure changes in motor corticospinal 
excitability levels to further substantiate the influence of  personal distress. By probing the 
primary motor cortex of  healthy individuals we aimed to extend the previous experiments by 
directly quantifying changes in the motor system as a function of  the number of  bystanders 
during an emergency situation. TMS studies have shown that when confronted with pain 
in another individual, both state and trait measures of  personal distress increase, rather 
than decrease, motor corticospinal excitability in the onlooker (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, 
Sforza, & Aglioti, 2009). Moreover, trait personal distress has been positively correlated 
with higher motor corticospinal excitability levels in response to viewing negative valenced 
pictures (Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2014a). These results suggest that a disposition 
to experience distress can have a direct influence on perception and action. Indeed, a recent 
study using kinematics showed that trait personal distress predicted reduced motor control 
in participants who were confronted with another person’s negative emotions (Ferri et al., 
Table 3. Outcome of  regression analysis for emergency slope in Experiment 2
b β p
Step 1
Overall model: F(1,27) = 1.19, p = .29, R2 = .04
Constant -0.19±0.65 [-1.52, 1.15] .78
Personal distress 0.34±0.31[-0.30, 0.98] .21 .29
Step 2
Overall model: F(2,26) = 4.18, p = .03, R2 = .24, ƒ2 = .32
Constant -3.07±1.24 [-5.62, -0.51] .02
Personal distress 0.48±0.29 [-0.11, 1.07] .29 .11
Perspective taking 0.96±0.36 [0.21, 1.71] .46 .01
Sympathy* -.11 .64
Fantasy* -.006 .98
b = unstandardized coefficients ± standard error [95% confidence intervals], β = standardized coefficient. * Removed predictors.
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2010). In line with these findings, we expected that the linear decrease in motor corticospinal 
excitability levels as a function of  increasing number of  bystanders during an emergency 
would be predicted by personal distress. 
Interestingly, previous studies have observed a relationship between trait levels of  perspective 
taking and motor corticospinal excitability levels (Avenanti et al., 2009; Borgomaneri, 
Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2014b). These findings were opposite to the pattern found for personal 
distress and interpreted as simulation of  the (action) state of  the observed individual and not 
action preparation. While we do not foresee an effect of  perspective taking, these observations 
suggest that if  perspective taking is predictive of  the influence of  bystanders on responding to 




Twenty-three right-handed volunteers (19 women, four men), between 19 and 27 years of  
age, participated in the experiment in exchange for course credits or payment. Participants 
were screened for contraindications for non-invasive brain stimulation (Keel et al., 2001). 
None of  the volunteers had a history of  psychiatric or neurological disease, and all had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants were naïve as to the aim of  the study, 
and written informed consent was obtained. The study was approved by the medical ethics 
committee of  the University Medical Center Utrecht and Utrecht University, Utrecht, The 
Netherlands. Stimulation parameters were in agreement with the International Federation 
of  Clinical Neurophysiology safety guidelines (Rossi et al., 2009) and in accordance with the 
standards set by the Declaration of  Helsinki.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
A biphasic magnetic brain stimulator (maximum output 4,160 A peak/1,750 VAC peak) with 
a modified 8-shaped iron core coil (Neopulse, Atlanta, GA, USA) was used for stimulation 
over the left M1.
Motor Evoked Potentials
Motor evoked potentials were recorded with active Ag-AgCl electrodes (11 x 17mm) using an 
ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, the Netherlands) from the right abductor pollicis 
brevis (APB) in a belly-tendon montage with the active electrode placed at the muscle belly 
of  the right APB and the reference electrode located at the proximal phalanx of  the thumb 
(Baumgartner et al., 2007; Hajcak et al., 2007; Schutter et al., 2008b). The ground (CMS-
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DRL) electrode was attached to the wrist. The sampling rate was set at 2048 Hz, and the 
signal was offline high-pass filtered (3dB cutoff frequency: 20Hz, roll-off 24dB/dB/octave).
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the experimenter explained the procedure, and participants 
provided written informed consent and answered several questions on present physical 
and mental well-being. Participants were seated in a comfortable dentist chair, with their 
arms placed on the upper leg and the palm of  the hand facing upward. The resting motor 
threshold (MT) of  the left hemisphere was assessed by means of  the standardized visual 
thumb movement procedure (Schutter & van Honk, 2006). During the task, TMS intensity 
was set at 120% MT. Participants were instructed to relax their body and not to focus on their 
hands, but to fixate on the fixation cross shown continuously during the task. Participants did 
not need to respond during stimulus presentation. The same stimuli as used in Experiment 2 
were presented in random order, with a blank screen with a fixation cross (4800–5200ms) in 
between. Thus, six conditions were used, with the situation (emergency versus nonemergency) 
and the number of  bystanders (none, one or four bystanders) as within-subjects factors. As in 
the previous two experiments, no mention was made with respect to the content of  the movies. 
The TMS pulse was pseudorandomly delivered between 800 and 1,000ms (in six steps of  
40ms) after stimulus onset. This procedure is commonly used in single-pulse TMS studies to 
prevent anticipation by the participants (for example Avenanti et al., 2005). In the present 
study, the timing of  the pulse did not affect MEP amplitudes, as shown by a general linear 
model (GLM) for repeated measurements with timing of  pulse (6) as within-subject factors, 
F(5, 100) = 0.82, p = .51. Figure 4 shows the TMS procedure. Similar to Experiments 1 and 
2, the procedure started with three practice trials (woman standing and waiting), followed by 
the scrambled videos of  the scenarios serving as the baseline (12 trials) and lastly, random 
presentation of  the six scenarios (12 trials per condition). As in the previous two experiments, 
participants completed the IRI at the end of  the experiment. Upon completion, participants 
were debriefed and received payment. 
Data analysis
The data from one participant were removed because of  noisy and unstable EMG signal, and 
data from a second participant was removed because of  failure to comply with instructions 
(i.e., excessive movement during testing). MEP was quantified as the peak-to-peak amplitude 
of  the maximal EMG response. Every trial was visually inspected, and this was done blind to 
the stimulus condition. Trials containing excessive background EMG and abnormal MEPs 
were removed. Mean±SD percentage of  trials removed across the participants was 4.37±4.15 
%. MEP amplitudes were calculated as percentage change from MEP amplitude during the 
baseline (scrambled) block.
For the statistical analyses a similar procedure to that described in Experiment 2 was 
followed. First, to test the influence of  the number of  bystanders on MEP amplitude during 
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the observation of  an emergency versus a nonemergency, a general linear model (GLM) for 
repeated measurements with situation (2) and number of  bystanders (3) as within-subject 
factors was used.
Next, we calculated the slope of  the MEP amplitude with the increase in the number of  
bystanders for the emergency and nonemergency situations for each individual. A negative 
slope would indicate that MEP amplitude decreased as a function of  the number of  
bystanders. A decrease in MEP amplitude reflects a decrease in action preparation, and an 
increase would reflect an increase in action preparation. To examine the relation between 
trait personal distress and the effect of  the number of  bystanders on MEP amplitude, a 
similar linear regression analysis was employed as in Experiment 2. Trait personal distress 
was entered in the first step, while in step two the three other trait empathy scores were added 
to the model in a stepwise fashion. Trait empathy scores of  one participant were missing, 
resulting in a sample of  20 participants for the regression analyses. 
Figure 4 Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) task. Motor-evoked potentials (MEP) were recorded to a TMS pulse 
that was pseudorandomly delivered between 800 and 1,000ms after video clip onset.




TMS was well tolerated and no adverse events occurred. Table 4 shows the MEP amplitude 
across conditions. No main effect for situation, F(1, 20) = 0.97, p = .34, number of  bystanders, 
F(2, 40) = 0.54, p = .59, or interaction between situation and number of  bystanders, F(2, 40) 
= 0.30, p = .74, were found. Additionally, we tested if  trait personal distress predicted the 
effect of  the increase in the number of  bystanders on motor corticospinal excitability levels 
during an emergency. A significant linear regression model was observed for the emergency 
slope, F(1,17) = 5.42, p = .03, R2 = .24, ƒ2 = .32 (Table 5). In line with the expectations, 
personal distress was negatively related to the effect of  the number of  bystanders during an 
emergency on motor corticospinal excitability level, β = -.49, p = .033. No significant model 
emerged for the nonemergency slope, F(1, 19) = 0.77, p = .39, R2 = .04.
Discussion
In the third experiment, we examined the effect of  the number of  bystanders during an 
emergency situation on a direct measure of  the motor system using single-pulse TMS. No linear 
decrease in motor corticospinal excitability levels was observed with an increasing number of  
bystanders when participants witnessed an emergency. In line with our expectations, people 
with higher levels of  personal distress showed a stronger decrease in motor corticospinal 
excitability levels during the observation of  an emergency when the number of  bystanders 
increased. 
In the previous two experiments we observed that both personal distress and perspective taking 
are associated with the effect of  the number of  bystanders on responding to an emergency. 
Using a direct measure of  the physiological state of  the motor system we found that only 
personal distress and not sympathy or perspective taking predicted the effect of  the number 
of  bystanders. These results suggest that the effect of  bystanders on the initial response to an 
emergency may be indeed related to action preparation (Hortensius & de Gelder, 2014). To 
further quantify this relation between personal distress and the effect of  bystanders and to 
disentangle the influence of  perspective taking and personal distress on action preparation, 
we studied the influence of  automaticity and cognitive involvement on these processes in a 
final experiment.
Several studies have started to explore if  reactions to distressful events are automatic (for 
3 As in Experiment 1 and 2, we checked for outliers. In line with Cook and Weisberg (1982), we removed one individual with Cook’s 
distance of  1.39. With this individual included, a similar, but weaker, model appeared, F(1, 18) = 3.72, p = .07, R2 = .17, ƒ2 = .20, in 
which personal distress predicted the emergency slope, β = -.41, p = .07.
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example Gu & Han, 2007; Morelli & Lieberman, 2013; Rameson et al., 2012; Yamada & 
Decety, 2009). For example, Rand and Epstein (2014) showed that the decision making process 
for extreme altruistic acts can be described as fast, intuitive and reflexive. Of  course, it is not 
an all or nothing mechanism. Some aspects of  an empathic reaction can be automatic and 
reflexive, while others are deliberate and reflective in nature. Fan and Han (2008) showed that 
late, but not early components are influenced by task manipulation. Moreover, inter-individual 
differences in terms of  automaticity and attentional malleability of  empathic responses have 
been reported (Rameson et al., 2012). Individuals with higher levels of  trait empathy showed 
no reduction in empathic responses when performing an unrelated task, suggesting a more 
automatic process underlying these responses in these individuals. However, this study did not 
look at different aspects of  empathy. 
While sympathy and personal distress are both considered to be part of  a larger affective 
empathy cluster, they rather differ in terms of  cognitive involvement. While conditioning, 
direct association, and simple labeling or categorization of  the emergency can lead to personal 
distress, they do not lead to feelings of  sympathy (Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 2014). 
Personal distress requires minimal cognitive processes (Eisenberg et al., 2014; Eisenberg & 
Fabes, 1990), whereas sympathy requires more elaborate or more complex cognitive processes. 
Similarly, perspective taking, the capacity to understand the thoughts and feelings of  another 
individual (M. H. Davis, 1980) requires more sophisticated, top-down processes (M. H. Davis, 
Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). This dissociation between personal distress, and sympathy 
and perspective taking, is also reflected in relations with prefrontal functions (Spinella, 2005). 
Trait personal distress was related to more executive dysfunction, while perspective taking 
Table 4. Mean motor-evoked potential amplitudes ± standard errors in percentage changes from baseline for 
Experiment 3
No bystanders One bystander Four bystanders
Emergency 133.94±14.06 142.39±14.72 140.18±14.33
Nonemergency 133.32±11.68 133.35±14.55 134.74±14.47
Table 5. Outcome of  regression analysis for the emergency slope in Experiment 3
b β p
Step 1
Overall model: F(1,17) = 5.42, p = .03, R2 = .24, ƒ2 = 0.32
Constant 14.22±5.69 [2.22, 26.22] .02
Personal distress -1.32±0.57 [-2.52, -0.12] -.49 .03
Step 2
Sympathy* -.15 .54
Perspective taking* .18 .42
Fantasy* .25 .26
b = unstandardized coefficients ± standard error [95% confidence intervals], β = standardized coefficient. * Removed predictors.
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and sympathy were inversely related to executive dysfunction. 
One possible way to disentangle the influence and need of  cognitive processes on personal 
distress, sympathy and perspective taking and the possible automaticity of  these reactions is 
the use of  a cognitive load manipulation. By imposing a cognitive load during the occurrence 
of  another task, the dynamics between cognitive processes and the behavior of  interest can 
be established. Under low load conditions, the cognitive system is accessible and can influence 
behavior. This behavior can be described as being reflective, deliberate or explicit. Under 
high load conditions the cognitive system is engaged and relatively inaccessible. If  a particular 
behavior occurs during a high cognitive load manipulation it is indicative of  an automatic or 
reflexive mechanism (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988), as these processes are not dependent 
on cognition. 
By using a cognitive load manipulation during the cued-reaction time task, we aimed to extend 
the previous findings and to dissociate the influence of  trait perspective taking and personal 
distress on the negative influence of  bystanders. Given the foregoing it was hypothesized that 
under conditions of  high cognitive load, only trait personal distress would predict the slowing 
of  reaction times during an emergency with bystanders present. If  trait perspective taking 
would be related to an effect of  bystanders, this would only be apparent under conditions 
of  low cognitive load. In line with the previous findings, we expect that sympathy does not 
predict an effect of  bystanders during the observation of  an emergency either in the low or 




Thirty-nine female and eleven male volunteers (43 right-handed, 6 left-handed, 1 
ambidextrous), between 18 and 28 years of  age, participated in exchange for course 
credits. Participants were naïve as to the aim of  the study, provide informed consent, and 
the experiment was carried out in accordance with the standards set by the Declaration of  
Helsinki. 
Task and Procedure 
The cued-reaction time task was adapted slightly to allow a cognitive load manipulation. 
Participants were instructed to remember a two-digit number (e.g., 12, low cognitive load) 
or a combination of  three two-digit numbers (e.g., 24, 36, 87, high cognitive load) while 
performing the cued-reaction time task. Before each block of  the cued-reaction time task a 
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screen with a load instruction was presented to the participant for 2,500 ms. This was followed 
by a block of  8 reaction time trials with 25% no go trials. After each block a memory probe 
was shown and participants indicated which of  the two numbers was part of  the original 
sequence. 
At the start of  the experimental session, participants first practiced the cued-reaction time 
in isolation (3 trials), followed by two practice blocks with the cognitive load manipulation 
(one low and one high cognitive load block each with three reaction time trials). Participants 
were instructed to remember the number presented at the start of  each block, while 
simultaneously performing the cued-reaction time task. For the practice trials video clips of  
a woman standing and waiting were used, while for the main experimental blocks only the 
emergency and nonemergency scenarios with no and four bystanders were used. In the first 
half  of  the experiment only the emergency and nonemergency situations with no bystanders 
were shown followed by the emergency and nonemergency situation with bystanders present. 
This was done to first measure the initial response to an emergency without bystanders and 
subsequently assess the impact of  bystanders on the response to an emergency without trial-
to-trial fluctuations and across-trial influence (cf  Rameson et al., 2012). The cognitive load 
manipulation was presented in a randomized order throughout the experiment, while the 
emergency and nonemergency situations were presented in a randomized order within each 
block. In total there were 32 blocks, resulting in 24 go trials per condition. After the cued-
reaction time task, participants completed the Dutch version of  the IRI.
Data analysis
Cognitive load manipulation was successful and accuracy decreased in the high cognitive 
load condition (mean±SD percentage correct: 86.50±11.11 %), compared to the low 
cognitive load condition (92.13±11.97 %), t(49) = 3.41, p = .001, d = 0.48. Filtering of  the 
reaction times was similar to Experiment 1 and 2 (mean±SD percentage of  trials removed: 
0.63±0.96 %, mean±SD percentage of  false alarms and misses: 2.94±2.26 %). To calculate 
a bias score, we subtracted the reaction times of  the situation with bystanders present from 
the reaction times in situations with no bystanders present, individually for the emergency 
and nonemergency situation in both low and high cognitive load conditions. Negative values 
indicated slower responses to the situation with bystanders present, thus a stronger bystander 
effect, while positive values indicate faster responses to the situations with bystanders present. 
Next, we corrected for general task effects by performing a regression that predicted the bias 
scores in each of  four conditions on the basis of  the task effect (accuracy low - high cognitive 
load). By using the standardized residual of  each of  the bias scores, the variance explained 
by overall task performance is removed and the unique contributions of  each condition can 
be examined. Next, linear regression analyses were used to predict the bias scores for the 
emergency and nonemergency situation under conditions of  low and high cognitive load. 
Similar to the previous experiments, in the first step the hypothesized predictors were entered 
into the model (low cognitive load: trait perspective taking, high cognitive load: trait personal 
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distress), while the remaining scales were added in step 2 (stepwise fashion). 
Results
In the low cognitive load condition no significant linear regression model was found for the 
emergency, F(1, 48) = 0.98, p = .33, R2 = .02, or nonemergency situation, F(2, 47) = 2.58, 
p = .09, R2 = .10. In the high cognitive load condition a significant linear regression model 
was observed for the emergency, F(1,48) = 6.02, p = .02, R2 = .11, ƒ2 = 0.12 (Table 6), 
but not for the nonemergency situation, F(1, 48) = 1.53, p = .22, R2 = .03. Crucially, trait 
personal distress predicted a stronger slowing of  responses to an emergency situation with 
bystanders compared to no bystander present, β = -.33, p = .02 (Figure 5). Nor sympathy 
nor perspective taking predicted the effect of  bystanders, β = -.12, p = .44 and β = .09, p = 
.52 respectively. 
Discussion
In our final experiment, we used the cued-reaction time task combined with a cognitive load 
manipulation to influence cognitive involvement during the observation of  an emergency 
with bystanders present. In agreement with our expectations, results showed that personal 
distress predicted the slowing of  responses to an emergency with bystanders present during 
the high cognitive load condition. In other words, people with higher levels of  personal 
distress demonstrated stronger response slowing to an emergency with bystanders present 
when cognitive involvement was restricted. Under conditions of  low cognitive load, thus 
without cognitive restriction, neither personal distress nor perspective taking akin predicted 
Table 6. Outcome of  regression analysis for the no bystander – bystander bias score in the emergency 
situation with high cognitive load in Experiment 4
B β p
Step 1
Overall model: F(1,48) = 6.02, p = .02, R2 = .11, ƒ2 = 0.12
Constant 0.99±0.42 [0.14, 1.84] .02
Personal distress -0.53±0.22 [-0.97, -0.10] -.33 .02
Step 2
Sympathy* -.12 .44
Perspective taking* .09 .52
Fantasy* -.22 .14
b = unstandardized coefficients ± standard error [95% confidence intervals], β = standardized coefficient. * Removed predictors.
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an effect of  bystanders on responding to an emergency. Sympathy was not associated with 
an effect of  bystanders on responses to an emergency either in the presence or absence of  
cognitive restriction. The results of  Experiment 3 indicated that personal distress is predictive 
of  a mechanism related to action preparation, and the results of  Experiment 4 extend these 
findings in an important manner. Personal distress predicted an effect of  bystanders on an 
initial response to an emergency that is more related to automatic, reflexive action preparation. 
General Discussion
The aim of  the present study was to investigate the influence of  bystanders on the response 
of  an individual to an emergency situation by integrating situational and dispositional factors. 
In a series of  four experiments we examined the differential effects of  trait sympathy and 
personal distress on the decrease in preparation to help with bystanders present. Results 
showed that even though personal distress and sympathy predicted overall faster responses 
to an emergency when no bystanders were present, personal distress was most consistently 
predictive of  a decrease in action preparation when bystanders are present during an 
emergency. These results are in line with findings showing differences between other-oriented 
and self-centered responses to emergency situations in terms of  sensitivity to social context. 
These observations show that the effect of  bystanders is already apparent at the level of  action 
preparation. This bystander effect is proposed to be stronger for people with a predisposition 
to experience self-centered empathic responses, as measured by trait personal distress. 
Our observations add to the growing body of  evidence on how empathic responses are 
modulated by situational and dispositional factors (Decety & Lamm, 2009), as well as how 
Figure 5. Under high cognitive load trait personal distress predicted the slowing of  responses when bystanders 
were present during an emergency.
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sympathy and personal distress differ in sensitivity to social context (Archer et al., 1981; C. 
D. Batson et al., 1981; 1983; 1987; Carlo et al., 1991; Coke et al., 1978; Eisenberg, Fabes, et 
al., 1989a; Fultz et al., 1986; Romer et al., 1986; Toi & Batson, 1982). Decety and Jackson 
(2004) argue that three inter-related mechanisms underlie the variety of  empathic responses; 
perception-action coupling (see also Preston & de Waal, 2002), emotion regulation mechanisms, 
and perspective taking. Since trait personal distress as well as sympathy measure affective 
responses to the distress of  others (M. H. Davis, 1983), one possibility is that a disposition to 
experience and regulate negative emotions (Davidov, Zahn Waxler, Roth Hanania, & Knafo, 
2013), underlie this difference in sensitivity to social context. Studies have shown a positive 
relation between a disposition to experience personal distress and heightened behavioral 
and physiological responses to social emotional situations and decreased regulation of  these 
responses (Avenanti et al., 2009; Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2014a; Eisenberg & 
Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg et al., 1994; Ferri et al., 2010; Okun, Shepard, & Eisenberg, 2000). In 
contrast, trait levels of  sympathy have been linked to increased emotion regulation (Eisenberg 
et al., 1996; Okun et al., 2000). Using single-pulse TMS we show that personal distress but 
not sympathy predicts the negative influence of  bystanders on motor corticospinal excitability 
levels as indexed by MEPs. In line with previous studies (Avenanti et al., 2009; Borgomaneri, 
Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2014a; Ferri et al., 2010), these results suggest that a distinction between 
sympathy and personal distress can be observed already in the action-domain. A disposition 
to experience personal distress compared to sympathy can thus not only lead to an imbalance 
in higher, regulatory-related processes, but may already have an influence at a lower , action-
related processes. Although the default mode is to help – that is, intact coupling between 
situation and response – the presence of  bystanders may result in a decoupling. This effect 
may be stronger in people with higher levels of  personal distress who display attenuated 
action preparation to respond to the emergency situation in the presence of  bystanders. 
What could drive this decoupling? The perception-action arc is motivation-dependent 
(Carver, 2006; Mogenson, Jones, & Yim, 1980). The state of  the motor cortex (Schutter, 
de Weijer, Meuwese, Morgan, & van Honk, 2008a; Schutter, Hofman, Hoppenbrouwers, 
& Kenemans, 2011), as well as the multifaceted concept of  empathy (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 
2012; Tullett, Harmon-Jones, & Inzlicht, 2012; Zaki, 2014) have been linked to approach 
and avoidance-related motivation. As described by Preston (2013), the distinction between 
avoidance and approach is crucial in explaining the lack of  helping behavior in some 
situations. To respond to an emergency, the event has to be classified as a threat, which 
consequently triggers approach- or avoidance-related behavior. There are several explicit or 
implicit strategies that can result in approach or avoidance of  current or future empathic 
responses (Zaki, 2014). For example, the avoidance can be overt (need to escape the situation) 
or covert (attentional disengagement). Graziano and Robin (2009) describe the approach/
avoidance dimension of  an emergency situation. They suggest that two evolutionary 
conserved motivational systems, fight-or-flight, including freezing behavior (flight-freeze-
flight system; for example N. McNaughton & Corr, 2004), and parental care, are activated 
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when encountering a novel or distressful event and these two systems act as opponents to each 
other’s dominant action patterns. Incorporating the opponent-process model of  motivation 
by Solomon and colleagues (Solomon, 1980; Solomon & Corbit, 1974), the authors state that 
the first, and fastest, response to an emergency is that of  distress (Process A, fight-freeze-flight 
system), and if  the possibility to escape the situation is available and easy, helping behavior 
does not occur. However, over time the slower reaction of  sympathy (Process B, care system) is 
activated opposing the fixed action patterns of personal distress (W. G. Graziano & Habashi, 
2010; W. G. Graziano & Tobin, 2009). This nicely fits the observation in the first experiment 
that, while sympathy and personal distress are opposing constructs, they both predicted faster 
responses to an emergency without bystanders present, and the notion in the literature that 
they are positively correlated and can exist in parallel within an individual (C. D. Batson et al., 
1987; M. H. Davis, 1980). However, the presence of  bystanders during an emergency possibly 
increases Process A (distress, the fight-freeze-flight system), leading to heightened distress and 
mitigating preparation of  helping behavior, while Process B (sympathy, care system) is not 
afflicted by the presence of  bystanders. This bystander-mediated increase in distress in the 
observer and increased activation of  the fight-freeze-flight system is only apparent in people 
with a disposition to experience personal distress. However, it remains unknown if  and how 
this increase in state levels of  distress occurs and what the dynamics of  a personal distress 
state-trait interaction are. 
It is possible that the observed effect might not be related to a decrease in action preparation 
or inhibition of  approach, but rather to a freeze-like response. This amounts to a reduction 
in motor corticospinal excitability with the increase in the number of  bystanders during an 
emergency. Thus, this reduction might reflect increased freezing in people with a disposition 
to experience personal distress. Freezing occurs when there is no possibility to escape the 
situation (or predator), or as an initial phase in a response (N. McNaughton & Corr, 2004). 
Several arguments complicate the interpretation of  the decrease in motor corticospinal 
excitability as a freezing motor plan. First, a freeze-like reduction in motor corticospinal 
excitability has been recorded 100-125ms post-stimulus onset (Borgomaneri et al., 2015b). In 
the present study we stimulated in a time window 800-1,000ms post-stimulus onset, making 
it unlikely that we tapped into a freeze-like motor program. Second, both state and trait 
levels of  personal distress are related to enhanced motor corticospinal excitability to stimuli 
negative in valence that are contrary to a freeze-related reductions in excitability levels 
(Avenanti et al., 2009; Borgomaneri, Gazzola, & Avenanti, 2014a). Third, we measured 
MEPs from an extensor muscle, the abductor pollicis brevis. While the link between extensor 
and flexor muscles and approach and avoidance motivation is complicated (Krieglmeyer & 
Deutsch, 2013; Phaf, Mohr, Rotteveel, & Wicherts, 2014), recordings of  abductor pollicis 
brevis and other muscles have been linked to approach motivation (Coombes et al., 2009; 
Schutter et al., 2008b). To shed more light on the issues of  approach and avoidance motives, 
future studies may incorporate different TMS procedures that allow the measurement of  
inhibitory processes, recordings from multiple muscle groups at several time periods, and 
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more direct measures of  freezing, motivation and prosocial behavior to disentangle these 
different processes. In addition, future research can use different situations (e.g., a person 
directly being threatened by another individual with bystanders present) to shed light on 
motives in the onlooker.
Helping behavior is thought to be driven by an evolutionarily conserved mechanism, reflexive 
in nature (Preston, 2013) and shared with other species (Preston & de Waal, 2002), that is 
the end result of  bottom-up and top-down processes. This is not to say that the decoupling 
is a deliberate, cognition-driven process, In the final experiment personal distress predicted 
the effect of  bystanders on responding to an emergency under conditions of  high cognitive 
load. This suggests that the bystander effect is not only apparent at an explicit cognitive 
level, but also on an implicit automatic action-related one. The perception-reaction arc 
can be automatic but still be context-dependent (Gawronski & Cesario, 2013). While some 
research suggest that the perception of  and reaction to the need of  others is not automatic (for 
example Gu & Han, 2007; Rameson et al., 2012), it is important to note that the majority of  
studies focused on the perception of  the need and distress of  others. In the present study we 
highlight the reactive aspect by measuring reaction times and motor corticospinal excitability 
to the distress of  others. In contrast with other studies that tend to be biased towards explicit 
cognitive processes (intention, mental states), we focus on perception-action coupling as a 
function of  context.
In the second experiment we observed that perspective taking and not personal distress 
predicted the negative effect of  bystanders on responding to an emergency. What is the role 
of  perspective taking? How does this relate to the effect of  personal distress and the two 
system perspective? Multiple mechanisms can exist in parallel to influence responses to, and 
helping behavior during, an emergency situation with bystanders. The prosocial individual is 
the combined sum of  situational-dependent cognition (e,g, perspective taking), feelings (e.g., 
personal distress or sympathy), and behavior (Habashi & Graziano, 2015). Of  course these 
components interact. Perspective taking can lead to an increase in state sympathy (C. D. 
Batson et al., 1989; C. D. Batson, Dyck, Brandt, & Batson, 1988; Toi & Batson, 1982). For 
example, instructing participants to take the perspective of  the victim rather than simply 
observe the victim increases sympathy, while personal distress remains unchanged (Toi & 
Batson, 1982). These interactions are also found for trait levels. Perspective taking is positively 
correlated with sympathy, but negative correlated with personal distress (M. H. Davis, 1980; 
De Corte et al., 2007). One hypothesis that partly reconciles the results is that perspective 
taking, by means of  its interaction with sympathy, is related to Process B (sympathy, care 
system). While Process B is not influenced directly by the presence of  bystanders, it is by 
means of  perspective taking. The latter would sustain a form of  cognitive influence on Process 
B. Together, situational influences on both Process A and B might be mediated by trait levels 
of  personal distress and perspective taking respectively. How the slowing of  responses as 
predicted by perspective taking is related to helping behavior remains to be investigated. 
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The majority of  participants were female college students, and the question arises whether 
the present findings can be generalized to the population at large. Popular believe holds that 
women score higher on empathy-related constructs, but men are more likely to provide help. 
So far, no consistent sex differences in helping behavior have been reported (Eagly & Crowley, 
1986). In a recent meta-analysis using all studies on the bystander effect between 1960 and 
2010, no significant sex difference was found (Fischer et al., 2011). Importantly, Tice and 
Baumeister (1985) showed that sex or the level of  femininity did not influence the occurrence 
of  helping behavior when bystanders were present. Only participants high in masculinity 
provided less help. It has been argued that sex differences in helping behavior (and other 
empathy-related processes) are all about gender roles (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Senneker & 
Hendrick, 1983). These differences only emerge when gender roles are primed by means 
of  social context, such as demand characteristics and type of  helping behavior studied, and 
are motivation-dependent (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000; K. 
J. K. Klein & Hodges, 2001). Although sex differences or the impact of  gender roles on the 
processing of  an emergency and helping behavior were not part of  our primary research 
question, they can be of  interest for future research. 
Another issue with both methodological and theoretical consequences that could be addressed 
in future research is the effect of  repetition on responses to emergency situations with or 
without bystanders. Of  course, a certain number of  trials is necessary to achieve a reliable 
measure of  response time, but it might also have several important consequences. First, 
reaction times might change as a function of  repetition number. While the effect of  repetition 
on stimulus-response relationships have been studied (Bertelson, 1965; Felfoldy, 1974) the 
interaction with stimulus condition and personality characteristics remain unknown. How 
do multiple repetitions of  an emergency situation interact with a disposition to experience 
personal distress? Based on the application of  the model described by Graziano and Robin 
(2009) on the current data, repetition could have differential effects on Process A (distress, the 
fight-freeze-flight system) and Process B (sympathy, care system). One hypothesis conceptually 
driven by the work of  Solomon and colleagues (Solomon, 1980; Solomon & Corbit, 1974) 
suggests that with increased repetition or exposure to emergencies the dominance of  Process 
A diminishes, while Process B increases in strength (W. G. Graziano & Habashi, 2010). This 
would then result in a decrease in distress-driven processes and an increase in sympathy-driven 
processes. In the present context, one would thus expect that with an increase in repetition 
personal distress will eventually not be predictive of  the negative effect of  bystanders on 
responding to an emergency. However, repetition effects can take multiple forms and shapes 
(Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006) and the interaction with stimulus condition and 
dispositional factors need to be investigated in carefully designed experiments. 
In conclusion, using a person-situation approach we have extended the existing literature on 
the psychological and neural basis of  the bystander effect by showing that the presence of  
bystanders during an emergency attenuates action preparation for people with higher levels 
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Chapter 6
of  trait personal distress –that is, with a disposition to experience self-centered empathic 
responses. 









Informed by naturalistic observations, experimental findings, and theoretical models of  
functional altruism and prosocial behavior, we studied if  inter-individual differences in 
reflexive- and reflective-like processes serve as a proximate mechanism and are predictive of  
prosocial behavior. We used behavioral reactivity, self-reported decision-making, proxemics 
behavior, and Immersive Virtual Reality to study helping behavior during a violent conflict. 
Specifically, we used behavioral responses to an emergency under conditions of  cognitive 
restriction to predict later helping behavior during this conflict. First, 29 male supporters 
of  F.C. Barcelona performed a cued-reaction time task with a low and high cognitive load 
manipulation. Next, participants entered a virtual bar and had a conversation with a fellow 
supporter. During this conversation a Real Madrid supporter entered and started a verbal 
fight with the fellow supporter that escalated into a physical fight. Verbal and physical 
interventions of  the participant served as measures of  helping behavior. In contrast to the 
hypothesis, results showed that faster responses to an emergency situation during low but 
not during high cognitive load, predicted more interventions during the violent conflict. In 
addition, a tendency to describe the decision-making during the violent conflict as intuitive, 
reflex-like was related to more interventions. Exploratory analyses revealed that a disposition 
to experience other-oriented feelings during distress was related to self-reported intuitive 
decision-making and helping behavior by proxy, that is a reduced distance to the perpetrator. 
Taken together, these results shed new light on helping behavior and are in line with a dual-




Helping behavior is not something uniquely human. Functional altruism and socially 
motivated helping, behaviors that benefit the recipient but with a cost to the actor, are 
observed throughout the animal kingdom (de Waal, 2015). Humans as young as 12 to 14 
months provide help (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken et al., 
2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Chimpanzees demonstrate costly helping in a variety 
of  situations with and without reward (Warneken et al., 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 
2006; Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2009; 2012). There is considerable evidence that 
rats exhibit helping behavior (Ben-Ami Bartal et al., 2011; 2014; Church, 1959; Márquez 
et al., 2015; Rice & Gainer, 1962; Sato et al., 2015). Moreover, observations point to the 
existence of  functional altruism in ants (Hollis & Nowbahari, 2013; Nowbahari & Hollis, 
2014; Nowbahari, Scohier, Durand, & Hollis, 2009). While the debate is ongoing whether 
all of  these costly behaviors can be interpreted as a form of  empathy (Silberberg et al., 2014; 
Vasconcelos, Hollis, Nowbahari, & Kacelnik, 2012), the crucial point is the occurrence of  
helping behavior. The fact that helping behavior is so widespread suggests the presence, at 
least at some level, of  a phylogenetically ancient mechanism that gives rise to the variety of  
prosocial and empathic behaviors in humans (Decety et al., 2012; Preston & de Waal, 2002). 
Indeed, recent theoretical models point to offspring care (Preston, 2013) as a possible hard-
wired, evolutionarily conserved mechanism that could provide the foundation for helping 
behavior and other functional altruistic behaviors. Importantly, as the species that show 
helping behavior differ greatly in cognitive capacities, it is unlikely that these capacities play 
a crucial role in the preparation and execution of  helping behavior. Thus, the occurrence of  
helping behavior is likely to be relatively independent from cognition and to rely more on 
automatically triggered fixed-action patterns (Preston, 2013; Zaki, 2014).
Is providing help a reflexive action? Statements on the decision to act given by people that 
provided help under extreme circumstances are rated as automatic, reflex-like, rather than 
deliberate or reflective (Rand & Epstein, 2014). Studies directly manipulating decision time 
found that under time pressure people are more cooperative as a results of  a more intuitive 
decision-making process (Cone & Rand, 2014; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Rand et al., 
2014). Time pressure also increased reported inclination to sacrifice a preferred activity to 
help a close other (Righetti, Finkenauer, & Finkel, 2013). Induction of  an intuitive compared 
to reflective cognitive state resulted in increased donation to the common good (Lotz, 2015). 
Similarly, increased cognitive load resulted in more generous offers to others (Cornelissen, 
Dewitte, & Warlop, 2011; Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, & Utikal, 2014). Taken together, 
intuition compared to deliberation is related to increased prosocial behavior (Zaki, 2014). But 
are inter-individual differences in reflexive- and reflective-like processes discernable and of  
predictive value for later prosocial behavior?




(Habashi & Graziano, 2015). For example, Marsh, Kozak and Ambady (2007) found across a 
series of  experiments that the ability to recognize facial expressions of  fear, a clear signal of  
distress in another individual, predicted prosocial behavior. Here, we addressed the question 
if  behavioral responses to an emergency situation are predictive of  later helping behavior 
during Immersive Virtual Reality (IVR). While previous studies have used situations and 
measures of  helping and other prosocial behaviors that are relevant to the individual, for 
example sharing in an economic game, they are low in terms of  risk and danger to the 
participant and probability of  being encountered in daily life. One way to circumvent this 
is to use the powerful tool of  IVR. This technique allows researchers to explore situations 
that cannot be created in reality because they are either unethical or too dangerous for 
the participant. It further provides an increase in ecological validity while simultaneously 
maintaining experimental control, and measuring genuine phenomenological, behavioral 
and physiological outcomes (Blascovich et al., 2002; Gamberini, Chittaro, Spagnolli, & 
Carlesso, 2015; Rovira, Swapp, Spanlang, & Slater, 2009; Slater et al., 2006). This technique 
has successfully been used to study behavior in onlookers during a violent incident in which a 
victim is verbally and physically attacked by a perpetrator (Slater et al., 2013).  
In the present study covert behavioral reactivity to an emergency situation in which a woman 
is in need of  help, as measured by reaction times during low and high cognitive load, served 
as predictors of  helping behavior. Following this behavior task, participants were confronted 
with a violent conflict between two individuals in a bar. The number of  physical and verbal 
interventions made by the participant during this conflict served as helping behavior measures. 
We tested the hypothesis if  reaction times to an emergency situation during high cognitive 
load, tapping into reflexive, intuitive processes, would predict later helping behavior during a 
violent conflict. It was not expected that behavioral measures when cognition is unrestricted 
would have predictive value. 
As helping behavior is thought to be the result of  one overarching mechanism (Preston, 2013; 
Zaki, 2014), we used two different situations to answer the question if  an initial reaction 
to one situation (an emergency) is predictive of  helping behavior in a different situation (a 
violent conflict). Given the foregoing, we additionally hypothesized that a tendency by the 
participant to describe the decision-making process during the violent conflict as intuitive, 
fast and reflexive would be positively related to the number of  interventions. Lastly, given 
the close relationship between a disposition to experience feelings of  sympathy for others, 
prosocial behavior (C. D. Batson et al., 1987; Carlo et al., 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; 
Eisenberg, Miller, et al., 1989b; Romer et al., 1986), and proxemics (Perry, Mankuta, & 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2015; Strayer & Roberts, 1997), (Gillath, McCall, Shaver, & Blascovich, 





Participants interested in football were recruited by advertisements around the Universitat 
de Barcelona campus and by means of  word-of-mouth. Potential participants were to fill in 
an online questionnaire that asked about their interest in football and their favorite team and 
level of  support for this team. Twenty-nine male supporters of  F.C. Barcelona, between 18 
and 29 years of  age, were recruited. The median level of  support for F.C. Barcelona on a scale 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) was 5 with an interquartile range of  2. Participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were screened for contra-indications for VR (e.g., 
epilepsy, recent alcohol intake). One additional participant was excluded before the start of  
the study because of  voice problems. Participants received oral and written information prior 
to the study, but remained naïve to the goal of  the experiment, and provided written informed 
consent. The compensation was ten Euros. The study was approved by the Comissió Bioètica 
of  Universitat de Barcelona and carried out in accordance with the standards set by the 
Declaration of  Helsinki. 
Procedure
After explanation of  the procedure by the experimenter, the participant provided informed 
consent and answered several questions on the intake of  psycho-active drugs and alcohol, 
frequency of  video game playing, level of  knowledge in informatics and programming, and 
past experience with virtual reality. The study consisted of  three parts; 1) cued reaction time 
task, 2) virtual reality scenario, and 3) questionnaires. The participants were not aware of  
any potential relation between the parts. After completion of  the reaction time task, the 
VR procedure began and participants were told that they would enter a bar and meet some 
people inside with whom they were free to interact. Before entering the virtual environment, 
participants were fitted with the 3D glasses, head tracker, headphones, and a microphone. 
Participants entered the virtual bar and were asked to describe the environment in detail. 
Following this familiarization period, an adapted scenario from Slater and colleagues (2013) 
started. In the scenario the participant had a short free-flow conversation on F.C. Barcelona 
(e.g., results, favorite player) with a male virtual human (V, victim), a fellow Barça supporter 
who was wearing a Barça shirt. While the utterances of  V have been prerecorded, the selection 
was done by an experimenter based on the response of  the participants, allowing for a normal 
conversation to occur (mean±SD duration: 103±24s). During the conversation, another male 
virtual human (P, perpetrator), wearing a Real Madrid shirt, entered and sat at the bar. After 
a few minutes he stood up and walked towards V starting an argument about his shirt and his 
support of  the club. During the argument V took a submissive, conciliatory role. Over time 
the verbal attack of  P on V became increasingly intense and escalated into a physical attack 
of  P on V. The conflict between P and V is the same for all participants (total time of  conflict: 
135s). Figure 1 provides a visual representation of  the scenario. Following the physical attack 




was concluded with completion of  several questionnaires. After debriefing the participant 
received his payment.
Cued reaction time task
An adapted cued reaction time task with cognitive load manipulation from Hortensius, 
Schutter & de Gelder (under review) was used. In between a response and a preparation 
cue, a 1s video clip depicting an emergency (falling woman) or non-emergency situation 
(woman standing up) was presented. Both go and no go cues (25% of  the trials) were used and 
presented for 160ms. Participants responded as fast as possible to the go cue with the index 
finger of  their dominant hand. During the reaction time task participants were instructed 
to simultaneously remember a phone number (see Spunt & Lieberman, 2013). This phone 
number could be easy (e.g, 888 - 888 -888, low cognitive load) or hard (e.g., 643 - 687 - 237, 
high cognitive load) to memorize. Before the onset of  an eight trial reaction time block, a load 
instruction screen was presented for 3000ms. At the end of  the block a memory probe was 
shown and participants indicated if  the presented phone number was the same as the to be 
Figure 1. Visual representation of  the scenario. While the participants had a conversation with the victim (A), the perpetrator 
walks over to victim (B) and starts an argument (C - E) that becomes increasingly intense and eventually escalated into a physical 
attack (F). Please note that the viewpoint of  these frames do not match the viewpoint of  the participants as the actual scenario was in 
three-dimensional stereo vision and based upon the position of  the participants in the CAVE. 
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remembered number (Figure 2). The use of  a cognitive load manipulation is well established 
method to impose restrictions on cognition and assess the role of  intuition and automaticity 
(Cornelissen et al., 2011; Gilbert et al., 1988; Schulz et al., 2014; Spunt & Lieberman, 2013), 
importantly it does not rely on problematic reaction time reverse inference (Krajbich, Bartling, 
Hare, & Fehr, 2015). A pilot experiment (n = 5) revealed that manipulation of  cognitive load 
was successful, t(4) = 4.81, p < .001, d = 2.15. Accuracy was higher in the low cognitive load 
condition, mean±SD percentage correct: 90±13.69 %, compared to the high cognitive load 
condition, 67.50±14.25 %. 
Reaction times in the cued reaction time task serve as the main outcome measures and 
have previously been used to index action preparation or readiness (Hortensius, Schutter 
& de Gelder, under review). Faster reaction times are associated with increased action 
preparedness, while slower reaction times indicated decreased action preparedness, with 
respect to the presented situation. Adding the cognitive load manipulation would restrict 
cognitive involvement during the high load condition, while the low load manipulation would 
leave cognitive processes unrestricted. 
After practice of  the cued reaction time task (three trials, one no go trial), the cognitive load 
manipulation was added and participants completed a low and high cognitive load block with 
each containing three reaction time trials (one no go trials). For the practice trials video clips 
of  a woman standing and waiting were used. 
Virtual Reality System
The program was developed in the XVR programming platform (Tecchia, 2010), with the 
virtual characters animated with HALCA software (Gillies & Spanlang, 2010), and delivered 
by a ‘CAVE’ system (Cruz-Neira, Sandin, DeFanti, Kenyon, & Hart, 1992). The CAVE 
consists of  three back-projected walls and a front-projected floor, each measuring 3.69 by 
2.25m, driven by a Master-node with four slave-nodes. Alternate images at 60Hz were 
presented to each eye of  the participants synchronized with the projectors using RealD 3D 
CrystalEyes 4 glasses resulting in overall 3D stereo vision. A head tracker (InterSense IS900) 
was mounted on top of  the glasses and fed the participants’ head position and movement into 
XVR. Participants were fitted with headphones for auditory stimuli, and a microphone for 
voice recordings. The entire scenario was recorded using a video camera from the top of  the 
CAVE filming the participant from the back to preserve anonymity. 
Decision-making Questionnaire
To assess self-reported intuitiveness versus deliberativeness of  the decision-making process 
during the conflict we included a questionnaire based on Rand and Epstein (2014). The 
questionnaire assessed the intuitiveness of  the decision to verbally or physically intervene or 
not at two time points during the conflict as well as the overall decision to act (five items). After 




following Rand and Epstein (2014), they rated the statements on a scale from 1 (intuitive/
fast) to 5 (reasoned/slow). The intervention scale of  the decision-making questionnaire had 
a high reliability, Cronbach’s α = .82. Table 1 reports the items and responses. General 
intuitiveness was also assesses by non-intervention related aspects. These three items, assessing 
the intuitiveness of  the interaction with V and internal reactions during the conflict, had a 
low reliability, Cronbach’s α = .28, and were discarded from further analyses. 
Trait Empathy Questionnaire
Trait levels of  cognitive and affective components of  empathy were measured with the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (M. H. Davis, 1980; 1983; Pérez-Albéniz, De Paúl, Etxeberría, 
Montes, & Torres, 2003).Perspective taking (the capacity to understand the thoughts and 
feelings of  another individual) and fantasy (the ability to transpose oneself  to a fictional 
situation) measure the cognitive component. The affective component is made up of  the 
personal distress and empathic concern subscales. These two subscales differ in terms of  
focus of  the emotional reaction. The former measures the experience of  discomfort in the 
observer in response to distress in others (a self-oriented emotional reaction), while the latter 
measures sympathy and compassion in the observer for less fortunate others (an other-
oriented emotional reaction). In line with the existing literature, we use the term sympathy 
when referring to the trait measure of  an other-oriented emotional reaction. The four scales 
of  the IRI all had high reliability in the current sample, Cronbach’s α ≥ .72.
Figure 2. Cued reaction time task with cognitive load manipulation. Before each reaction time task block a low or high 
load instruction screen was presented. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible to the go cue with the index finger 
of  their dominant hand while simultaneously remembering the phone number. Between a preparation and a response cue, a video 
clip depicting an emergency or nonemergency situation was shown. After eight reaction time trials a memory probe was shown and 




Presence of  the participant in the virtual word was assessed using a previous developed 
questionnaire (Pan, Gillies, & Slater, 2015; Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005; Slater & Steed, 
2000). Presence is the notion that an individual feels and behaves as if  he is in the virtual 
world despites knowledge of  the virtual aspect. On a scale from 1 (low presence) to 7 (high 
presence) participants answered several questions that assess both the place illusion (the 
sensation of  being in the virtual bar) and plausibility (the illusion that the conversation and 
conflict occurring in the bar were real). Both the place illusion and plausibility scales have 
good internal reliability in the present study, Cronbach’s α = .85 and α = .87 respectively. 
Data processing 
Reaction time analysis 
Reaction times below <150ms and >1500ms (responses after the offset of  the response 
screen), as well as incorrect trials were removed from analysis (mean±SD percentage of  trials 
removed: 1.86±1.55 %). We calculated the bias score for both the low and high cognitive 
load condition separately by subtracting the reaction times in the nonemergency from the 
emergency situation. Negative values indicate faster responses to the emergency situation. For 
the main analysis we corrected for the general task effects of  the cognitive load manipulation 
by using the standardized residual of  the bias scores after a linear regression with accuracy 
low – high cognitive load as predictor (Hortensius, Schutter & de Gelder, under review). 
Given the a priori predictions we used Spearman correlations to test if  these bias scores 
during the cued reaction time task predicted intervention during the conflict.
Video coding
Helping behavior was defined as the number of  verbal and physical interventions of  the 
participant during the conflict in the virtual bar. Two people independently coded the 
videos. One of  the experimenters and one independent person were instructed to count the 
number of  verbal and physical interventions. The same definition of  interventions was used 
as in Slater and colleagues (2011). Utterances directed at P or V were counted as verbal 
interventions. Laughing or sighs were not counted as interventions. Physical interventions 
Table 1. Decision-making Questionnaire
Question Median (IQR)
I tried to intervene, because my reaction was: 3 (3)
When the guy with the Real Madrid shirt started to insult the other guy, my verbal intervention was: 4 (3)
When he started to insult the other guy, my physical intervention was: 3 (3)
When the guy with the Real Madrid shirt started to push the other guy, my verbal intervention was: 4 (3)
When he started to push the other guy, my physical intervention was: 3 (2)
Overall decision-making 3.2 (1.8)
The scale ranged from 1 (intuitive/fast) to 5 (reasoned/slow). IQR = interquartile range. If  the participants did not intervene, the 




were defined as either an action together with a verbal intervention, or an action directed at P 
or V (e.g., stepping in-between P and V or a hand movement to signal P to stop). The number 
of  counted interventions was highly correlated between the two coders; verbal interventions 
rs = .89, p < .001, physical interventions, rs = .95, p < .001. The coding of  the videos was 
carefully compared between the two coders and a final review of  all the videos was performed 
to provide solutions for discrepancies and to make sure that no intervention was missed. This 
revealed that the slightly lower correlation for the verbal interventions was because one of  
the coders did not count the whistles of  a participant as verbal interventions. These whistles 
were used by the participant to get the attention of  P and were at the end counted as verbal 
interventions.
Tracking
Throughout the VR scenario the head orientation and position of  the participant as well as 
the position of  V and P were tracked and recorded (X/Y/Z-coordinates). Please note that X 
is left/right, Y is up/down, and Z is forward/backward. The unit is meters and the center (0, 
0, 0) of  the CAVE lies on the front wall center floor. The signal was offline downsampled to 
60Hz using Spline Interpolation (with a pre-downsample filter of  27Hz, 24dB/oct). When 
tracking was lost, the data during that time window was excluded (n = 4, ~2, 4, 9, and 16.5s). 
Besides mean and standard deviation displacement in terms of  X- and Z-coordinates, the 
following outcome measures were calculated. Distance to V was calculated with the following 
formula:
Where  and  are the coordinates for V and  and  are the coordinates for the 
participant. The mean and standard deviation distance to V were calculated separately for 
the conversation and conflict period. The same approach, but limited to the conflict period, 
was used for the distance to P. Next, we calculated the time spend in proximity of  V and P. 
Using the definition of  social distances from proxemics (E. T. Hall, 1966), which are also 
found in virtual reality (Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Loomis, 2003; Gillath et al., 2008; 
Llobera, Spanlang, Ruffini, & Slater, 2010), we calculated the time spend in public (between 
3.7 m and 7.6m), social (between 1.2 m and 3.7 m), personal (between 0.46 and 1.2 m), 
and intimate (<0.46 m) distance. The well-known personal space bubble corresponds to an 
interpersonal distance of  around 40 cm. 
Results
Preliminary analyses
The cognitive load manipulation was successful, t(28) = 7.62, p < .001, d = 1.85. Accuracy 
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was higher in the low cognitive load condition, mean±SD percentage correct: 98.28±4.39 
%, compared to the high cognitive load condition, 72.41±19.30 %. Table 2 reports the 
reaction times and bias scores for the cued reaction time task. A main effect of  cognitive load 
was observed, F(1,28) = 9.59, p = .004, ηp2 = 0.26. Participants were faster in responding to 
emergency and nonemergency situations alike in the low cognitive load condition, mean±SD 
in ms: 318.08±41.12 ms, compared to the high cognitive load condition, 330.78±46.32 ms. 
No main effect for situation or interaction between situation and cognitive load was found, 
F(1, 28) = 0.00, p = .98 and F(1, 28) = 0.26, p = .62 respectively. Bias scores did not differ 
between the two cognitive load conditions, t(28) = 0.51, p= .62.
No suspicion of  the procedure and no side effects to the virtual reality were reported. Median 
response (and interquartile range) for the place illusion questions was 4.24 (2.63) and for 
the plausibility 3.67 (2.17). Table 3 and 4 report the rating for the individual items. These 
results are comparable to the ones obtained in previous studies (Pan et al., 2015; Slater & 
Steed, 2000). 
The mean±SD number of  interventions was 9.07±11.12, with 3.38±4.57 physical 
interventions, and 5.69±6.85. From the 29 participants, 9 refrained from any intervention. 
The first±SD intervention was 26.20±27.10s after onset of  the conflict. As the number of  
verbal and physical interventions were significantly correlated, rs(29) = .83, p < .001, we 
calculated one measure of  helping behavior. 
Figures 3 and 4 provide a visual representation of  the movement and position of  the 
participants with respect to V and P throughout the violent conflict. There was a significant 
shift in position of  the participant during the conflict phase compared to the conversation 
phase, mean X- and Z-coordinates, t(28) = 2.30, p = .03, d = 0.42 and t(28) = 4.38, p < .001, 
d = 0.55 respectively. More variability in position was also observed, standard deviation of  
X- and Z-coordinates, t(28) = 2.16, p = .04, d = 0.49 and t(28) = 4.90, p < .001, d = 1.30 
respectively. When V was attacked by P participants moved closer to V compared to the 
conversation phase, t(28) = 2.24, p < .03, d = 0.26, and the distance to V was more variable, 
t(28) = 5.79, p < .001, d = 1.58. Mean±SD distance to V and P during the conflict phase 
was 0.95±.20m and 0.74±0.14m respectively. Overall, participants were most of  the time 
in personal distance to V and P (Table 5). Starting position, defined as the distance of  the 
participants during the conversation to V, did not influence the number of  interventions, rs(29) 
= -.01, p = .96.
Main analyses
In contrast to the predictions, the bias score during the high cognitive load condition did not 
predict the number of  interventions, rs(29) = -.23, p = .23. Interestingly, the bias score during 
the low cognitive load condition predicted the number of  interventions, rs(29) = -.36, p = .05 




Table 3. Place illusion Questionnaire
Question Median (IQR)
Please rate your sense of  being in the discussion in the bar, on the following scale from 1 to 7, were 7 represents 
your normal experience of  being in a place
5 (3)
To what extent were there times during the experience when the discussion in the bar was the reality for you? 4 (2)
When you think back about your experience, do you think of  the situation in the bar more as images that you 
saw, or more as somewhere you visited?
5 (3)
During the time of  the experience, which was strongest on the whole, your sense of  being in the bar, or of  being 
in the real world of  the laboratory? 
5 (3)
Overall Place illusion 4.25 (2.63)
The scale ranged from 1 (low presence) to 7 (high presence). IQR = interquartile range.
Table 4. Plausibility Questionnaire
Question Median (IQR)
How much did you behave during the discussion in the bar as if  the situation were real? 4 (3)
How much was your emotional response during the discussion the same as if  it had been a real situation? 3 (4)
How much were your thoughts you had during the discussion the same as if  it had been a real situation? 4 (4)
To what extent were your physical responses the same as if  it had been a real situation? 3 (2)
How much did you behave as if  the guys were real? 3 (3)
How much was your emotional response to the two guys as if  they were real? 5 (3)
How much were your thoughts in relation to the two guys as if  they were real? 4 (4)
How much were you thinking things like “I know these guys are not real” but then surprisingly finding yourself  
behaving as if  they were real? 
4 (3)
How much did you have physical responses to the guys as if  they were real? 3 (3)
Overall Plausibility 3.67 (2.17)
The scale ranged from 1 (low presence) to 7 (high presence). IQR = interquartile range.
Table 5. Mean ± standard deviations of  the time spend in proximity of  V and P. 
Public Social Personal Intimate
V – Conversation - 14.19 ±32.65 84.39±37.29 0.08±0.43
V – Conflict - 17.37±32.13 114.47±33.58 1.55±6.86
P – Conflict - 2.03±4.43 123.73±18.08 7.62±17.59
The definition for social distances from Hall (1966) was used. Time in seconds is reported.
Table 2. Mean reaction times ± standard deviations for the cued reaction time task
Low cognitive load High cognitive load
Emergency 317.31±38.67 331.62±48.62
Nonemergency 318.86±44.11 329.93±44.75
Emergency – Nonemergency bias score -1.55±25.70 1.69±22.53
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nonemergency situation while cognition was unrestricted during the cued reaction time task 
intervened more during the conflict between P and V in the virtual environment. To further 
quantify this effect we contrasted the intervention with the no intervention group. Results 
showed a between groups difference in bias scores in the low cognitive load condition, Mann-
Whitney U test: U = 48, p = .05, r = -.37, but not in the high cognitive load condition, U = 82, 
p = .73. Under condition of  limited cognitive restriction, participants that would intervene 
had a negative bias score during the reaction time task, thus reacted faster to the emergency. 
The participant that did not intervene showed slower responses to the emergency situation 
(Figure 5A). 
Is helping behavior related to a more intuitive decision-making process? In line with our 
hypotheses, we found that a tendency to rate the decision to intervene during the conflict as 
more reflexive was related to more interventions, rs(29) = -.38, p = .04 (Figure 5B). Directly 
contrasting the intervention with the no intervention group, showed a near significant 
difference in self-reported decision-making, U = 50.5, p = .06, r = -.35. The participants 
that intervened reported a more intuitive decision to intervene, while the participants that 
refrained from intervention reported a more deliberate decision-making process (Figure 5B). 
The self-reported decision-making style was not correlated with the bias scores during the 
cued reaction time task, p ≥ .37. 
Exploratory analyses
It is likely that a mediating factor plays a role in these contrasting results. Sympathy has 
consistently been linked to costly helping (C. D. Batson et al., 1987; Carlo et al., 1991; 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg, Miller, et al., 1989b; Romer et al., 1986), and recently 
we showed that trait levels of  sympathy predicted faster responding to an emergency in a 
cued reaction time task similar to the one used here but without cognitive load manipulation 
(Hortensius, Schutter & de Gelder, under review). Therefore, we investigated the role of  
a disposition to experience sympathy in an exploratory analysis. In contrast to previous 
observations, sympathy was not directly related to bias scores, rs(29) = -.19, p = .34, nor 
to the number of  interventions, rs(29) = .13, p = .51. However, sympathy was negatively 
related to decision-making, rs(29) = -.38, p = .04, and was higher in intervening compared 
to non-intervening participants, U = 45.5, p = .04, r = -.39. In other words, a disposition to 
experience sympathy for others is related to a tendency to report the decision to help during 
a violent conflict as a consequence of  an intuitive and fast process. Is trait sympathy also 
related more objective measures of  prosociality? As the distance of  the participant to a person 
in distress has served as a proxy for prosocial behavior (Perry et al., 2015; Strayer & Roberts, 
1997), and is correlated with feelings of  compassion (Gillath et al., 2008), we investigated if  
trait levels of  sympathy predicted distance to V and P. Results showed that sympathy was 
significantly related to reduced distance to P, rs(29) = -.44, p = .02, but not to V, rs(29) = -.18, 
p = .34. Participants with a disposition to experience feelings of  concern for others moved 




Figure 3. Movement of  the participant and V and P during the violent conflict. n indicates number of  interventions.
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Figure 4. Distance to V and P during the violent conflict. The rapid increase in distance to P and V at the end is because 
of  the physical fight. Thick lines indicate the mean distance across participants. Please note that if  lines are discontinued tracking 
was lost (n = 4).
Figure 5. Prediction of  the number of  interventions by behavioral reactivity to an emergency and self-reported 
decision-making style. Participants that responded faster to the emergency compared to the nonemergency situation during the 
cued reaction time task with low cognitive load intervened more during the violent conflict (A). A tendency to rate the decision to 
intervene as more intuitive and reflexive was related to more intervention (B). Inset shows between group differences for behavioral 
reactivity during low cognitive load (A) and self-reported decision-making style during the violent conflict (B). Participants that 




nature of  the scenario and the possible outcome of  prosocial intervention. Getting closer 
to the aggressor to prevent a physical attack and possible harm to the victim is an efficient 
strategy and could serve as helping by proxy. 
Discussion
The goal of  the present study was to predict helping behavior during a violent conflict from 
behavioral reactivity to an observed emergency. Reaction times during the low, but not high, 
cognitive load condition predicted interventions during the violent conflict. While small in 
terms of  effect size, results show the feasibility to use reactions in one emergency context to 
predict helping behavior in a different context. In addition, participants that tend to report 
their decision to intervene as intuitive and reflexive provided more help. Lastly, exploratory 
analyses revealed that sympathy was related to this self-reported intuitive decision-making 
style and to a decreased distance to the aggressor. 
In contrast to the prosociality-intuition link (Rand & Nowak, 2013), we did not find support 
for the prediction of  helping behavior by behavioral measures under conditions of  restricted 
cognition. While we cannot definitely assess the direct effect of  cognitive load on emotional 
and cognitive processing of  an emergency situation, cognitive load manipulations have 
reliably been used to restrict the influence of  cognition and top down control (Gilbert et al., 
1988; Rameson et al., 2012; Spunt & Lieberman, 2013), and to bias the participant towards 
a more intuitive style (Cornelissen et al., 2011; Schulz et al., 2014). One, albeit speculative, 
explanation might be the overshoot of  the cognitive load manipulation. Even under conditions 
of  low cognitive load the emergency situation is processed implicitly given the nature of  the 
cued reaction time task. Participants are focused on the go and no go cue, fixate on the center 
of  the screen, and are not made aware of  the special nature of  the video clips shown during 
Figure 6. A disposition to experience other-oriented feelings during situations of  distress was related to a 




the task. Related, the high cognitive load condition might result in restriction of  perceptual 
processes and lead to a form of  attentional unawareness of  the actual stimuli, that is the 
emergency situation. 
Another more likely explanation is the notion that prosocial behavior is not solely linked 
to, or predicted by, intuitive, automatic and reflexive processes. Several studies suggest that 
the perception of  distress in another individual serves as a function of  attentional processes 
(Gu & Han, 2007; Rameson et al., 2012). In an intriguing study, Cowell and Decety (2015) 
investigated the interplay between event-related potentials linked to automaticity and 
top-down control and prosocial behavior in children between three and five years of  age. 
First, children passively observed scenes that showed either pro- or antisocial behavior of  
cartoon figures while simultaneously recording ERPs. Following this, children were given 
the opportunity to share their reward with another, anonymous, child. Results showed that 
while both early and late ERPs show distinguishable patterns to the observation of  pro- and 
antisocial acts, only the late waveform, related to controlled processes, predicted sharing 
behavior. 
There is a growing body of  evidence on how empathic responses, ranging from a cognitive 
understanding to an affective reaction, are modulated by situational and dispositional factors, 
but a crucial aspect is the behavior to provide help when confronted with an individual in 
need (C. D. Batson, 2009). A wide variety of  studies have provided important insight into 
the person-by-situation interaction (for example Batson:1987wa Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; 
Romer et al., 1986), neural mechanisms (FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, Evans, & Mobbs, 2015; 
Marsh et al., 2014), and neurocomputational processes (for example Hutcherson, Bushong, & 
Rangel, 2015), that contribute to the occurrence of  helping behavior and functional altruism. 
However, this behavior is complex with several proximate causes. This explains why so far 
no one single trait or a combined set of  traits or predictors have been found. It is likely, as 
also suggested by the present result, that helping behavior is the result of  a complex interplay 
between intuitive, reflexive and deliberate, reflective mechanisms. 
In an important review, Graziano and Habashi (2015)suggest that there are not necessary 
distinguishable prosocial traits. Researchers should instead ‘think of  dispositions as parts 
of  processes and systems’, where ‘prosocial dispositions are summary terms for observed 
processes’ (p. 250). They suggest that the prosocial and ultimately altruistic personality are 
built up from thoughts (e.g., intent, beliefs), feelings (e.g., empathy), and behavior that are 
highly linked and correlated and are the result of  a motivational system. The dual-process, 
sequential opponent motivational system (W. G. Graziano & Habashi, 2010; W. G. Graziano 
& Tobin, 2009) nicely fits recent theoretical accounts on empathy (Zaki, 2014) and altruism 
(Preston, 2013) and provides the foundation for a wide variety of  prosocial behaviors. As the 
name suggests two opposing evolutionary conserved motivational systems are sequentially 
activated when one is confronted with an emergency or other distressful event, the fight-
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freeze-flight and parental care system. Helping behavior is the complex interplay of  these 
two systems that differ in terms of  automaticity. The fixed action patterns of  the first system 
are related to distress (process A) and a freezing response, and consequently inhibits helping 
behavior. The slower system of  parental care counteracts these processes (process B) and 
is sympathy-driven and facilitates the occurrence of  helping behavior and other forms of  
prosocial behavior. This later system explains the present and previous results (Hortensius, 
Schutter & de Gelder, under review). In line with the strong link between sympathy and 
prosocial behavior (M. H. Davis, 2015), we observed that sympathy was related to reduced 
distance to the perpetrator, self-reported intuitive decision-making style (present study), and 
faster responding to an emergency (Hortensius, Schutter & de Gelder, under review). Thus, 
prosocial thoughts, feelings and behavior are the result of  one overarching sympathy-driven 
system (for example Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995) that can differ in terms of  
automaticity. For example, a belief  system of  the individual in which helping behavior is seen 
as automatic, reflexive, internal might be beneficial to actual occurrence of  helping behavior 
(Bierhoff, Klein, & Kramp, 1991; Rand et al., 2014; Rand & Epstein, 2014). 
In conclusion, we have used a multilevel approach and incorporated behavioral reactivity, self-
reported decision-making, and proxemics during Immersive Virtual Reality to study helping 
behavior during a violent conflict. Results showed that faster responses to an emergency 
situation while cognition is not restricted are predictive of  later helping behavior and suggest 
an important role for a disposition to experience other-oriented responses to distress in the 








The goal of  this thesis was to provide insights into the neural mechanisms of  the reactive 
aspects of  social interaction. How is the human brain equipped to deal with the wide range 
of  social emotional situations that occur in daily life? From helping an older woman that fell 
on the ground, to confrontation with an aggressive individual that harasses an innocent man. 
This thesis was divided into two parts. Part I dealt with the perception of  and reaction to 
threat signals, while part II studied the prosocial consequences of  the perception of  distress. 
A multidimensional framework was used with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in the healthy and damaged brain, and eye-
tracking complementing behavioral testing. In an exciting new endeavor, immersive virtual 
reality was used to study helping behavior in a naturalistic setting. In this chapter, the results 
of  the empirical work (Table 1) and their theoretical implications will be discussed and 
integrated. This will be done for part I and II separately. In a last section several new and 
important directions for future research derived from this thesis will be described.
Part I – Summary and discussion
We are confronted with threat almost at a daily basis. Fortunately, we are well equipped to 
deal with such situations. The first part of  this thesis, chapter 2 – 4, focused on the neural 
architecture that allows humans to cope with threat. A working model based on the dual route 
perspective of  affective perception as outlined in de Gelder, Hortensius and Tamietto (2012) 
Table 1. A one-sentence summary of  the main findings of  this thesis
Chapter Main finding
Part I The Devil – Threat
2
Increase in motor corticospinal excitability regardless of  direction of  anger, while an emotion by direction interaction 
underlies explicit recognition 
3
Reflexive gaze behavior to angry bodily but not facial expressions in high dominant people and this is likely to be 
mediated by detection but not recognition of  the signal
4
A disruption in a prefrontal midline – temporal pole – inferior parietal lobule network during threat processing after 
damage to the basolateral amygdala
Part II Sympathy – Distress
5
A decrease in activity in the pre- and postcentral gyrus and medial prefrontal cortex with an increase in bystanders 
during an emergency
6 Personal distress predicts the negative effect of  bystanders on responding to an emergency
7




served as a starting point. Together, the results obtained in the first part concur with the notion 
of  two separate but interrelated pathways for detection and recognition, which underlie 
important changes at the level of  physiology, perception, behavior, and phenomenology. The 
results from chapter 2 and 3 highlight the importance of  fast and reflexive reactions to 
threat that are mediated by the detection route, while chapter 4 shows that damage to one 
specific region leads to a cascade of  changes across the detection and recognition routes 
(Figure 1). 
Defensive distance and threat
When confronted with threat several distinct reactions occur in the individual that mediate 
the fight, flight or freeze response. These reactions range from effects on attention (Notebaert, 
Crombez, Van Damme, De Houwer, & Theeuwes, 2010; 2011; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2015a; 2015b; Vuilleumier, 2005), startle response (Lang et al., 1990), heart rate 
(F. K. Graham & Clifton, 1966; Hagenaars et al., 2014), fast facial reactions (Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 1998; Grèzes, Philip, Chadwick, Dezecache, Soussignan, et al., 2013b), motor 
corticospinal excitability (Borgomaneri et al., 2015b; Schutter et al., 2008b), and muscles 
activity (Huis In ‘t Veld, van Boxtel, & de Gelder, 2014a; 2014b). As described in chapter 1 
the defensive system is the combined result of  approach or avoidance motivation and defensive 
distance. The latter aspect is largely overlooked in the literature on human threat processing. 
One intriguing and timely study is that by Åhs and colleagues (2015). In a series of  four 
experiments that incorporated immersive virtual reality (IVR) and basic psychophysiology, 
the authors showed that interpersonal distance influenced defensive avoidance. That is, 
interpersonal distance increased startle amplitude and fear memories, and distance to a 
Figure 1. The results of  the first part of  the thesis in a simplified graphical representation of  the two parallel 
routes as described in the working model. The arrow in the dorsal stream reflects the detection route, while the arrow in 
the ventral stream denotes the recognition route. The detection route underlies the increase in motor corticospinal excitability for 
anger regardless of  direction (chapter 2), the reflexive gaze behavior to angry bodily expressions in high dominant people (chapter 
3), while activity in this stream is enhanced during the processing of  threat after BLA damage (chapter 4). The recognition route 
underlies the emotion by direction interaction found in the recognition task (chapter 2), and processing in this route is impaired after 
BLA damage (chapter 4). Please note, this is a very simplified representation as the routes are not exclusive and major parts of  the 




virtual human that served as a previous fear cue was increased and transferable to a new 
environment. Going beyond defensive avoidance, the authors observed decreased startle 
amplitude to proximal cues that served as rewards, indicative of  defensive approach. 
In keeping with the importance of  defensive distance, chapter 2 reported on a single-
pulse TMS study that investigated defensive reactions in the observer to threat with variable 
direction. The movement of  the threatening person was either towards or away from the 
observer resulting in proximal or distal threat. Single-pulse TMS was used to measure motor 
evoked potentials in response to brief  presentations of  angry, fearful or neutral individuals 
that jumped towards or away the observer. In addition, participants completed a three-
alternative forced-choice emotion recognition task. The results showed differential effects of  
threat direction on the level of  physiology and explicit recognition. An incongruence effect 
was observed for explicit recognition of  anger and fear. That is, anger was better recognized 
when directed towards the observer compared with when directed away, while the opposite 
pattern was found for fear. In contrast to explicit recognition, motor corticospinal excitability 
did not serve as a function of  direction. In the face of  anger, motor corticospinal excitability 
levels increased independent of  direction compared to fear and neutral signals. 
These results nicely dovetail with the dual route perspective. First, automatic reactions 
to threat, at least as measured with motor corticospinal excitability, are not influenced by 
direction. A rapid detection route mediates this direction-independent processing of  threat. 
This would allow for fast perception-action coupling thereby increasing behavioral flexibility 
in the face of  threat. In this study anger regardless of  direction was likely the signal with the 
highest threat value for the observer. Within the second route the emotional content together 
with the direction, and thus relevance to the individual, is extracted. This framework is in 
line with other observations. A recent study found that relevance of  bodily threat modulates 
activation in a frontal-based route, but not in an emotion-action route that includes regions 
such as the amygdala and premotor area (Grèzes, Adenis, Pouga, & Armony, 2013a). A 
different line of  research suggest that contextual effect on facial (Sinke et al., 2012; Van den 
Stock, Vandenbulcke, Sinke, Goebel, & de Gelder, 2014b) and bodily expression perception 
(Van den Stock et al., 2014a) are present in ventral regions such as the extrastriate body 
area and parahippocampal place area, but not in regions implicated in the detection route. 
An outstanding question is how top-down processes, or the recognition route, modulate this 
initial, possibly aberrant detection of  and reaction to threat signals. 
Functional significance of  bodily threat
One important aspect of  reaction to threat is the reflex-like nature of  the reaction and the 
personality of  the individual. Even under conditions of  attentional and sensory unawareness 
(Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010), threatening signals result in distinct consequences. A recent 
meta-analyses found evidence for an attentional bias towards threat in anxious individuals 
even in the absence of  visual awareness of  the signal (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
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Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). Given the importance of  emotional signals in building 
and maintaining social hierarchies, one would expect that this is also the case for behavioral 
patterns of  dominance and submission. This is indeed observed (Terburg & van Honk, 2013; 
van Honk & Schutter, 2007). 
Extending the literature, the results of  chapter 3 showed that inter-individual differences in 
dominance predicted gaze-aversion to non-conscious presented bodily expressions of  anger. 
Dominance traits were positively related to slower gaze-aversion from angry compared to 
happy bodily and face and body compound expressions. Interestingly, this was not found for 
gaze-aversion from facial expressions in isolation. A follow-up study showed that the possible 
mechanism for this contrast between faces and bodies lies in the detection of  the category, but 
not in the recognition of  the emotional content. That is, the observer is aware of  the body but 
not the emotional value of  the body. 
These findings not only confirm the dual route of  affective perception, but also emphasize 
the functional significance of  bodily expressions of  threat. Emotional signals have so far only 
been discussed as one largely coherent signal in this thesis. However, the smaller building 
blocks of  social interaction are made up of  verbal and non-verbal cues, for example facial, 
vocal, and bodily expressions. The field of  social affective neuroscience was until recently 
largely “face-centric”. This is well illustrated by the literature on neuroimaging of  emotion 
perception. The first neuroimaging study on emotional face perception was already published 
in 1993 (George et al., 1993), shortly followed by sounds (George et al., 1996), and pictures 
(Lane et al., 1997). Only in 2003 the first study on emotional body expression perception was 
published (Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003). While largely ignored in the beginning days of  
social affective neuroscience, bodily expressions have now widely been used to study neural 
processes underlying social interaction (de Gelder et al., 2010; de Gelder & Hortensius, 
2014; Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014; Grosbras & Paus, 2006). Importantly, several naturalistic 
observations and neuroscientific findings point to the functional dominance of  the body over 
the face in signaling threat. 
Think of  how animals establish dominance, or how animals fight, and the significance of  
the body will immediately become clear. Bodily expressions are primary emotional signals, 
complemented by facial and vocal expressions. This is also well appreciated in humans. An 
aggressive person with arms sweeping around the body, fists clenched, and shoulders up high, 
is a looming stimulus that warrants fast reactions. Bodily expressions have a high biological 
relevance, ecological validity, and tight action-coupling (de Gelder, 2009). If  an evolutionary 
conserved mechanism underlies the detection and perception of  emotional expressions, this 
would be certainly not be biased towards the processing of  facial expressions. 
Directly contrasting neural activation during conscious perception of  face and body 




activation in regions such as the extrastriate body area and temporoparietal junction but also 
inferior parietal lobule and superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Kret et al., 2011).These last two 
areas have been implicated in the detection of  threatening bodily expressions. Stimulation of  
the IPL resulted in increased detection of  changes in fearful bodily expressions (Engelen et 
al., 2015). Likewise, not only did stimulation of  the STS results in a selective increase in the 
detection of  changes in threatening body postures (Candidi, Stienen, Aglioti, & de Gelder, 
2011), disrpution of  this area increases the awareness of  a fearful body, but not fearful face 
(Candidi, Stienen, Aglioti, & de Gelder, 2015). However, the results of  chapter 3 showed 
differences between faces and bodies under conditions of  non-conscious perception. This 
poses the question if  bodies are more efficiently processed.
In a recent study, we used breaking continuous flash suppression (CFS-b) to shed more light 
on this issue (Zhan, Hortensius, & de Gelder, 2015). With CFS-b the suppression time of  a 
stimulus can be measured and this provides important clues on non-conscious processing (T. 
Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011). For example, CFS-b results showed that faces and bodies are 
preferentially processed (T. Stein, Sterzer, & Peelen, 2012). In this recent study we measured 
the differences in suppression time between neutral, fearful, and angry facial and bodily 
expressions (Zhan et al., 2015). Crucially, opposite suppression times for angry facial and 
bodily expressions were observed. While angry faces were suppressed for a longer duration 
compared to neutral and fearful faces, angry bodies broke suppression faster compared to 
fearful and neutral bodies. As the duration outside of  awareness is the combined sum of  
the content of  the stimulus (e.g., face or body, and emotion) and low-level visual effects (e.g., 
contrast, luminance), we controlled for low-level visual effects. While the suppression time 
was indeed influenced by some lower-level visual properties of  the stimuli, this explained the 
results only to a very small extent and did not change the results. The dominant factor that 
modulated suppression time was still the emotional content of  the stimulus. 
Detection and recognition of  social threat
Together these findings suggest that threat is better communicated by bodily compared to 
facial expression. Indeed, while some studies found a detection advantage for angry facial 
expression (for example E. Fox et al., 2000), a recent meta-analysis found no detection or 
recognition advantage for angry facial expressions (Nummenmaa & Calvo, 2015). While 
facial and bodily expressions are the most commonly perceived social emotional signals, they 
are hardly ever perceived in isolation. The emotion signal is most often a blend of  facial and 
bodily expressions. Proper integration is crucial for defensive reactions.
The aim of  the last chapter of  the first part, chapter 4, was to investigate the effect of  
basolateral amygdala (BLA) damage on the processing of  face body compounds. The BLA 
is a crucial region in the processing of  threat. Five participants with Urbach-Wiethe disease 
(UWDs) who have focal BLA damage and twelve matched controls viewed congruent and 
incongruent face-body compounds. Results showed that BLA damage leads to differential 
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activity in a prefrontal midline (PFC) – temporal pole (TP) – inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 
network. First, UWDs compared to controls showed more activation for fearful versus happy 
bodies in the right IPL, but less in the left fusiform gyrus. Crucially, the latter region showed 
increased functional connectivity with the left IPL in the UWDs compared to controls. While 
under the same task conditions, the right IPL showed increased coupling with the right 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex in UWDs compared to controls. Second, when facial 
and bodily expressions were shown simultaneously as part of  a compound stimulus but differ 
in valence, decreased activation in the bilateral TP, but increased activity in the prefrontal 
midline, that is the right medial orbitofrontal, ventromedial prefrontal, and dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex was observed in UWDs compared to controls. Results from the functional 
connectivity analyses were inline with this division between the prefrontal- and temporal 
network. 
These results provide new information on aberrant functional integration of, and reaction to, 
social stimuli after BLA damage that could potentially lead to hypersensitivity for threat. As 
the functional roles of  the individual nodes in this PFC-TP-IPL network have been extensively 
described in chapter 4, the importance of  integration of  multiple emotional signals and the 
dual route will shortly be commented on. Perception is not straightforward. How we perceive 
and thus react to the world is influenced by host of  factors. Perception is in essence biased. 
When confronted with threatening situations recognition follows detection. Rapid crude 
processing is followed by a more careful analysis of  the situation. As the two routes run in 
parallel and are connected, a variety of  changes with varying results can occur. For example, 
early emotion processing either mediated by the subcortical or cortical pathway can bias 
upstream processing in the recognition route. A brief  view of  a defensive posture with a smile 
can bias the processing towards the former. The initial labeling of  a non-threatening signal as 
threatening at an early stage could potentially result in not only reflexive reactions, but also 
conscious recognition of  the situation as threatening. The possible reflexive reaction that is 
normally counteracted in the case of  a false alarm by inhibitory processes might take place 
in the absence of  such control mechanism. In sum, there are multiple ways in which initial 
or late atypical processing of  emotional signals result in perceptual and possible behavioral 
deficits, and the proper integration of  emotional signals is crucial. 
For example, Kret and de Gelder (Kret & de Gelder, 2013) showed across a series of  
four experiments that not only are male violent offenders more distracted by angry males 
and confuse a fearful male for an angry male, they have a deficit in combining different 
emotional signals. When a happy face is paired with an angry body, the percept in the violent 
offenders is biased towards the bodily expression. Similarly, the presentation of  a person 
with a neutral expression in a threatening context increased activation in the extrastriate 
body area (Sinke et al., 2012), in line with a perceptual bias effect (de Gelder & Bertelson, 
2003). Conscious interpretation can also bias processing of  social situations, as is the case 




boys, when confronted with an ambiguous social situation involving another individual were 
more likely to judge the intent of  the other person as hostile instead of  benign. In total, an 
adequate defensive system in response to threat depends on a delicate interplay between a 
rapid detection-reaction system and slower recognition abilities. 
Part II – Summary and discussion
While threat and other negative aspects of  social interaction play an important role in 
everyday life, so do empathy and prosocial behavior. In the second and last part of  this thesis, 
chapter 5 – 6, the influence of  contextual and dispositional factors on the perception of  
and reaction to distress and the occurrence of  helping behavior was investigated. Together, 
the results of  the second part provide an important new perspective on the bystander effect 
and helping behavior and fit the Dual-Process Sequential Opponent Motivational System. 
The results of  chapter 5 and 6 provide an explanation for the bystander effect that goes 
beyond higher-order cognitive mechanisms and explanations and provide evidence for a 
negative effect of  bystanders already at the level of  action preparatory processes. The results 
of  chapter 7 show that behavioral reactivity under low cognitive load to an emergency 
predicts later helping behavior during a violent conflict. 
Beyond cognitive explanations for the bystander effect
In the late sixties, Latané and Darley (1970) initiated an extensive research program on the 
effect of  bystanders on helping behavior during an emergency. Since their seminal first paper 
on the bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968), this reduction in helping behavior in the 
presence of  others has been widely observed (Latané & Nida, 1981). A recent meta-analysis 
comprising data of  7,700 participants from 53 articles showed an effect size of  -0.35 (Fischer 
et al., 2011). While many studies have been performed since, the explanations have not 
evolved much after the first description by Latané and Darley (1970). The three psychological 
processes that affect the decision to act, diffusion of  responsibility, evaluation apprehension 
and pluralistic ignorance, are still the dominant explanations for the bystander effect. 
However, several aspects are unknown or unexplained. While a situational and cognitive 
approach is crucial, it forgets the more automatic, implicit, reflex-like processes that are likely 
to occur when one is confronted with another individual in need of  help, and ignores a large 
body of  work from contemporary research on empathy, helping and other prosocial behavior 
(Preston, 2013; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Zaki, 2014), as well as emotion (Frijda, 1986). What 
if  the bystander effect is studied from a different angle, using a bottom-up approach that 
takes into account naturalistic observation and experimental findings from social affective 
neuroscience that stresses the reactivity aspect of  social interaction? As has been showed 
and discussed throughout this thesis the notion that the observation of  a threatening signal 
is directly coupled with action is well appreciated. There are no substantial arguments to 
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suggest that this is not the case for emergency situations. Contemplating a situation is unlikely 
to be the most adaptive response. To act upon the situation by preparation of  action plans 
will give the organism a temporal advantage and increases behavioral flexibility by selecting 
the most adaptive response. It seems unlikely that only a conscious decision precedes helping 
behavior. This then, should also be reflected in the neural consequences when observing an 
emergency in the presence of  bystanders.
The aim of  chapter 5 was to investigate the neural basis of  the bystander effect. To tap into 
implicit processing participants performed a color-naming task. In this task three colored 
dots are shown and participants indicated whether these dots had the same or whether 
they had different colors. Crucially, the dots are presented during a movie of  an emergency 
with varying number of  bystanders (none, one, two and four). Confirming our hypothesis, 
the results showed a decrease in activity with the increase in group size in the left pre- and 
postcentral gyri and left medial prefrontal cortex. The increase in bystanders resulted in a 
parametric increase in activation in vision- and attention-related regions, including the right 
superior occipital and lingual gyrus. 
These findings suggest that an increase in bystanders during an emergency coincides with 
a decrease in activity in brain regions important for preparation for action and situation-
response coupling. In view of  tranditional explanations of  the bystander effect one would 
expect to find the involvement of  the so-called metalizing and/or empathy network (Kennedy 
& Adolphs, 2012). While these networks are often found to be activated in the face of  distress 
(Lamm et al., 2011), no bystander-related increase or decrease in activity was found. This is 
not surprising given that the majority of  published studies focused on deliberate observation 
of  an individual’s suffering using stimuli that are quite distant from situations one would 
encounter in daily life (for example a needle penetrating a hand). Chapter 5 focused on 
the neural consequence of  an unintentional and implicit observation of  an emergency with 
bystanders, a situation that, unfortunately, appeals to everyday life. Likewise, everyday life 
is not an emotion recognition task. The study of  implicit observations of  social situations 
is a interesting and valuable new approach to understand the neural mechanisms that 
drive possible behavioral reactions of  an individual (de Gelder & Hortensius, 2014), and 
is necessary for going beyond emotional labeling and cognitive processes. For example, 
observing a situation in which an individual threatens another individual increased activation 
in the premotor area and putamen independent of  attentional demands (Sinke et al., 2010). 
In a recent fMRI study, we showed the influence of  personality factors and the focus of  
attention during a violent conflict (aggressor or victim) in a network encompassing categorical 
and emotion areas (Van den Stock, Hortensius, Sinke, Goebel, & de Gelder, 2015a). 
As discussed in the general introduction (chapter 1) and throughout this thesis preparation 
for action plays an important role in social interaction. The results of  the fMRI study in 




activation in the MPFC might suggest a decoupling between the situation and response. A 
study by Rameson and colleagues (2012) showed the importance of  this region in helping 
behavior. Activity in the MPFC was positively correlated with daily helping behavior and 
activity in the same region was enhanced in participants with higher trait levels of  empathy 
when implicitly confronted with distressed individuals. While the fMRI results already pointed 
towards a negative effect of  bystanders on action processes, several questions remain. How 
do dispositional factors influence this effect, and can we use more sensitive measures that go 
beyond reverse inference?
Personal distress and the bystander effect
The effects of  personality traits on helping behavior have been largely ignored in studies of  
the bystander effect. As an illustration consider the following. The only hit for the keyword 
‘personality’ in the recent meta-analysis that encompassed ~40 years of  research (Fischer et 
al., 2011) was with journal names in the reference list (for example ‘Journal of  Personality 
and Social Psychology’). The general thought is that situational factors on helping behavior 
dominate possible personality influences. Despite this wide held belief, some researchers 
have studied the contribution of  dispositional factors in social norm following (Darley & 
Latané, 1968), masculinity (Tice & Baumeister, 1985), and embarrassment (Zoccola, Green, 
Karoutsos, Katona, & Sabini, 2011). So far, no personality traits have been identified that 
are consistently related to bystander effect. However, in other fields of  psychology the effects 
of  inter-individual differences on helping behavior have been widely appreciated. The work 
led by Batson and Eisenberg in the 1980s showed the importance of  sympathy and personal 
distress in helping behavior (for example C. D. Batson et al., 1987; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). 
To date, no direct testing of  the influence of  these factors on the reaction to distress when 
bystanders are present has been performed. 
To fill this gap, the research described in chapter 6 investigated the interplay between a 
disposition to experience sympathy and personal distress and the bystander effect in four 
experiments. It was hypothesized that only personal distress would predict the negative 
effect of  bystanders on responding to an emergency. Indeed, in the first experiment without 
bystanders, both sympathy and personal distress were related to faster responses to an 
emergency. However, experiment 2 showed that perspective taking and not personal distress 
predicted the slowing in reaction times with an increasing number of  bystanders during an 
emergency. In a follow-up experiment, single-pulse TMS was used to get a direct readout of  
the motor system during the reaction to an emergency. Results showed that personal distress 
was the only predictor of  the decrease in motor corticospinal excitability with the increase 
in bystanders during an emergency. In the last experiment, a cued-reaction time task with 
cognitive load manipulation was used to test if  personal distress was associated with a negative 
effect of  bystanders on reflexive preparation for action. Indeed, personal distress predicted 
slower responses to an emergency with bystanders compared to no bystanders during a high 
cognitive load manipulation. 
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First and foremost, these results indicate that the bystander effect is not the same for every 
individual. The negative effect of  bystanders is most apparent in people with a disposition 
to experience personal distress, which is a self-centered emotional reaction to the distress 
of  others. Thus, unlike some researchers have suggested (Gilovich & Eibach, 2001; Ross, 
2001), a person-by-situation interaction is possible and valid. Second, the results provide a 
complementary explanation for the bystander effect. When confronted with an emergency, 
the presence of  bystanders already influences processes that are more related to reflexive, 
automatic consequences. The decrease in initial action preparation could be the first trigger 
that leads to a decrease in likelihood of  helping. Diffusion of  responsibility, evaluation 
apprehension, and pluralistic ignorance could be post-hoc cognitive interpretations of  the 
lack of  intervention by the individual. That is, the real ‘bystander effect’ takes place at a much 
lower and more reflexive level. Third, as will be explained below, the results are compatible 
with the Dual-Process Sequential Opponent Motivational System as proposed by Graziano 
and colleagues (2010; 2009).
Together with the results from chapter 5 and 6, the Dual-Process Sequential Opponent 
Motivational System provides a necessary framework to describe the effect of  bystanders on 
reflexive action-related processes that are likely to occur before the five-step perception-to-
decision model of  Latané and Darley (1970). As described in chapter 1, two motivational 
but opponent systems, fight-freeze-flight system (Process A) and parental care (Process B) 
are activated in sequence when encountering a novel or distressful event. Crucially, personal 
distress and sympathy are related to the first and second system, respectively. The presence 
of  bystanders during an emergency situation selectively increases the automatic activated 
Process A in people with a disposition to experience self-centered emotional reactions to 
distress (Figure 2A). As the two processes oppose each other the net effect is a dominance 
of  Process A over B. This increased distress and activation of  the fight-freeze-flight system 
results in situation-response decoupling and reduced preparation for action. Ultimately no 
helping occurs either as the consequence of  a freezing response or avoidance of  the situation. 
Of  course, this is not to say to the previous explanations are obsolete. In an intriguing recent 
study 5-year-old children refrained from helping when other children were present (Plötner, 
Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2015). When the other bystanders were visibly unable to help, 
the children did help - albeit slower than in the no bystander situation. While this suggests 
that diffusion of  responsibility is a crucial explanation for the bystander effect, the effect 
of  distress could run parallel to the five-step sequence of  Latané and Darley (1970), and 
influences these more explicit processes.
Sympathy and helping behavior
Of  course there are situations in which the bystander effect is less present. Dangerous 
situations with perpetrators present (Fischer et al., 2011), as well as in-group membership 
of  the victim (Slater et al., 2013) reduce the bystander effect. Are there also factors within 




Samaritan (I. M. Piliavin & Rodin, 1969)? Previous research mainly looked at the link between 
perception of  distress and prosocial behavior (Cowell & Decety, 2015; for example Marsh et 
al., 2007; Marsh & Ambady, 2007). Given the results of  chapter 5 and 6 and the theoretical 
perspective of  this thesis, a next question is if  inter-individual differences in reflexive- and 
reflective-like behavioral reactivity to an emergency are predictive of  helping behavior. 
Chapter 7 combined the previously created cued-reaction time task with immersive virtual 
reality to predict helping behavior during a violent conflict. The experiment consisted of  two 
parts. The participants, all supporters of  F.C. Barcelona, first completed the cued-reaction 
time task with a low and high cognitive load manipulation, followed by the virtual reality 
scenario. In the midst of  a conversation between the participants and a fellow supporter 
in a virtual bar, a supporter of  a rival team started verbally attacking the fellow supporter. 
This conflict eventually escalated into a physical fight. During this conflict the verbal and 
physical interventions of  the participant were measured. The outcomes were three-fold. 
First, participants whom reacted faster to an emergency situation under low cognitive load 
intervened more during the violent conflict. This was not found for behavioral reactivity 
measured during high cognitive load. Second, participants who described the decision to 
intervene as more reflex-like provided more help during the violent conflict. Third, a 
disposition to experience sympathy was related to a tendency to describe the decision to act 
as more reflex-like and importantly to a reduced distance to the perpetrator. The latter result 
can be seen as helping behavior by proxy.
Besides important theoretical contributions chapter 7 provides new methodological tools 
and shows the value of  a focus on the behavioral consequences when perceiving distress. 
The cued-reaction time task allows for measuring reaction times to an emergency in a covert 
setting and these are predictive of  real helping behavior. It allows for the assessment of  
behavioral inclinations in a novel way both in an inter-individual and an inter-group setting. 
But how do the results of  chapter 7 and the first experiment of chapter 6 fit the Dual-
Process Sequential Opponent Motivational System?
The two processes of  distress and sympathy (Process A and B) are sequentially activated in 
an individual when observing an emergency situation. For helping behavior to occur Process 
B needs to counteract the early inhibition of  Process A on helping behavior. Graziano and 
Habashi (2010) describe two possibilities for this, time and repeated exposure. First, while 
Process A is at the beginning the sole activated system it decreases over time. This allows for the 
slower activated Process B to counteract Process A. One would predict that the likelihood of  
helping increases when sufficient time has passed. Second, repeated exposure to emergencies 
and other distressful situations might change the strength of  the two systems in a similar way 
as repeated exposure to drugs (Solomon, 1980; Solomon & Corbit, 1974). Over time repeated 
confrontations with distress results in a decreased strength of  Process A but increased strength 
of  Process B. Moreover, Process B is activated earlier in time. The end result is a stronger 
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dominance of  Process B over Process A, thus sympathy over distress, and care system over 
fight-freeze-flight system (Figure 2B). The results of  chapter 7 hint at the notion that a 
stronger disposition to experience sympathy might also facilitate the relative dominance of  
Process B over A. It remains elusive if  a stronger disposition to experience sympathy is related 
to history of  repeated exposure or that it reflects a natural tendency or a combination of  
both (Eisenberg, 2000). Exposure to distress could serve as a way to influence these opponent 
processes (for example Hagenaars, Mesbah, & Cremers, 2015) and ultimately increase later 
helping behavior. In sum, while the bystander effect is likely to affect Process A, distress, an 
increase in helping is linked to an increase in Process B, sympathy. Like confrontations with 
threat, reactions to a distressful event really seem to boil down to elements of  approach and 
avoidance and individual differences in these motivational tendencies. 
The shape of  social affective neuroscience to come
This thesis comments upon a wide variety of  phenomena experienced in social emotional life. 
Where do we, social affective neuroscientists, go from here? How do we achieve a complete 
understanding of  active and everyday social interaction? In this last section the potential 
of  Immersive Virtual Reality will be described, a technique that will allow a new vista on 
the positive and negative consequences of  threat and distress perception and ultimately on 
human social life.
Figure 2. The effect of  a disposition to experience self-centered and other-oriented emotional reactions to distress 
and the occurrence of  helping behavior. The observation of  an emergency with bystanders selectively increases Process A 
in people with a disposition to experience self-centered empathic reactions (A). In contrast, a disposition to experience sympathy, 
other-oriented feelings, results in both an earlier and enhanced activation of  Process B, while simultaneously reducing Process A 
(B). As helping behavior is the net result of  the two opposing processes the likelihood decreases when Process A is enhanced, due 
to a dominance of  the fight-freeze-flight system over the care system. An opposite patterns is observed when Process B is increased. 
Figures based on the work by Graziano and colleagues (2010; 2009) and Piliavin (1982). Gray glow indicates the possible effect 




While the field of  social affective neuroscience provides great new insight into social life, a word 
of  caution is warranted as several weaknesses and challenges remain. A typical experiment, 
as reported in the literature as well as in this thesis, involves a participant explicitly labeling 
an emotional expression, or observing the pain of  another individual, or making decisions to 
donate money to a third party, all in the same situational context, a computer in a room on 
a university campus. Topics studied in the field largely revolve around concepts focusing on 
internal processes, such as self-knowledge, attitudes, and theory of  mind (Lieberman, 2012), 
and revolve around three stages of  social information processing, social perception, social 
cognition, and social regulation (Adolphs, 2010). Arguably, several aspects need adjustments. 
One stage is clearly missing, social action, as the reactive aspect of  social interaction is 
ignored, and situations used are nowhere near real life. We need an active perspective on 
social interaction, with a full affective loop, that studies real behavior in a variety of  situations 
(de Gelder & Hortensius, 2014). Virtual Reality provides great promises to achieve that and 
chapter 7 is a first attempt.
One of  the most important psychological experiments is hard to replicate. Not because of  
scientific reasons, but because of  ethical arguments. It is almost impossible to get ethical 
approval to perform an exact or relatively similar experiment. Of  course, this refers to the 
Milgram’s obedience experiment (Milgram, 1963). However using IVR Slater and colleagues 
(Slater et al., 2006) created an obedience paradigm and observed physiological, behavioral 
and phenomenological reactions as if  the situation was real. IVR provides the possibility to 
study social behavior in situations that cannot be created in reality because of  ethics, financial 
cost or danger to the participant or experimenter. It allows unique ways to study the neural 
mechanisms of  threat and distress. From an attack with a knife to the hand (Gonzalez-Franco, 
Peck, Rodriguez-Fornells, & Slater, 2014), to witnessing a gun attack in a museum (Friedman 
et al., 2014), or solitary confinement in a Guantanamo Bay-like prison (la Peña et al., 2010), 
the possibilities are endless. 
With the ultimate combination of  high experimental control and profound realism (Blascovich 
et al., 2002), while simultaneously measuring consistent and genuine reactions in the individual 
despites the virtual aspect (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005), IVR provides the field of  social 
affective neuroscience with a crucial next step. Already several studies have incorporated IVR 
to looked at defensive responses to virtual threat as well as prosocial behavior. For example, 
a follow-up fMRI study on the virtual Milgram experiment showed that the perception of  
pain in the virtual human activated brain regions related to emotion processing, such as 
the amygdala, and posterior cingulate (Cheetham, Pedroni, Antley, Slater, & Jäncke, 2009). 
Interestingly, trait levels of  personal distress influenced activity in these regions. Thereby 
showing the potential of  IVR to elucidate the neural mechanisms of  perception of  and 
reaction to distress and the role of  motivational processes in these processes.
Virtual reality also allows the embodiment of  an individual in another person (Banakou, 
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Groten, & Slater, 2013; Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, & Slater, 2013; Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-
Vives, & Blanke, 2010), going from cognitive perspective taking to first-person perspective 
taking, with important consequences (Maister, Slater, Sanchez-Vives, & Tsakiris, 2015). 
Embodiment of  white participants in a black body for less then 12 minutes reduced their 
implicit racial bias (Peck et al., 2013). Similar changes in implicit associations to children have 
been observed (Banakou et al., 2013). The potential of  IVR in increasing prosocial behavior 
has been noted. For example, the embodiment in a virtual superhero with the ability to fly 
increased helping behavior afterwards (Rosenberg, Baughman, & Bailenson, 2013). 
As a last example of  the potential of  IVR for the field consider the following. While it would 
be impossible and unethical to repeatedly expose participants to threat or a violent conflict 
or bystander situations, IVR would easily allow this. For example, it could directly test the 
theoretical model described in the previous part. Will the repeated exposure to distress 
of  another individual increase the second system of  sympathy and decrease the strength 
of  the first system, thereby reducing avoidance and freeze-related responses? Ultimately, 
incorporating IVR in the study of  the social domain will provide the means to counteract 
the pitfalls of  social affective neuroscience, while simultaneously permitting new ways to test 
theoretical questions that thus far have only been envisaged. 
Conclusion
The work in this thesis described novel insights into the neural mechanisms of  positive and 
negative social interactions. By incorporating a multitude of  techniques and paradigms from 
different fields and stressing the reactive aspect of  social interaction, the different chapters 
showed how neural and psychological processes mediate the consequences of  threat and 
distress and how these are influenced by dispositional and situational factors. The framework 
of  this thesis will be of  great value to tackle outstanding questions and eventually allow for a 
full comprehension of  the impact of  social interactions on the individual. Or to end with the 
first example of  the thesis, eventually we will be able to predict and manipulate the behavioral 
consequences of  fellow commuters. Or to react with sympathy to the threat of  a stressful train 
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And now I’m sorry I missed you  
I had a secret meeting in the basement of  my brain
      – The National
Binnen de beperktheid van de taal moet ik een weg vinden om gevoelens, gedachten, of  
ervaringen te verwoorden. Dit fenomenologische probleem is op te lossen. Morrissey > 
Science, dus aan zijn hand bewandel ik dit pad.
Dit proefschrift had niet bestaan zonder mijn promotor, Beatrice de Gelder. Bea, je moet 
vaak hebben gedacht “bigmouth strikes again”, maar hier ben ik. De afgelopen jaren waren 
bijzonder, interessant, en dynamisch. Het was altijd een feest om te zien welk onderzoek we 
nu gingen doen, waar we heen gingen, wie ik ging ontmoeten, en hoe je me introduceerden 
(mijn favoriet: “my almost finished PhD friend Ruud”). Je hebt me geleerd dat het pas echt 
interessant wordt als mensen zeggen dat het onmogelijk is. Je leerde me de oneindigheid 
van de wetenschap te waarderen. Jouw enthousiasme voor de wetenschap en voor al het 
goede in het leven is aanstekelijk. Daarbij, jouw zorgvrije perspectief  is ontnuchterend en 
jaloersmakend. Dank je wel voor al het vertrouwen, de vrijheid, het plezier en je besmettelijke 
levenslust. 
Mijn copromoter, Geert van Boxtel was de rust op de achtergrond. Hoewel we niet intensief  
met elkaar hebben samengewerkt was je vooral in het eerste jaar daar waar ik mogelijk kon 
verdrinken in de oceaan van het promoveren. Het ging goed maar het was altijd fijn om te 
weten dat de rust een paar kantoren verderop zat. 
“Some men here, they have a special interest in your career. They want to help you to grow”. 
Dennis Schutter and Eddie Harmon-Jones. Before I started on this endeavor, you defined and 
kick started my career as a young scientist. Dennis, jouw enthousiasme, inspiratie, vertrouwen 
en geduld hebben me op dit pad gebracht. Ergens zag je de potentie in mij en je hebt dit altijd 
gestimuleerd. Dat je als coauteur een voorname bijdrage hebt geleverd aan dit proefschrift 
maakt me erg trots. Eddie, you offered me the freedom to pursue some new directions in your 
lab. Under your guidance the works and plays of  science were revealed. You have not only 
learned me to balance science, but also how to enjoy it best. Science can definitely be fun. 
Next, there is a whole army of  scientists that contributed to this dissertation, my research, and 
my development as a scientist. As a coauthor, collaborator, or as committee member. 
Jack van Honk, David Terburg, Dan Stein, Barak Morgan, working on the UWD project has 
always been stimulating and intriguing. It challenged me to reflect critically on my work, to 
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pursue new ideas, and appreciate different perspectives. David en Jack, jullie zijn een ander 
merk wetenschappers en dat maakt het erg verfrissend om met jullie samen te werken. 
Wen-Jui Kuo, Nissen we have sent hundreds of  emails detailing experimental procedures for 
new and exciting studies. It was always interesting to see where a vague idea from my side 
could end up. Akihiro Tanaka thank you for the possibility to use your lab to explore some 
new questions in my research.
Frans de Waal, Mel Slater, Mavi Sánchez-Vives, Rene Hurlemann, Alexander Sack, John 
Rijsman, I truly feel privileged that you serve on my committee.
I also want to thank the reviewers of  my manuscripts. Especially Stephanie D. Preston. It is a 
wonderful experience for a young scientist to receive constructive comments from an expert 
in the field in an open and transparent manner. It is this process of  constructive open peer 
review that makes science so great.  
Mijn collega’s van het Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Laboratory in Tilburg en later 
ook het Brain and Emotion Laboratory in Maastricht. Toen ik begon waren daar Charlotte, 
Bernard, Lisanne en Mehrdad. Lisanne, als twee Beo’s hebben we succesvol geworsteld met 
experimenten, fMRI, manuscripten, en promoveren in het algemeen, maar ook en eigenlijk 
alleen maar, veel plezier en grote avonturen beleefd. Dat dit alles zo succesvol is verlopen 
komt doordat jij een halfjaar eerder begonnen bent en het pad voor mij begaanbaar hebt 
gemaakt en ook door onze unieke beer-conomy. I probably owe you a beer. Later kwamen 
daar the people in Maastricht bij. Tahnée, Minye, Rebecca, Kiki, Aline, and all the others, 
it is always funny to see how you deal with a pretentious guy from up north like me. Luckily, 
Minye now starts to make jokes at my expense. 
All the labs I have visited, either for research or to give a talk. The EVENT lab in particular. 
What a smooth operation it was. Sofía, it is such a pleasure working with you on a cool and 
fascinating project that keeps on growing and growing. Solène, we have so much in common 
and working with you on the VR project was an amazing experience. Testing football fans 
while discussion Houellebecq will be the new normal for science. 
Naast de directe collega’s, waren er andere mensen die een rol speelde. Jeroen, Mirjam, 
Carlijn, Jean en alle andere die me uit het isolement van Tilburg haalden. Wetenschappers 
rusten op een solide fundament van technische en secretariële ondersteuning, student-
assistenten, interns en BSc and MSc studenten. Was het niet voor Annemay dan had ik nooit 
experiment na experiment kunnen draaien. Annemay, de wetenschap zal je missen. Armin of  
Brain Innovation, thank for your patience in explaining the nuts and bolts of  BrainVoyager 
again and again. Dank aan SPiTS, Saskia en Diana, Christl en Riny, voor de ondersteuning 
van dit avontuur. 
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Morrissey had ongelijk wanneer hij zong “we hate it when our friends become successful”. 
Geert-Jan en Ronald, mijn paranimfen, jullie succes ervaar ik ‘by proxy’. Jullie hebben mij 
door de jaren gesteund met jullie wijsheden en relativeringen. In manische en donkere tijden. 
Geert-Jan, jouw openheid, eerlijkheid en ongelofelijk kennis is uitzonderlijk en stimulerend. Je 
bent een voorbeeld. De wetenschap heeft jouw perspectief  en passie nodig. Samen voeren we 
de strijd tussen eigenheid en conformeren. Laten we nog vaak als Johnny Marr en Morrissey 
congressen bezoeken. Ronald, je hebt veel verhalen over de wetenschap moeten aanhoren. 
Avonden aan avonden, ik heb je zelfs even in de valkuil van de wetenschap laten trappen en 
dan nog sta je achter mij. Jouw talent! Het kan ook niet anders dan dat de voorkant van jouw 
hand komt. Je brengt de rust in de ander met jouw oneindige ratio. Jongens, jullie leren mij 
zoveel, ik blijf  graag in jullie schaduw staan.
Dat wetenschap en vriendschap goed samen gaan liet Japan wel zien. Het overvliegen van 
een groep vrienden naar Okazaki City voor een onderzoek was mijn antwoord op de vraag 
“maar Ruud wat doe je nu eigenlijk?”. Sommige van mijn vrienden ken ik al meer dan de 
helft van mijn leven. Jullie weten waar ik vandaan kom, zonder opsmuk. Van schreeuwende 
straatpunk tot schreeuwende wetenschapper. Het is door jullie dat ik niet –altijd– naast mijn 
schoenen loop. Toch, Bruno, Dio, David VT, Jelle, Casper, Liset, Julia, Barend, Sander v N., 
Jop, Jelte, David B., Ruud M., en alle anderen? The brains of  being pure at heart. Dr. Sander 
en Dr. Geert-Jan. Ayyayai. Onze tijd op de 20ste is voor mij het ijkpunt hoe elk lab zou moeten 
zijn. Femke en Ronald, het is zo fijn dat wij als huishonden in jullie leven mogen zijn. De 
avonden vol wijn, gesprekken over en door Ruud, en het doornemen van ‘het leven’, is alles 
wat een homeostase nodig heeft. Lisanne en Marie, geweldig dat ik jullie afspraken met Merel 
mocht verstoren door hyperactief  rond te lopen en dat jullie desondanks met champagne het 
einde kwamen vieren. 
Ooit, ver voor het promoveren, was er een voorspellend gedicht in December. Dank jullie wel 
Ineke en Mark, Martijn en Maja, Jeroen en Janna. Jullie interesse en gezelschap maakt het 
allemaal lichter. Mijn broers en zussen, ik ben zo anders, maar die ruimte geven jullie mij. 
Mijn ouders. Wie had dit ooit gedacht. Jullie hebben me altijd de rust en ruimte gegeven om 
te studeren en te doen waar mijn hoofd naar stond. Met als enige verwachting dat ik gelukkig 
werd. Dat ben ik. Dank jullie wel voor de vrijheid, steun en jullie trots.
Oh, the alcoholic afternoons  
When we sat in your room 
They meant more to me 
Than any, than any living thing on earth 
They had more worth 
Than any living thing on earth
     
     – The Smiths
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Lieve Merel, door jou, voor jou, met jou en om jou. Alles is mogelijk. Elke dag zorg je ervoor 
dat ik het beste uit alles haal. Jouw “goedemorgen wereld”, wijsheid, kracht, zorgzaamheid, 
unieke perspectief  en je oneindige liefde. Je staat naast me. Jij brengt en bent de focus. Ergens 
zijn we begonnen en nu zijn we hier. We zijn zoveel geweest en gaan zoveel worden. Samen, 
vergroeid of  verweven. De vrijheid. Het plezier. Laten nog vaak proosten op ons geluk en om 





Ruud Hortensius was born on September 3rd 1983 in Wageningen, The Netherlands, and 
spent his childhood in and around the woods and floodplains of  Elst. An underachiever in 
secondary school, he was retained one year but eventually managed to receive his HAVO di-
ploma in 2001. He chose to study Social Work at the University of  Applied Sciences Utrecht 
and he received his BSc in 2005. As he felt he wasn’t ready for working life just yet, he decided 
to become a child psychologist instead. However, during his first year studying Psychology at 
Utrecht University he followed a course on the biological foundations of  human behavior. 
It was this course, and the subsequent revelation that we are our brains, that he wanted to 
become a neuroscientist. With this renewed focus he received his BSc cum laude and enrolled 
in the Neuroscience and Cognition research master at Utrecht University in 2008. During 
his master’s he worked with Dr. Dennis Schutter, and used a combination of  electroencepha-
lography and non-invasive brain stimulation to study neurophysiological and emotional pro-
cesses. Together with Prof. Eddie Harmon-Jones at Texas A&M University, United States of  
America, he explored the role of  the frontal cortex in aggression. Maintaining a healthy hun-
ger for more, he started his PhD project with Prof. Beatrice de Gelder at Tilburg University in 
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